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Muhammad Ādil Shāh (1627-1656) and the Portuguese

BY

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The relations between the Adilshahi Kingdom of Bajapur and the Portuguese have been stated by me elsewhere[1] as "generally peaceful without being friendly." Though the Sultans of Bijapur never reconciled themselves to the loss of Goa, they could not oust the Portuguese from their coastal possessions to which these unwelcome intruders clung tenaciously by virtue of their superior naval strength. The beginning of the seventeenth century brought two other trading interests in Indian waters, the English and the Dutch. Their arrival changed, to some extent, the relationship between Bijapur and Goa and the Adilshahi Sultans were led to believe, for a time, that they could take advantage of these new forces in making once again an attempt to recover from the Portuguese the territory lost to them during the sixteenth century.

The Portuguese were for a time afraid that the Dutch intrusion on the Adilshahi coast would affect their interests. The Portuguese Viceroy writing to his government on 8th January 1623 says:[2] "I fear greatly that this will induce them to favour and admit them [the Dutch] and all others on this coast will find themselves in great difficulties. I decided to perform towards them [the Bijapuris] all possible good offices, so as to maintain the friendship they possess towards this state, and manifest to them what a wretched undertaking it would be for them to mix themselves up with such a vagabond people and of such small truth and stability as these one, and from whose commerce they will never derive any considerable profit; and by these and other warnings in which no point will be lost."

After the accession of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh to the throne of Bijapur in 1627 the Portuguese also succeeded in negotiating with

1. New Indian Antiquary, II, 359-368.
2. BM, V, 250-251.

him a treaty of friendship[3] in April 1633 by which it was agreed that the relations between the two should continue on the basis of old treaties and that the Adilshah would not enter into an alliance with the Dutch to harm Portuguese interests. This relationship seems to have continued till 1637. During this period the Adilshahi State was preoccupied in campaigns against the Hindu chiefs of Karnataka and in dealing with the Mughal advance in the Deccan which resulted in the final extinction of the Nizamshahi Kingdom in 1636. The Portuguese kept themselves well informed about these happenings as can be seen from a letter of their Viceroy to their King dated 16th November 1637.[4] "The Mogor continued to harass the king Idalcao [Adilkhan] with the war he was making to him."

The Portuguese were also watching with keenness the movements of the Dutch on the Adilshahi coast. The Dutch had been well received by the governor of Dabhol and towards the end of 1636 a small Dutch fleet appeared near Goa. From here the Dutch authorities "sent the 'Egmont' and a yatcht to pay a visit to Wingurla, which place lies in the kingdom of Visiapour. Our people were well received by the inhabitants and everything could be obtained in abundance; so that if we sent a ship there 2 hours before day-break she could be back at the fleet in the evening with 20 to 25 'leggers' of water, bucks, fouls and country fruit, and thank God they could get every thing they wanted in abundance."[5] The Dutch had thus found an easy supply base if their fleet launched on a blockade of Goa.

Early in 1637 the Dutch sent an embassy to Bijapur under van Twist[6] to obtain from Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh permission to trade in Adilshahi ports and to build a factory at Vengurla. The Sultan agreed to give these facilities to the Dutch and in return expected them to blockade Goa by sea and so support the land operations that he might launch against the Portuguese. The Portuguese Viceroy of Goa did his utmost to counteract the Dutch

3. Heras, "Some unknown dealings between Bijapur and Goa", Indian Historical Records Commission, Proceedings, VIII, 142.

4. BM, XI, 20.

5. Dagh-Register, Journal of the Bombay Historical Society, I, ii, 189.

6. I am publishing in a subsequent issue of this journal van Twist's account of his mission.

move. Reporting on van Twist's mission to his king on 5th October, 1637, the Viceroy says: "The Ambassador which the Dutch sent to the Idalcao was well received by that king, because Mamede Raza, (Muhammad Rezā) governor of Concao set all skill on this, and after keeping him there many days, he obtained a Firman to enable them to have a factory in Vingurla, where they left three Dutch, with much apparel, according to the information I have had, . . . I have neglected no means for endeavouring with all skill to oust from thence these enemies, making great efforts to that effect by means of a favourite of the said Idalcao, by name Eclascan (Ikhlas Khān) who shows himself to be very friendly towards us, to whom I sent a present in order to propitiate him further, and I also wrote to the king on that matter many times with the prudence which it behoves . . . . but . . . as those who govern this king are ill-affected towards our affairs, because by nationality they are Persians or foreigners. . . and I am told that the Dutch have promised them that they will return this year with a much larger power, in order to make war unto us by sea, and these moors to make it by land; and albeit that what the Idalcao has worked in this is against the contract of peace and friendship existing between him and this state, I temporise until time shall show what I ought to resolve upon."[7] In another letter[8] of a subsequent date (16th November, 1637) the Viceroy stated that "the king Idalxa having allowed the Dutch to come into his ports, this being against the clauses agreed upon of the peace treaty . . . we can make towards him some demonstration. Nevertheless I am temporising in the matter until I see what action he takes with the said Dutch, on account of the endeavours I have made . . . . besides which the position in which we are at present . . . . does not allow us to move fresh wars."

The Portuguese Viceroy made reprisals against Bijapur and the "demonstration" took the form of attacks on Adilshahi ships and their capture with all merchandise and men. The Portuguese were also accused of by the Bijapuris of having imposed customs restrictions on the land frontier and of having erected fortifications in some frontier outposts in violation of agreements. There was

7. BM, XI, 27.
8. BM, XI, 20 et seq.

a sharp exchange of notes[9] between Bijapur and Goa; and the Portuguese, in their turn, accused the Adil Shah of designs and attempts to hinder Portuguese trade and encourage the enemies of Portugal.

The Dutch do not seem to have helped Bijapur to any extent on this occasion. They flattered themselves into believing that "the commerce of the Portuguese is at the present moment (December 1638) in such a very bad condition and if the Almighty deign to bless our efforts the whole of the coast of Malabar will soon be in the power of the (Dutch East India) Company."[10] They pressed their own cause at the Adilshahi Court and made repeated attempts in 1639 to obtain *firmans* for further trade.[11] But the Portuguese were able to neutralise these Dutch attempts and, in addition, they succeeded in entering into an argeement with the Bijapur court. The agreement stipulated that "the king of Visiapour shall forbid any of the Dutch nation to reside in his dominions, nor even allow them to buy provisions in his lands or trade with his subjects, and that the Viceroy shall be at liberty to attack the Dutch in Wingurla or Rajapour, or any other sea-ports, to drive them forcibly away from there, and seize all their goods stored in the factories. None of the king's subjects will offer any resistance to these proceedings, and in the event of the Portuguese fighting the Dutch fleet the subjects of the king (of Bijapur) will remain neutral.

The Viceroy will make good any damage done to the king's vessels or subjects by the Dutch on condition that the king shall treat the Dutch as his deadly enemies."[12]

This Dutch report of an agreement between Bijapur and Goa is corroborated by a letter dated 4th December 1642 from the Portuguese Viceroy to his king wherein he says "the Dialcao maintains good relations with me."[13]

9. Full text (in English translation) of these notes are given as appendix. The notes are of interest for the information they give and for an understanding of Bijapur-Goa relationship under Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh.

10. Letters, XI, CCCL.

11. Letters, XI, CCCLXI, CCLXII.

12. Letters, XII, CCCLXXV, 4th June 1641.

13. BM, XIV, 609. Portugal had now regained her independance from Spain and news of this must have reached India by about the middle of 1641.

In the meanwhile, in Europe, a treaty of peace was concluded between Portugal and Netherlands (12th June, 1641) and, even while negotiations for it were going on, the Portuguese Viceroy was instructed to acquaint the Dutch that all cause for war had now ceased, that an armistice was to be declared and that no hostilities were to be commenced pending further orders. But the Dutch in India continued to harass the Portuguese and declined to desist until they should receive instructions from their own government.[14] Even after the Dutch in India and the East had received intimation of this peace treaty they continued to be unfriendly to the Portuguese. Writing to the Dutch East India Company in Holland on the 12th December 1642, a Dutch despatch observes, "The Portuguese are very pleased at the conclusion of peace on account of their poor condition in India, however we still shall do them as much harm as possible..."[15]

The Dutch in Vengurla and other Adilshahi places indeed seem to have succeeded once again in turning the 'Ādil Shāh against the Portuguese, at least for some time, for early in 1643 we find relations between Bijapur and Goa estranged. The Portuguese Viceroy writing to his King on 7th February 1643, reports, "During the last days there have been suspicions that the Dialcao is mustering men with the intention of approaching this vicinage. I keep preparing myself for any contingency which may take place. I know not what he will do, but I make bold to affirm to Your Majesty that the want of men and succour and of the ships which convey them, encourage them to form these designs more especially as the Dutch are their friends, who daily visit them with ships."[16] But the 'Ādil Shāh made no move for a year; it was not till January 1644 that he mustered an army for a march towards Goa. "The Idalco....left his court in Vizapor on the last days of January, and remains ten leagues from Goa with a large army all formed, which he personally commands and is affording us great anxiety, because we cannot attain to know where he intends to discharge his tempest."[17] The Bijapur king continued to camp

14. Danvers, The Portuguese in India, II, 273-275.
15. Letters, XII, CCLXXXVIII.
16. BM, XIV, 632.
17. BM, XV, 716.

in this same place, without launching on any military action, till about the end of April 1644 when he withdrew to Bijapur at the approach of the monsoon.[18]

The Dutch, in spite of their unfriendly attitude towards the Portuguese on Bijapur coast could no longer actively help the Adilshahis against Goa as they had probably been instructed by their government not to indulge in such unfriendly behaviour any more. It is likely that Muhammad Ādil Shāh abandoned his campaign of April 1644 after finding that the Dutch no longer offered him naval support. For the next few years he was fully occupied in a war of expansion in the Karnatak country and it was only towards the close of his reign that he once again turned his attention to the Portuguese.

In the beginning of the year 1654, Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh sent an embassy to Goa inviting to his court two of the Jesuit fathers. Accordingly, Fr. Martins was deputed to go to Bijapur with a present for the king. His instructions were to try to prevent war between Bijapur and Goa. But before he could reach Bijapur, Muhammad Ādil Shāh sent his army against Bardes and Goa, which arrived in the Portuguese territory on August 12, 1654. The Muhammadans first stormed the town of. Tivy leading into Bardes. The Portuguese offered resistance but they had to fight against odds and the victory opened to the Bijapurs the gates of Bardes. After this, a stronger Bijapur army turned to Salsette, and captured a few towns. Goa was now blockaded on the landside by the forces of Bijapur and had been reduced to great straits. By this time Goa got reinforcement from Portugal and the invaders hearing of this suddenly withdrew to their own kingdom. About the same time Fr. Martins reached Bijapur and induced the Sultan to stop the war with the result that he gave definite orders to his troops to retreat from the Portuguese territory. The Adilshahi kingdom did not come into conflict with the Portuguese after this. Shivaji now occupied most of the Adilshahi Konkan and the Portuguese slowly faded out of Deccan politics, though they continued in undisturbed possession of Goa.

18. ibid., 669.

APPENDIX

Transcript of the clauses and complaints which, in the name of the King Idalxa ['Ādil Shāh], were laid before the ambassador of His Majesty, Antonio Nuniz Barreto on the part of Xabul Ansan [Shāh Abu'l Hasan] procurator of the King Idalxa on the 15th Dec. 1638.

What things the Portuguese committed against the peace contract, with innovations of customs and the robberies they have effected by taking ships, vessels, clothes and goods, and other items of the exchequer of His Highness, and from the Todagares, merchants, and Moorish people they had put to death without being guilty, is now stated and declared by the following clauses.

A vessel from the port of Dabul that had come from the strait of Arabia, which vessel running short of water on the voyage, made for the lands of Bacain to take water, in which was goods of His Highness and the Todagares Merchants of the value 200,000 pagodas.

Another vessel carrying letters which left the port of Dabul on her voyage which they took and carried on to Mascate, on board of which there was merchandize of His Highness and of the Todagares(?) Merchants in the value of 350,000 pagodas, all which they took and left in this manner to effect an exchange, and take satisfaction for all that, and on being made known they only deliver empty vessels.

Coje Mamuda, the Ambassador, who had been sent by His Highness with the ambassage to the king of Bacora and on the return voyage was bringing a return present from the said king of Bacora for His Highness of twelve horses of great value and good, indeed of such a stud that they were unequalled, and on the said Coje Mamuda arriving to the fortress of Chaul they took from them the said horses, and robbed the whole of the house, and despoiled him of 10,000 pagodas, beside the said twelve horses and ready cash.

And likewise from the lands of His Highness, in consideration of the prosperity of the island of Goa, with the permission of His Highness, merchants come and go, but which they aggrieve, quitting their former customs, and serving their style with innovations, which gave rise to complaints and differences, and on all goods, areca and provisions which go to Goa, they impose higher duties, and they have taken from the time they commenced to gather dues up to the present, a large sum of money, and on this matter His Highness has sent many reminders and vois from the ports of his kingdom, and in accordance to these papers what it was for, and what it amounted, will be seen and have the sums returned to whomsoever may be seen to have been overtaxed.

And similarly did they further take two vessels from the ports of your Highness, and robbed them, sinking one of them, collecting together all the cloths there was in her which amounted to 180,000 pagodas.

In the contract of the Peace Treaty it was agreed upon, that on the extreme limits of the lands of your Highness no walls or fortresses should be

erected, whereas in fact opposite the jurisdiction of Perna, the lands of Ponda belonging to your Highness which stands in front of Bardez, there was made a wall and a fortress.

It was resolved in the contract of Peace, that if either of the parts who should be the first to act, and thus break the contract, shall pay in penalty 100,000 xeraphins; hence as the Portuguese have often times broken the contract, the penalties amount to a large sum of money to which the Portuguese are condemned to pay, and of all satisfaction should be given.

Further more there was taken from Nawabo Mustafakhan, and from the said Xabul Ansan, cloth, pepper, food supplies and silver chairs to the value of 10,000 pagodas, and to the account of this what may have been returned shall be taken into account, further more restitution should be made to the said Nawabo and the said Xabul Hasan.

And likewise they took to Goa 4,700 candies of timber for ship building to sell, which was taken from the said Xabul Ansan, and was taken in Goa.
Also she brought seven masts of mizen and Ancola to take to Rejapor, and which was taken on the route.

In the treaty of peace it was agreed upon, that to all ships crafts and vessels which should make their voyages from the royal ports of His Highness, the Portuguese would afford good guard against the Malabarese, and any other piratical robbers, and would accompany them well, giving them favour in all things, and whereas this was so, and it behoved them to afford fulfilment to the contract, the said Portuguese take the vessels of His Highness, and through consideration of their own danger, and that of the robbers, they desisted from undertaking their voyages.

This libel was brought forward in the presence of His Highness, and it was ordained in his royal presence to go forward with it, and it has been sent to the ports of his kingdom, where the Portuguese have taken apparel, money and goods of His Highness in order that from thence....be sent in writing which will be at once seen to.

I, Crisna Sinay Interpreter of the State translated the above from the original in Persian writing into Portuguese to which I refer. Visapor on the 23rd of December 1638.—Crisna Sinay.

Reply of the ambassador Antonio Nuniz Barreto which in the name of His Majesty he gives to the clauses brought before him on the part of Xabul Hasan Procurator to the crown of the said king on the 15th December, 1638.

The chief complaints brought forward in these articles are in respect to the three vessels which the fleets of the King of Portugal my lord, took and carried to Mascate, and also in regard to another vessel which they burnt down at the port of Rejapor.

As regards the three vessels—to wit, two of Dabul and one that was taken at Sunda, I mean that they were in most strict justice taken, because not only did these vessels have on board much paper, steel and other prohibited goods, but above these for the vessels of Your Highness and

other officers of the said ships they disguised their malice, for not only did they refuse to show their cartages, but attempted to fly, and when they saw they could not do so in safety, they took up arms by which they incurred the wrath of the soldiers and the captains of Your Majesty, and they fought and some of the men on both sides fell, and these vessels were unfortunate, because our side prevailed and finding that besides the prohibited goods, they brought also men from the land of the Turk, they carried them on to Mascate, where the captain general had some of them put to death, because they were our enemies which the vessels of Your Highness were bringing in their company, against the terms of the cartages, which state that they should be unable to bring steel, or pepper or Mive(?), nor any enemy of ours, nor any other thing that should be prohibited....it is now three years that by the arm of the Dutch, our rebels and thieves, he has been making war to the state of India, and with the arm of the same enemies hindering the navigation during each years exceeds 90,000 venezeanos, beyond what the dues that are lost in the custom Houses of India and Portugal amount to, besides the losses to merchants and vessels; all which your Highness is bound to pay according to the contract of the peace treaty....And if His Highness likewise complained of another vessel which our fleet burnt at the port of Regapor, I state that the said vessel must have been a pepper ship, and as such, on sighting our ship, without following it she proceeded to withdraw, and on making a signal for her to stop she refused to do so,....and in the case of this vessel belonging to the vessels of His Highness, as she did not take cartages, as the rest of those that were taken in the strait, there is no need to talk about her....

However, even should in the burning down of any vessel there has been any fault, a thing which we deny, it is certain that the guilt of taking our pataxo (?) which was lately down in Rajapor was far greater and a great treachery, because it was taken under security, and through treachery, a thing which no king had ever done in India; how much more should this be wondered at from the King Idalxa, for it was a deed done on purpose, and he a brother at arms of the King of Portugal; and it is not less worthy of surprise in His Highness the favour he gives the Dutch, for he not only admits them in his ports, against what has been sworn, but he even, last year, passed four or five firmins, in which he bids his vassals to favour the said rebels, fighting with them against the Portuguese....And without mentioning many other injustices, it is true to say that all vegetable merchants of the city of Goa are not allowed to come to the other shore without making them pay a percentage on each ship.

And besides this complaint which we have against the king Idalxa, Your Highness is bound by the contract to deliver up all the Portuguese who came from our lands as fugitives, or in any other way to the lands of the said King Idalxa, under oath that neither Idalxa nor his captains shall harbour them nor afford them room nor shelter, but will turn them away in order that they should return to the fortresses of the king our lord. And as regards the slaves of the Portuguese....and the residents of Goa, who had fled and went to the power of the captain of Ponda and his Tanadars, your Highness is also bound to make them return to their masters.....

As regards the complaint of the sheet of wall and the fortress which he states was made against the terms of the contract, opposite the jurisdiction of Perna, I reply that I am not aware of any fortress having been made and if a sheet of wall was in truth erected, it was because when the contract was celebrated, and the peace treaty, there were no Dutch in India, against whom later on was made the said wall, both in order to defend our lands, as also because as good friends, we should hand in hand, prevent those robbers....from entering into the lands of His Highness whom we are ever desirous of assisting....And in the case of this being in any way a cause of complaint, it should have been laid before the Viceroy who then held the charge, and to those who now govern....

Interpreter Crisna Sinay Visapor on the 26th of December, 1638.

(BM, XIII)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Almost all the material used in this paper is from the translations obtained by Danvers from Portugal and Holland during the last century and deposited at the India Office Library in London. Most of this material is as yet unpublished even in original Portuguese and Dutch. Though it is always best to go direct to the sources in the original it is sometimes not possible for a student to do so if the material for his study is not easily accessible and particularly when it happens to be in a language with which a student is not familiar. The writer of this paper was faced with both these difficulties in the course of his study of the history of the Kingdom of Bijapur and its relations with the Portuguese and the Dutch. The late Sir William Foster, who had occasion to use the translations of the Portuguese and Dutch materials in the India Office Library, assured him in 1950 that it was reasonably safe to depend on it.

BM—Books of the Monsoons are volumes containing letters from the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa and other Portuguese officers to the King and the latter's replies. The originals of these letters (Livors das Monçoes) are in the official archives at Lisbon.

Letters—Letters from India. These are made up of 29 volumes and are comprised in a series called "Dutch Records at the Hague." These letters were written by the Dutch officials in the East to each other or to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company at Amsterdam.

Both the Portuguese and Dutch letters give first hand information about topics and happenings which do not find any mention in Persian chronicles and other sources of Deccan history.

(The first Roman figure in the footnotes indicates volume and, in the case of the Dutch letters, the second Roman figure gives the number of the letter).

Identification of Indo-Aegean Tribes

BY

DR. J. T. CORNELIUS, M.A., M.D., PH.D., M.P.H.

In Homeric period and in Egyptian records of Syrian campaign of 1288 B.C. at the beginning of Iron age in Syria, the Aegean tribes mentioned are, the Iliunna, the Derden, and the Masa, as having taken part in the campaign.

The following tribes have been confirmed as having formed the bulk of the 'Peoples of the Sea' mentioned in Ancient Egyptian monuments;— (1) Luka or Lycians; (2) Akaiwasha or Achaeans; (3) Tuirsha or Teresh or Danuana or Etruscans; (4) Pulasathi or Philistines; (5) Zakaray, Zakal or Thekal from Zackro in Crete; (6) Shakalsha from Siculi in Sicily, and (7) Wash-asha from Caria. Out of these, Luka and Shakalsha are identical for reasons which will be given later in their identification, and therefore the list can be reduced to six tribes as having constituted the then known Aegean tribes.

The final list with identifying roots and totemistic emblems is made up as follows :—

Name of tribe	Identifying root	Totemistic emblems
1. Pulasathi	"Ar" or "Su".	Rice or Fish.
2. Zakaray.	"Sar" or "Te" or 'Ti".	Snake or Tree.
3. Shakalsha.	"El" or "Di".	Goat or Cock.
4. Danuana.	"Go" or "Ma" or "Id".	Bull.
5. Akaiwasha.	"Li" or "Kur".	Sheep.
6. Wash-asha.	"Mai".	Buffalo.

These tribes have given their tribal symbols or totems or a combination of these by which they were known, to the settlements, and places occupied by them in various parts of the world, and their social organisations.

H. Hall considered that all these six tribes, or almost all of them were of Cretan origin from such place-names in Crete as, Palai Kastro, Zackro, etc. According to Hall, these Cretan tribes were of two types, one the Anatolian or Eteo-Cretan or Carian from Anatolia in Asia Minor, and the other, Minoans from Nile-valley, which would correspond to my classification of Indo-Aegeans into the Lebu (Anatolian), and Tamahu types I and II (Minoan or Mediterranean).

I have worked out six linguistic roots, and their equivalent roots and symbols, by means of which it would now be possible to identify these tribes and their settlements, wherever they may occur by tracing their place-names, from their tribal names, and conversely from the place-names to their tribal names. The primary linguistic roots are: (1) "Ar"; (2) "Sar"; (3) "El"; (4) "Go"; (5) "Li" and (6) "Mai" as indicated against the six tribes mentioned above. Hall in his Aegean Archaeology states that the first wave of Cretan tribes of emigration was through the Cyclades Isles to the main land of southern Greece. This must have occurred about 2500 B.C. The names of places occupied by them were Argolis of Messene, Lakonia of Boeotia and later of Thessaly, and of Boeotia by Kadmeians. It will be seen that these place-names are derived from four of the six roots given by me and I would assign them to the following tribes:—

Name of tribe	Identifying roots	Other equivalent symbols or roots
1. Pulasathi	"Ar"	"Ulo"—to plough; "Ar"—River; "Su"—water; "Cyr" or "Syr" or "Sra"—Head—Syria, or "Vai"—mouth, and "Sor"—boiled rice. Ceres.
2. Zakaray or (Derden).	"Sar"	"Der"—Tree, "Sar"—sweet juice, "Sarkkara"—Jaggery or 'Sura"—liquor. "Pan" Palmyra—Pandu or Bacchus. "Ti" or "Te", "Tevu"—Island. Sicily, Sardinia; "Kan"—Eye. "Ishu"—Arrow—Iluvan: Tuvasar.

Name of tribe	Identifying roots	Other equivalent symbols or roots
3. Shak-el-Shah or (Iliunna).	"El"	"Di" or "Lak" — Light. "El" — shining, or oil seed, or silver or other metals. "Kal"—Kali, salt. "Attu", "Ajas" (Skt.) "Kochchai" "Elu-va", mean Goat. "Kas—Kus—Money" or Trade. Tamra—Sembu — copper — sippara — Cypress. Urudu — copper — ur.
4. Danuana, or Tuiresh or Tarash or Teresh.	"Go"	Gona, Madu "Go" or "Ma"—Bull or Ox-Eru from Erudu, or Kottiyam - Bull. "Sa" from Sadjte a sound note of the Drum Salligai, "Id" — "Iddi" — spear, Idaiyan — cowherd. "Ey"—Arrow, Boar or Pig, "Io", 'Tyre' — Tier —Sea — Jya — Bow.
5. Akai-washa.	"Li"	"Li" or "Ada" or 'Achae" or "Kuru" sheep or Kori or "Ada" or "Li", "Lim"—sheep. Cemmari or Kemmari or Komari—Aries—Ram—Eli.
6. Wasah-asha or (masa).	"Mai"	"Mai", "Kara" or "Mai"—Buffalo-Erumai. Masa or Mysians.

The southern Greek province, AR-GO-LIS is seen to be a combination of a compound name of a tribal settlement and named after three tribes Pulasathi, Danuana and Achaians or Akai Washa, *Lak*-onia of Boeotia was the settlement of "Lak" Tribe which is Shak-al-shah, and Saronic gulf named after "Sar" or "Zakaray" tribe, and *Thessaly* occupied by Kadmeians or Kudimeians or the Pulasathi tribe from the characteristic tuft of hair worn by this tribe, and Mycenia, by Wash-asha or Mysians or Mycenians.

From the above, it will be seen that about 2500 B.C. the Pre-Greek population of Greece consisted of these six Aegean tribes and the name of Greece itself is a modified form of Crete, and Argives was the term used by Homer, for the Greeks of his time. Crete derived its name from River Caeratus—'Ceres' on which Cnossus, the capital was situated.

The Greeks of Alexandrian times about 500 B.C. knew more about these tribes than did the Rig vedic Aryans, who mention reliably the names of only three or four out of these six tribes as members of the "Krivi" or "Panchala" tribes as Turvasas, Kesins, and Srin-jayas, which can be recognised in the list of six tribes mentioned by me, Turvasas being Zakaray, Kesins, Shakal-Sha; and Srin-jayas, Pulasathi and Danuana, in terms of my linguistic roots.

The next list of Indo-Aegean tribes that is of an authentic record is the names of five tribes that met at the confluence of the Satlej and the Indus mentioned by Cunningham in his Ancient Geography of India, who surrendered to Alexander in 325 B.C. in the Punjab which are:—

Name of tribe.	Identifying root	Aegean	Other equivalent symbols or roots.
1. Bagarda (Place name)	"Ar"	Pulasathi.	"Ar" for agriculture.
2. Bhatis (Place name)	"Ti"	Zackaray.	"Ti" Island Tevu.
3. Lak-vira	"Lak"	Shak-el-sha.	"El"—"Kas"—"Lak" coin-trade. (Melli tribe)
4. Madho-vira	"Ma" or "Go"	Danuana or Tuirash.	"Go", "Ma"—Bull. "Ey" 'Vel'-spear or bow or boar or wild pig. Tier "Tyr"—Sea (Kathi tribe) Hittite.
5. Adam-vira	"Li"	Akai-washa.	"Sheep" Kurumbas or Kuravas.

The South Indian list consists of place-names from which the names of the tribes may be easily deduced by means of the linguistic roots. I have taken the names of places mentioned by Dr. Arokiaswamy in his article on the Dolmens in the Pudukottai State in Tamil culture of February 1952, and S. Radhakrishna Iyer's General History of Pudukottai State and W. Logan's Malabar. Vol. I.

Place name.	Name of tribe.	Identifying root.	Aegean.	Equivalent root and symbols.
1. Arani-Patti.	Pandya.	"Ar"	"Pulasathi"	"Syr" or "Sra" or "Cera" Seras or Munda. Pandyas.
2. Vedam-Patti.	Veduvar or (Nisada-ryans) or Pandu.	"Sar" or "Pan"	"Zacharay"	"Pandu" or "Nadar" or "Sarnar"—Ishu or Iluvan "Ishu"—Arrow. Pan—Bow.
3. Sellu-k-kudi.	'Lak' or Cola (Kudimi-yan).	"El"	"Shakelsha" (Kadmian)	"Lak" or "El" or "Kal" salt.
Seval-kudi-Muthu-kadu.	Muthu-Makkal.			"Saval" or "Cock" or 'Ker'. Trade—Pearls, Kudimiya Hill.
4. Tiru-go-karnam.	Pallava or Titian or Tuvarai.	"Go" or "Tier" or "Tyre"	"Danuana" or Tuirash.	"Go", "Bull" or "Ey" Boar or Bow or Arrow or pig. Tier—Sea.
5. Mottai-malai.	Kurumbar	"Kuru" or "Li"	"Akai-washa"	Achai. Lim-sheep. Mottai-sheep
6. Todaiyur.	Todas.	"Mai"	"Mysins"	Erumai-Buffalo. Kara-Carians.

From the above analysis the sixth tribe Todas has emerged which shows their place of emigration from Pudukkottai to the Nilgiris from East to West and points to the fact that the earliest colony of Indo-Aegeans in Pudukottah State was maritime, and connected with pearl fishery carried on by them about 2000 B.C. Todas are the representatives of the Mysian tribe of Asia Minor.

The names of five Dravidian tribes are mentioned as most ancient by S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar. They are (1) Tidiyan (2) Eluni (3) Erumaiyuran (4) Irungovel man of Aryam and (5) Poruman. In Cambridge History of India it is stated that the Dravidian tribes were known in ancient times as Palaiya 'Marar' and 'Kosar' or new Marar tribes.

The term 'Marar' used in Cambridge History of India to designate the Dravidian or Tamil tribes is derived from the Sumarian word 'Mar' meaning 'Hoe.' The term 'Marar' means a ploughman. The Sumarian word for ox-driven plough is 'Apin', and in Tamil, Kal-appai.

In terms of my linguistic roots, these names can be identified and equated as follows:

J. 3

Name of Dravidian tribe.	Identifying root and place name.	Aegean tribe, place name.	Modern Dravidian tribe and place name or root.
1. Tidiyan.	'Id' or Tyre Idean cave in Crete.	Danuana or Tyrehnian. Lydia in Asia Minor.	Idae = sails (Tamil) Idayan = cowherd. Madu—ox or cow Tier—sea.
2. Eluni.	'El' or 'Di' Dictean cave in Crete.	Shakalsha in Lycia in Asia Minor.	Ellu—sesame oil seed—light.
3. Erumaiyuran.	'Mai' (Kara).	Mysians Caria in Asia Minor.	Erumai—Buffalo Erumai-ur (Mysore).
4. Irungo-velman or Arayam.	'Ar' Sor-des. Capital of Lydia in Asia minor.	Pulasathi Palai kastro in crete.	Vellallar—Arisi—rice—Syria—Arizawa in Asia Minor.
5 Poruman = Dancer or entertainer (Tamil).	'Sar' (Sardinia)	Sardes, capital of Lycia Sardinian.	Sar-nan (Tinnevelly).

The first colonies of Indo-Aegeans from the west to settle in South India were in Malabar and in Cochin. The ancient seat of the Ar-go-li tribes was in Mount Deli or Elimala and the name of Malabar itself is derived from Ma-li-bar equal to "Go-li-ar" or Ar-go-li tribes. The Arab Navigators called it "Ma-le". The River in this area was Valar- ('Velar') pattinam River. The Village at the head of the river was Irukur or Erroocoor equal to 'Go-li' tribes.

The Ar-go-li tribes are thus identified with Ceras of Kottayam (Kottiyam-ox) or Iruvali-nad, Ernad, Periyar or Ponnani, Palghat and South Travancore.

Cochin (Kochchai equal to goat), Calicut ("Kali-kot"), Telicherry, (El) light, Cannanore, (Kan-Eye equal to 'sar') were the seat of the "El" confederacy known as Kerala equal to Kara—(Buffalo) and "el" 'light' tribes, including the "Sar" tribe. The Kerala tribes occupied also the Laccadive Islands, and the Ar-go-Li tribes, the Maldives, in the Arabian Sea. These six Aegean tribes represent the peoples of the sea mentioned by ancient Aegyptians.

By means of the six linguistic roots we have thus been able to identify the Aegean tribes with the five Krivi tribes of the Punjab and six Dravidian tribes of South India.

The Anatolian or Eteo-Cretan tribes are (1) Danuana (2) Shakalsha (3) Akai-washa and (4) Wash-asha.

The Mediterranean or Minoan tribes are Pulasathi and Zakary. As previously mentioned the Anatolian tribes belong to the Libu type, and the mediterranean to the Tamahu type I and II.

These six components combined to form composite confederacy or group organisations which exist even to the present day administration. Two rival groups came into existence even in the early occupation of Crete, one having its seat in Mount Ida, and the other in Dictean cave in Crete, and to indicate which I have proposed the alternative identifying roots as "Id" and "Di" respectively. One group was made up of Danuana, Pulasathi and Akai-washa tribe known as "Ar-go-lis" and the other combination made up of Shakalsha, Zackaray and Wash-Asha as Mycenian. The former was known in the Punjab as "Sabagrei" and the latter as "Sambagrei" and in the U.P. as "Vai-sa-li" of Lichavi clan and the "Ko-sala-Videhi" of the Yadava or Sakya clan respectively. Maha-bharatha war was fought between these two rival clans on the bank of the Chambal river in Northern Punjab.

An explanation as to the linguistic roots of Vai, sa, li and Kosala is necessary at this point.

"Vai-sa-li" is the compound name of Vriji (rice) confederation which is made up of the following linguistic components and are equated with Ar-Go-li.

Name of place.	Identifying root.	Name of tribe.	Aegean root.	Equivalent root or symbols.
Vai-k-karai (Bakare, South India).	Vai.	Pandya or Bagardes (sorian) Vaideha or Mithila in U.P. or Ar-gudu of Afghanistan.	"Ar"	"Vai" mouth, Vai-gai river in Madura: Velar "Ar"—river —rice and 'sor'—boiled rice—Pandya.
Sadtji.	Sa. (sound note of war drum).	Maravar or Tirabhukti or Tirhut of U. P. or Tuvarai of Mysore-Irungovel of Arayam.	"Go"	"Salini" priestess of Korra-vai: (South India) Salligai, war drum of Pallavas. Pallavas. Iru—ox. Tier—Sea—Matsya.
Limurike (Gk) South India.	Li.	Lich-chavis or Kurumbas or Adamvir.	"Li"	Lim-sheep or Ram, Lich-chavi clan—Kuravar. Deli, Eli-mala.

Thus Vaisali is equated with Argolis of Ancient Greece and Vriji confederacy of Lichhavi clan, and Irungo-vel of Arayam or Pallava and Pandyas and Kurumbas = Ceras of Malabar.

Wajjian confederation of Yadava videhi.

Sam-brace or Johiyas (Kosala confederation) = Irukkuvel of Pudukottah = Cholas = Keralas of Cochin.

Alakappo (on Gandak river).	"Lak"	Baluka.	"Lak of Boeotia".	"El" or Lak. Alakkar salt field (Tamil Kallar, Kali-salt, Calicut.
Alakapura.	"Ak"	Yakha or Jaksha.	"Attica or Athenian.	Ajas goat.-wajjian.
Ko (title of chola king).	"Sal"	Ko-sala (Ko-nadu).	"Salimis Island".	"Sal"—salt, Samikon and Samos in Greece. Sellu kudi (Pudukotta) Elkuds (Palestine). Dead-sea, Salt.
Videhi.	"Vedu" (Hunt)	Nis-adaryan or veduvar.	Zachary.	Sami-kon in Greece and vedam patti (Pudukottai). Ishu—Arrow, Pan—Bow—Iluvan.

In North India the united vrijis was known as "Sam-vriji" made up of Vriji and Wajjian confederation, and according to Crosius, Sabagrae. In the Punjab the five tribes, Lak-vira, Madho-vira, Adam-vira, Bagardes and Bhatis have formed two organisations. The Johiyas were made up of Lak-vira (el) or "Khas", and (Sar), and their combination was called "Sar-khas", and the name of their coin was probably "sar-kas".

The Yaudheyas were made up of Madho-vira, Adam-vira and Bagardes and the inscription of their coins was "jaya" (Jya)-'go,' Yaudheya (Li)—Ganesaya (Ar), representing the names of these three tribes. The 'Johiyas' are the 'Malli' (Amorite), and the 'Yaudheyas' (Argoli) formed the 'Kathei' (Hittite) confederation.

In South India the confederation of chiefs was known as (1) Irungovel of Aryam and (2) Irukkuvel in Pudukottai State. The Irungovel is equated with the Vriji or Vaisali confederation, and Irukkuvel with Wajjian confederation. It will be seen that the former is made up of three tribes Pandya (Ar), Pallava (Go) and Kurumba (Li) chiefs of Punal Nadu, corresponding to Vai, sa, li, and the Chola (El) and the Veduvar 'Sar' of Konadu corresponding to the Kosala-Videhi confederation. The river in Pudukottai State is named Vellar which corresponds to a river named Belar in Thessolonia in Greece. Irungovel of Arayan is identical with the "Vriji" confederation, as "Aryam" and "Vriji" mean Rice, and the constituent tribes of this organisation have already been equated.

Irukkuvel and Wajjian is identical as "Ircus" (Latin) and "Ajas" (Sanskrit) mean "Goat". Irukkuvel is also known as Velir chiefs. The word Velir (veli-silver) is derived from the linguistic root "el" (velicham) means light from which the term "Cola" is also derived. "Col-i" means to be resplendent or shine.

The term Sabagrae standing for "united vrijis" means a confederation of chiefs. According to Cunningham, Buddha was consulted by Ajata-satru of Magadha how to subdue the people of Wajji and was informed that they would be invincible as long as they remained united. It is further mentioned that the Raja by a stratagem of his Minister "in the course of three years so completely disunited their rulers one from another, that no two would walk the same road together" and they were subdued without making any resistance. The "Sabha" organisations in fragmentary forms

survive to the present day in South India known as 'Ur" and "Nadu" administrative units, which indicate that dual nature of this great, powerful, military and naval organisation. The seat of the naval organisation known as "Saba" was in the South West portion of Arabia, called Yemen, occupied by the Navy of Hiran (Joktanite) and the navy of Thar-shih on the western coast of the Persian gulf occupying the Bharien Islands. The former were called Phoenicians. In the Bible these tracts are referred to as the Joktanite Sheba. These areas were also called the "Land of ships." In Sumarian language "ma" meant ships, and the Persian Gulf seat was known as Magum, and the Arabian coast area as Ma-leucce. It is easy to identify Magum as the seat of Tuirash or Danuana or Tuvarai or Pallavas or Irungo-vel of South India and M'leuce as the seat of "luck" or Sola or Cola, from which the port of Masulipatam or "Masola" of Pliny, is derived in South India, and the term Hiran can be traced to Iruk-ku-vel through "Hircus" meaning "Goat" of the Wajjian confederation. The naval organisation "Saba" was the great connecting link between the "Peoples of the sea" of the eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and South India, who established their colonies by sea, along the western and the eastern coast of South India from Tondi to Masulipatam, and in Ceylon, about 2000 B.C., the oldest ports being from west to east, Tyndis (Tondis), Liuke (White Island) known also as Velliyan kallu, Ophir, near modern Beypore, Muziris or Maseras (Cranganore) the port of Vanji or Karur with the river mouth Ali-mukkham, Bakare (vai-k-karai) the port of Nyeacinda, and Nirkundram in the Pandyan territory, and Cape Komari, from Komari leading into Argalic gulf (note the name of the gulf Ar-go-li in Tamil called *Argali,* and port of Kolkoi (Cola) or Korkai. Ceylon was known as Island of Taprabani (a Cola territory from Tamra meaning copper). From Argalic gulf the early settlements of Pudukottai State the eastern emporium of Tondi and Puhar at the mouth of the Kavery and lastly Masolos of Pliny, which is now called Masulipatam, were established. These South Indian Ports were established at a later date than the ports at the gulf of Cutch in Sind, which led to the establishment of Mohen-jo-doro in Sind, and Harappa in the Punjab. The Naval "Saba" organisation in South West Arabia were functioning in a flourishing condition during the time of Solomon, about 1000 B.C. It must have been in existence for a couple of thousand years previous to that period.

The Indo-Aegeans were a maritime people, most of them entered the Punjab from Sindh, and from the other ports of South India from the west, and Middle East. Some of them must have entered North India by land via Afghanistan and Baluchistan. They landed at the gulfs of the main land of the countries they wanted to colonise from Crete, Cyclades and Bahrein Islands, at the mouth of great rivers, and distributed themselves from the mouth of the river upstream towards the sources, as at the mouth of the Eupherates and Tigris in the Persian gulf; in Sindh at the mouth of the Indus, and at Musiris or Maseres in the western coast, and Argalic gulf in the Eastern coast of South India; and in Greece, at the gulf of Nauplia, and at Saronic gulf and gulf of Corinth.

These settlements were along the coast of these rivers and their tributaries bearing their tribal names, starting from the mouth upstream. They formed long and narrow tracts of tribal settlements: Usually at the mouth, were the "el" tribe, and in the middle, the "Ar", and the "Sar" tribes, and in the upper portions, the "Go" and the "Li" tribes. This general pattern of regional distribution arises because these tribes were essentially a maritime people who colonised foreign lands to develop their industries of agriculture and trade. The foundations of these colonies in South India was in relation to pearl fisheries which was an important industry about 2000 B.C. These tribes were shifted from one area to another according to political and economic requirements as they arose, mostly through river communications and by sea.

In Palestine there was what is known as "Philistine confederation of five cities (I) Ekron, the seat of Achaeans or "Li" Tribe (2) Ashdod, of the Danuana or "Go" tribe (3) Gath of the Pulasathi or "Ar" tribe (4) Ashkelon of the Lycians or "Kal" or "El" tribe and (5) Gaza of the Sardinian or "Sar" tribe. I cannot go into details of their identification with the place names at the present time. The terms Philistines (villavar) and Pelasgians are group names. I shall briefly summarise the relations of the Indo-Aegeans in terms of linguistic roots employed in this article.

The Pelasgians were made of two race types, the Mediterranean and the Anatolian or Alpine race, as has been shown in my previous article. These formed an Eastern and a Western Branch, starting from Libya, when the Anatolians arrived there from Asia Minor, after their invention of Boats. The Western

Branch went to Spain and Portugal and the Eastern Branch to Greece via Sicily and Italy. The term "Pelasgian" is derived from "Pila-to split-pelakus (in Greek) Battle-Axe.

The Eastern Pelasgians formed a confederation with "Id" clan known as "Argoli" and the Western Pelasgians, the "Sardinean or Mycenaean confederation with "Di" clan. These confederations were formed in Greece and were known as Achaean confederation, in Palestine, the Philistine, and the Sumero-Assyrian, and



Babylonian confederation in the Middle East and the "Vriji" and the "Wajjian" confederations in North India, and the Irungo-vel of Arayam in Mysore State and Irukkuvel of Pudukottai State from which after their disintegration evolved Pallava, Pandya and Chera, and Kerala and Chola Kingdoms of the South. The Chera, and the Tamil Kingdoms of Pallava and Pandya were derived from the "Ar-go-li" tribes, and the Telugu or Chola, Kerala, Canarese, and Maharatta kingdoms from the "El" or "Kal", "Mai" and "Sar" tribes.

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3. P. T. Srinivasa Aiyangar, *Pre-Aryan Tamil Culture,* 1929.
4. *Aegean Archaeology,* by H. R. Hall, 1914.
5. *Origin and Spread of the Tamils,* by V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, 1947.
6. *Pre-historic Burial Places in South India,* by A. Rea, 1888.

7. Tamil Culture, January 1953, *Linguistic Evidence for the Common Origin of the Dravidians and Indo-Europeans,* Nallur Sami S. Gnana Prakasar.

8. Tamil Culture, February 1952. *Dolmens of Pudukottah State* by M. Arokiaswamy.

9. *General History of Pudukotta State,* by S. Radhakrishna Iyer, 1916.

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11. *Evolution of Administrative Units in South India,* by Nilakanta Sastri.

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The Origin of the Vellalas

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The place of social history in the history of mankind has come to stay and so far as the story of South India is concerned a close and minute study of the origin of the caste system that is the one great mark of the social life of that region is of the utmost necessity. Nor is this a new venture. Scholars of the reputation of General Sir A. Cunningham, Sherring, Caldwell and, not to omit, Edgar Thurston in his *magnum opus,* "Castes and Tribes of Southern India" have been at it for well nigh one century;[1] and yet it cannot be said that the last word has been written on this subject of absorbing interest.

In my book, "The Early history of the Vēllār basin"[2] I have devoted some attention to the origin of the Vēḷḷāḷās and the Vēḷḷāḷā caste and have arrived at certain conclusions on the subject. It is my object in this paper to verify them again in the light of certain remarks made by Prof. S. Vaiyāpuri Pillai, who has done the good office of reviewing my book in the Journal of Indian History for December 1954.

My position with regard to the Vēḷḷāḷā origin is this :

(1) that the people called to-day as 'vēḷḷāḷās' must be related to the Vēḷs or Vēḷir chieftains spoken of in the Śangam literature.

(2) that the very term 'vēḷḷāḷā' is derived from the term or the root, 'vēḷ', meaning 'viruppam' or desire.

1. See for example Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India,* Vol. I, Sherring; *Hindu Tribes and Castes,* Vol. I, Caldwell; *Hist. of Tinnevelly* and Thurston; *Castes and Tribes,* Vol. VII.

2. Arokiaswami; *Early History of the Vēḷḷār Basin,* Pt. I.

(3) that the Ganges origin attributed to them is an indication in this direction.

(4) that the Irukkuvēḷs or the Irungōvēḷs are the immediate forefathers of the modern vēḷḷāḷās.

I shall try to show in the sequel how every one of these theses can be established to evidence, though Prof. S. V. Pillai, my reviewer, roundly declares that this portion of the book remains unsatisfactory.[3]

There is no denying the fact that numerous castes that are found now in South India are all traceable to older peoples who had settled down there in ancient times and distinguished themselves for something that had finally given them a caste name. Thus for example I may quote the caste of the *maravar* who derive their name obviously from the *maram* or valour seen in them. Elsewhere I have explained this derivation while discussing the origin of Adigamān of Tagadūr.[4] The caste of the *Paraiyar* furnishes another instance of the same process, the name deriving itself from the *parai* or drum that was and is beaten by them.[5] On the other hand, there are certain castes which derive their name from their original ancestors. The *Pallā* is thus described as a descendant of the Pallavā clan.[6] In the case of the Vellālā we find both the processes at work, the term deriving itself from the root, 'vēḷ' showing the distinct character of the Vēḷḷālā community, which through the ages has been one of satisfying the wants of people. It is this characteristic that embraces like a summer cloud the description of the Vēlir chieftains in the whole volume of Śangam literature; it is the same description that we find of the Vēḷḷālās in later literature, as for example in the very poetry of that prince of poets, the great Kambar himself. The *Kural* of Valluvar goes so far as to lay down the definition of *Vēlānmai* as doing good to those who sought one's help:

3. *J. I. H.*, Dec. 1954, 334.

4. *J. I. H.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 229ff.

5. See Caldwell, *Com-Grammar*, p. 549 where he controverts those who give the term any other origin.

6. Oppert., *MJLS*, 1887-88, p. 98.

"Irunthombi il vālvathellām virunthombi
vēḷānmai seytharporuttu"—Kuraḷ 82.[7]

Thus it follows that the name 'vēḷḷālā' is undoubtedly a causal name deriving itself both from the distinction gained by the early vēḷḷālās in being prolific in their generosity and from their being the descendants of the Vēḷs spoken of in Śangam times.

So far for the etymological connection between the two terms, 'vēḷ' and 'vēḷḷālā'. Mr. S. V. Pillai suggests the possibility of the latter term deriving itself from the term, '*veḷḷam*' meaning water. That this is not possible is clear from the very fact that the term 'veḷḷālā is always written with the 'e' elongated while in 'vellam' it is shortened and the two must be differently derived. Nor can an argument be adduced from the fact that the word vēḷḷālā is not found in Śangam literature. It is quite possible that it is later in date with regard to the time when it came into vogue but the history of its development is clear in the pages of Tamil works written at different times. Already in *Porunararruppadai* we hear of the term 'vēḷān':

"vēḷān vāyil vētpakūri"—line 75.

In inscriptions of the Cola times from atleast the IX century the term 'vēlān' is definitely used to denote a vēḷḷālā as in the oft-seen name 'muvēndavēḷān'. Thus the historical development of the term, 'vēḷḷālā' has been without doubt in the direction of vēḷ-veḷān-vēḷḷālan.

The learned professor would say: "The vellalars on the other hand are said to be the sons of the Ganges, perhaps on the basis of a popular derivation of the word from Vellam meaning water."[8] A whole legend could not have arisen basing itself on this erroneous derivation; and one would like to attach a little more importance to our *puranas* and legends, which ought to reveal at least some fundamental truth on which and for which they were presumably constructed. Two legends get mentioned in connection with the origin of the vēḷḷālās. One is the *agnikulā* legend referred to by Kapilar

7. Whatever older writers have thought on the matter of the derivation of the term 'Vellala', the connection between 'vel' and 'vellala', in which the latter is considered as a giver or donor seems to be quite apt. The very term 'vēḷvi' is derived from this root as seen in Kural 88, "virunthombi *vēḷvi* thalaipadāthār."

8. *J. I. H., op cit., loc. cit.*

in *Puram* 201, in which the sacrificial pit of the northern sage is mentioned as the place of the vēḷ origin; and the other is the Gangaputra legend referred to, for example, in *Tondamandala śadakam*. Prof. Pillai argues that they are unrelated and do in fact refer to different origins.[9] With all respect to my learned reviewer it is my view that they not only refer to one and the same thing but in fact the latter may be said to explain and complete the truth contained in the former. No one believes that a set of people rose from fire and lived as men. What is indicated here is merely a connection, a very close one indeed, that must have existed between the vēḷs and the northern sage referred to. Now that Naccinarkiniyar, the great commentator, tells us that this sage was none other than the sage Agastiyā,[10] the two legends seem to confirm the same truth, since, whatever be the uncertainities with regard to him, it seems certain that his original *habitat* lay in the Ganges basin, the region of Varaṇāsi or Benares.[11] Nor is the Ganges legend so late as the XVIII century. Though the *śadakam* makes clear reference to it, equally clear references are found to it even in the Puranas and the Epics and the *Mahabharata* draws pointed attention to the fact that the vēḷs increased in numbers in the Ganges valley, when Lord Krishna moved them southwards.[12] It is at this point that the reference to the *Gangāridai* of Ptolemy and the *Gangāridae* of Pliny read as *Gangvida* by Thurston becomes instructive.[13]

Under these circumstances the derivation of the Vēḷḷāḷā of later times from the vēḷ of the Śangam times seems to be wholly reasonable. Any other derivation is also not possible and the onus of giving an alternate explanation should heavily lie on those who deny the truth of what is said here. That the Irungōvēl of Ārayam referred to in the *Puram* and the Irungōvēḷ spoken of in other Śangam poems like the *Pattinappālai* are the same as the Irukkuvēl of the later-day inscriptional records is again obvious, since the change from the first name to the second is natural and easy.

9. *Ibid.*
10. See Comment on *Tolkappiyam-payiram.*
11. The Epics and the Puranas speak of Agastya as the native of Karambai on the banks of the Ganges. See *QJMS*, XVII, 171.
12. *Viyasabharatam, Sabhaparvam,* Chap. XIV.
13. Ptolemy: Geography, Bk. VII, Ch. I, 81; Plny, Lib., VI, Caput. lxv; Thurston, *op. cit.,* 368.

The interchange between *ingo* and *ikko* is common in Tamil and grammatically beyond question as in the word of common use, *ingannam,* which is written with ங as well as க. The change woud have thus occurred as Irungō—Irukkō—Irukku. The Śangam works do not speak of Irukkuvēḷ but only—of Irungō-vēl; but it seems to me that by either name the same person or persons have been meant. Even granting that the mention of Kodumbālūr, the later Irukkuvēḷ capital, is very late, our argument with regard to the Vēḷ-Vēḷḷālā connection will stand undisputed. But it must be remembered that the question of the date of the *Śilappadikāram,* which mentions this city, is very much antedated than Mr. Pillai suspects; and I do not propose to enter into this problem here. If someone still chooses to differ from the identification made here between the Irungōvēl and the Irukkuvēl, it is upto him to point out as to who the Irukkuvēḷ was instead of leaving us in a kind of blind alley. It must be remembered that Mr. Venkayya's argument in post-dating this chieftain is based very much on palaeographical grounds but hard historical facts would place the first chieftain mentioned in the Kodumbālūr inscription as early as the middle of the V century A.D.[14] This would take the Irukkuvēl ruler of inscriptional history close enough to the Śangam times. If Adigamān of the *Puranānūru* fame is heard of in his progeny in late Colā times, there is nothing impossible in tracing a chieftain of the V century A.D. to the period of the Śangam.

I have found on further consideration that the northern origin of the Vēllālās here postulated is, far from being singular, of a piece with the origin to which many castes in South India trace themselves. I may quote but one example that is found in the origin of the Barathās or Paravar of the east coast of South India, who claim to have descended from the Brahuis of the N. W. India.[15] The now established fact that at one time not only the South but the whole of India was filled with Dravidian peoples in fact gets further support from the views here expressed with regard to the origin of well-known South Indian castes.

14. Arokiaswami; *op. cit.,* pp. 31ff.

15. See Simon Casie Chetty; *JRAS,* IV, pp. 130-34. That this is not a a novel conception is seen for example from the Mackenzie MSS., in one of which the northern Vēḻḻālā migrating to the south is clearly mentioned (*Wilson's Catalogue,* Tamil Local History, No. 4, Taylor; *Cat. Raisonne,* Vol. III, p. 88, No. 2322).

Decline and Downfall of the Saiyads

BY

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Muḥammad Shāh 837-47/1434-1443.*

On the very day of Sultān Mubārak Shāh's assassination, the Delhi nobles raised Prince Muḥammad, son of Farīd, son of Khizr Khān, to the throne. The Prince was adopted as a son by Sultān Mubārak Shāh[1] and had been nominated as his heir to the throne. Sarwar-ul-Mulk, the Wazīr, whose ambition could not rest till he had placed the crown of Delhi on his head, offered homage to the Sultān. But the king in actuality remained a non-entity, a virtual puppet in Sarwar's hand, the latter being in possession of the treasury, the arsenals, horses and elephants.[2]

On the occasion of the coronation, Sarwar-ul-Mulk and Mirān-i-Sadr, (the latter the main assassin of Mubārak Shāh) received the title of Khān-i-Jahān and Mu'in-ul-Mulk respectively. The actual murderers got their rewards and became practically independent in their domains and fiefs.[3]

Sarwar-ul-Mulk eliminates loyalists by imprisoning prominent officers and army men; attempts coup d'tat.

Malik-us-Sharq Kamāl-ul-Mulk, Sarwar's partner in Wazīrship, who was in charge of the Sultān's personal camp at Dīpālpūr at the time of the Sultān's return to the capital, came to render fealty on the same day, and resolved in the heart of his heart to avenge the murder of his patron. Meanwhile, on the

* Acc. to Nelson Wright, The Sultāns of Delhi... 849-855/1445-51 in Delhi, 852-883/1448-1476 in Badaun.

1. Tār Mub Shāhī, 236; Tab Akb I, 288.
2. Tār Mub Shāhī, 236; Tab I, 288.
3. Tār Mub Shāhī, 137.

second day of the installation of the new Sultān, Sarwar-ul-Mulk imprisoned all the leading nobles, who were masters of personal following, after summoning them to the capital, nobles whose only fault was their loyalty to Mubārak Shāh and the members of his family. Malik Sūra, the minister of Public works was executed, Malik Karam-Chand, Malik Muqbil, Malik Fattū, and Malik Pirā were imprisoned, and their estates and endowments confiscated and distributed among members of his (Sarwar-ul-Mulk's) gang.[4] The elimination of the supporters of the dynasty was necessary, before Sarwar-ul-Mulk could put the crown on his own head. The Parganas of Bayānā, Anrōha (hitherto the sinecure of a Saiyad) Nārnaul,[5] Kuhrām and some Parganas of the Doāb were transferred to Sidhpāl, Sidhāran Khattrī and his relatives. But the occupation of these fiefs proved difficult, and when Sidhpāl sent his slave Rānū, the Abyssinian, with an army to occupy the fief and the fort of Bayanā, Yusuf Khān Auhadī, the chief of Bayānā, beat Rānū's army at the first encounter, and killed the pretender with his followers.[6]

Sarwar-ul-Mulk's plan to put the crown on his head foiled by a confederacy of nobles headed by Kamāl-ul-Mulk.

When the treachery of Sarwar-ul-Mulk and his base intention to sell himself to the murderers of the Sultān became known, many of the fief-holders and nobles who owed their position to the Khizr Khānī Dynasty, with-drew their allegiance from the government under Sarwar's tutelage and planned for revenge. Sarwar-ul-Mulk, on the other hand, was only biding his time and contriving to seize them. Malik Ilahdād Kāla Lōdi,[7] governor of Sambhal and Ahār (in Buland-shahr district, U.P.), Miān Jaman, the fief-holder of Badāun and grand-son of Khān Jahān, Amīr 'Alī Gujrātī, Amīr Kīk Turk-bachcha openly revolted in their respective assignments, and converted Bulandshahr into a rendezvous of their

4. Tar Mub Shahi, 237, Tab Akb I, 288.

5. Narnaul town lies on the bank of the Chhalk Nadī, 37 miles from Rewārī on the Rewārī-Phulera section of the Rājputāna Railway. It is the Hd. quarter of the Muhammadgarh Nizāmat of the Patiāla State. I. G. See also Āīn Jarrett II, 193-4.

6. Tār Mub Shāhī, 238.

7. Yahyā has Kākā; Badāoni I, Text 300 has Kālā. Hodivala Studies, 410 is emphatic about Kālā.

activities. Sarwar-ul-Mulk deputed Khān-i 'Āẓam Saiyad Khān (son of Saiyad Sālem), Malik Kamāluddīn (Kamāl-ul-Mulk), Malik Yusuf (son of Sarwar-ul-Mulk), and the sons of Sidhāran Gāngū[8] for the suppression of the confederate nobles. He was not till then aware of the real attitude of Kamāl-ul-Mulk[9] who had outwardly compromised his position with Sarwar, and was after an opportunity to turn the tables on him. Kamāl-ul-Mulk crossed the Jumna in Ramazān 837/April 1434, came to Bulandshahr as the vanguard of the Delhi army, intent on avenging on Yusuf Khān and Sidhāran's sons. Instead of fighting Malik Ilāhdād, he openly joined his forces with those of the rebel confederates.

Defeat of Sarwar's troops at Buland-shahr, 1434.

Apprehending troubles caused by Kamāl-ul-Mulk's desertion, Sarwar sent re-inforcements under his slave Malik Hushiār, to protect his generals against Kamāl-ul-Mulk's treachery. And when Malik Jaman (Chaman in some histories),[9a] joined his forces with those of Malik Ilahdād, Yusuf Khān and the son of Sidhāran, feeling that they had been out-numbered, left camp and retired to Delhi. At the end of Ramazān, Malik Ilahdād, Mīān Jaman, and all their confederates united with Kamāl-ul-Mulk and they jointly marched on Delhi from Buland-shahr. Sarwar-ul-Mulk, anticipating this move, fought to prevent the confederates crossing the Jumna, at the Kīcha ford without success.

Kamāl lays siege to Delhi and captures it.

Kamāl pushed on, reached the vicinity of Delhi and encamped in his own garden-house at Sīrī, compelling Sarwar to take shelter in the fort. The fort was closely invested for three months. Sultān Muḥammad pretended amity with Sarwar, and when Sarwar-ul-Mulk and the two sons of Mirān-i Ṣadr, suddenly approached before the king's camp with drawn sabres [8th Muharram 838/14th Aug. 1434], the Sultān who used to surround himself by a large party of attendant guards, succeeded in killing Sarwar on the spot. The sons of Mirān-i Ṣadr were captured and tortured to death.[10]

8. Badāoni, I, 301, has "Sidhāran and Gāngū", which is not correct.
9. Tār Mubarak Shāhī, 239.
9(a). *Jaman* in Tār Mub Shāhī.
10. Tār Mubārak Shāhī, 242.

The Sultān joined Kamāl through the Baghdād Gate. Sidhpāl fought till he was killed. Sidhāran Gāngū and other accomplices were impaled near the tomb of Mubārak Shāh at Muḥammad Shāh's orders. Malik Hushiār and Mubārak were executed before the Red Gate.

Muḥammad Shāh placed on the throne and Kamāl-ul-Mulk made Wazīr.

On the next day Kamāl-ul-Mulk and his partisan nobles offered allegiance to the Sultān, and raised him to the throne; Kamal-ul-Mulk was appointed Wazīr and dubbed Kamāl Khān, Malik Jaman became Ghazī-ul-Mulk, and was confirmed in his possession of Amrōha; Malik Ilahdād did not accept any title, but his brother became Darya Khān Lodi; Malik Khūbrāj Mubārak Khānī became Iqbāl Khān and was confirmed in his hold over the vilāyat of Ḥisār Fīrūza; the eldest son of Malik Sālem became Majlis-i 'Ālā Saiyad Khān, and the latter's younger brother became Shujā-ul-Mulk; Malik Baddha became 'Ālā-ul-Mulk and Malik-us-Sharq Hājī Shudnī became Police Prefect of the Metropolis.

Muḥammad Shāh's expedition against Shaikh Yusuf declared king of Multān 1434 A.D.

When matters settled down, Muḥammad Shāh turned towards Multān to punish Shaikh Yusuf, the descendant of Shaikh Bahāuddīn Zakaria Qurēshī who had declared the independence of Multān by putting the crown on his head. Setting up camp at *Mubārakpūr*, he was joined by Malik-us-Sharq 'Imād-ul Mulk (Malik Maḥmūd Ḥasan) Majlis-i 'Ālā Islām Khān, Muḥammad Khān, son of Zirak Khān, Khān 'Āzam Asad Khān, Yusuf Khān Auhadi (of Bayānā) and Ahmad Khān Miwātī and several other high generals. We know nothing of this expedition except the ceremonial entry of the Sultān to seek benediction at the tomb of the great Shaikh (Bahāuddīn Zakaria). It appears that the Multānīs, unable to resist the attack had fallen back. The Sultān did nothing but come back leaving a garrison, under Khān-i-Jahān.

Last military expedition undertaken in Sāmānā.

In 840/1436, the Sultān marched towards Sāmānā, and came back after plundering the fief of Bahlol Lōdī. From Sāmānā, he

sent a force against Jasrath Khokhar with abortive results.[11] After his return to Delhi, he busied himself with bouts and enjoyments of life, never caring to bother as to what happened in the kingdom.[12]

Disturbances and insurrections in the outlying Provinces.

Next year news was brought of fresh disturbances in Multān, caused by the insurrection of the Langas[13] resulting in the expulsion of the Delhi garrison, of Ibrahim Shah Sharqi's occupation of certain border districts in the east, and the Raja of Gwalior's ceasing to pay tribute. The easy-going Sultān did nothing to retrieve the situation, and "in every head grew ambition and in every heart desires."[14] Chaos reigned in the provinces and disorder prevailed outside the capital. Some Miwāti chiefs[15] with memories of plunder and destruction of their hearth and home by the Delhi forces under Mubarak Shah still fresh in their minds, and some courtiers of Delhi sick of the condition of affairs, induced Sultān Maḥmūd Shāh Khāljī of Mālwa, to invade Delhi the seat of the empire.[16]

Invasion of Delhi by Maḥmūd Shāh Khaljī of Malwa, 844/1440.

Being joined near the Jumna by *Yusuf Khān Hindauni,* Maḥmūd Shāh encamped near the metropolis and laid siege to the fort. The Sultān having neither the resources nor the heart to fight such a powerful enemy, summoned, as a dying man catches at the serpent, Malik Bahlul Lōdi from Sāmānā which had, of late, grown into a big Afghān colony, and appointed him the Commander-in-chief of his whole fighting forces. The Delhi troops encamped with the city of Tughlaqabād at its back. On learning that the Delhi forces were not commanded by Muḥammad Shāh in person, the chivalrous Maḥmūd deputed his sons Prince Ghayāsuddīn and Prince 'Alāuddīn to lead the Mālwa army. After a bloody action which lasted from mid-day till night-fall, both the armies entered their respective camps without yielding ground. But Sultān Maḥmūd of Mālwa became perturbed having dreamt over-night that

11. Badāuni Muntakhab I, 303.
12. Ferishta, Newalkishore I, 170.
13. Badāoni, I, 303.
14. Tab Akb I, 291.
15. Badāoni I, 303.
16. Tāb Akb I, 291.

the city of Māndū had been captured by a band of ruffians whose leader installed himself on the throne of Mālwa.[17] In the morning Maḥmūd Shāh hastened to conclude a treaty with the enemy before departing for Māndū. In view of the truce, the Mālwa army was quietly with-drawing. Bahlul treacherously fell on it, routed and dispersed it and captured all camps, arms and equipment. The weak-minded Sultān conferred on Bahlul the title of Khān Khānān, and the shaqs of Lāhore and Dipālpūr, called him son and thus whetted his ambition.

Bahlul seizes Delhi territories from Dīpālpūr to Pānipat, without excuse.

In 845/1441, the Sultān moved to Sāmāna to perform the investiture ceremony of the conferment of Lāhōre and Dīpālpūr on Bahlul. After this he deputed Bahlul to suppress the Khokhars in the Punjāb and returned to Delhi. The shrewd Jasrath compromised himself with the wily Paṭhān, and spheres of influences were agreed upon by them by mutual consent so that, Delhi and its territories were ear-marked for Bahlul. The Saiyad dynasty was tottering to its fall. Bahlul collected Afghān tribesmen from far and near into a formidable army, and forcibly seized all territory from Dīpālpūr to Pānipat, without any pretext. He marched on Delhi, invested the city for some time (about 845 H), but failed to occupy it. Bahlul having exposed the hollow-ness of the Sultanat and the weakness of its king, nobles who were at a distance of 40 miles from Delhi, with-drew their head from allegiance and became practically independent.[18]

In 847/1443, died Muḥammad Shāh after an inglorious reign of ten years and odd months.[19] His Tomb according to Gordon Hearn, lies in the village of Khairpūr.[19a] Nelson Wright[20] basing his evidence on Numismatics puts the date of his death to 849/1445. As none of the Persian authorities has mentioned the latter date,

17. Niẓāmuddīn Tab, III, 223, is of the opinion that, Maḥmūd Shāh made haste to conclude terms, at the news of the encroachment of his territories by Aḥmad Shāh of Gujrāt.

18. Tab Akb I, 292.

19. Tab Akb I, 292.

19a. Carr Stephens, *Seven Cities of Delhi,* p. 1611-62. Fergusson, *Indian and Eastern Architecture,* II, 217; Āsār-us-Sanādid, Ch. III, 42; Zafar Hasan, A list of Mahammadan and Hindu Monuments, Vol. II, No. 43, p. 32.

20. Sultān of Delhi, their Coinage and metrology, 234.

I am inclined to regard Wright's coin bearing the date 849/1445,[21] as a posthumously dated one.

Accession of 'Alāuddīn' Ālam Shāh, and widening of anarchy.

After Muḥammad Shāh's death, the nobles raised to the throne Prince 'Ālāuddīn, son of Muḥammad Shāh and for a long time governor of Badāun. He had already been declared heir-apparent by the late Sultān during his last ill-ness.[22] All the nobles including Bahlul did not take long to conclude that he was more incompetent, indolent and ease-loving and sensuous than his father. The result was a wide-spread anarchy and irritrievable confusion. Bahlul repented for his early compliance and soon stood up in open defiance.

'Ālam Shāh fixes his abode in Badāun and abandons Delhi.

In 850/1446, the Sultān rode towards Sāmānā, ostensibly to punish Bahlul for his obstinacy. Hearing a rumour that Sultān Mahmūd Shāh Sharqi was marching on Delhi, he retraced his steps, and came back to the capital. Ḥiṣām Khān, the Wazīr and his Deputy-in-Absentia (Nāib-i Ghaibat), was out-spoken enough to tell the Sultān, that it was un-kingly on his part to return from a campaign on merely hearing a rumour. The Sultān took objections to this remark. And next year 851/1447, he visited Badāun and stayed there for some months. On coming back when he expressed his willingness to transfer the capital to Badāun on the ground that he (the Sultān) had found its climate very agreeable, Ḥisām Khān, very politely warned the Sultān of the impolicy of such a move involving the abandonment of the eye of the kingdom in favour of a provincial town. This was too much for the weak Sultān to swallow in good grace. He dismissed Ḥisām Khān from Wazīrship, and leaving two of his brothers-in-law (wife's brothers) in charge of Delhi, one as Prefect, the other as minister of Public Works (Amīr-i Kohī), he left for Badāun in 852/1448, destined not to see Delhi in his life time.

Citizens of Delhi expel Sultān's brother-in-law and Ḥisām Khān seizes Delhi.

At that time almost nothing was left in the possession of the Sultān except the capital city, which too was lost soon after. His

21. Wright, Sultāns of Delhi.... 241, 249.
22. Badāunī, Muntakhab I, 304.

brothers-in-law fought with each other, so that one of them was killed and on the next day the citizens of Delhi, murdered the other, at the instigation of Ḥiṣām Khān.[23] The sway of the Sultanat was actually confined to an area between Delhi and Pālam. Outside of this, Provincial officers and chieftains reigned supreme. The Punjāb, Dīpālpūr, and Sirhind, upto Pānipat, remained with Bahlul; Aḥmad Khān Mīwāti held sway from Delhi to Lādu-sarāi in the vicinity of Delhi. Daryā Khan Lōdi (brother of Malik Ilahdād Kāla Lodi) held the tract from Sambhal (Moradabad Distt. U.P.) to Khwāja Khizr ford in the vicinity of Delhi 'Īsa Khān Turk-bachcha[24] held Kōl (Aligarh), Maḥmūd Khan held Kālpi; Qutb Khān the Afghān, Rāprī upto Bhongāon (both in Mainpuri Distt. of U.P.); Rāi Pratāp, the Chauhān chief held Patiāli and Kāmpil (Farrukhabad Distt. U.P.), and Dāūd Khān Bayāna. In 845/1441 Māhmūd Shāh Khaljī marched upon Kālpī and on the submission of Māhmūd Khān, the Kālpi chief, sent for the latter a beddecked crown, horses and other presents.[25] This was in fact the recognition of Mahmūd Shāh as a sovereign Prince under Mālwa's sphere of influence. No rent-collecting expedition had been sent to Kaṭhēr, from the time of Mubārak Shāh and a considerable portion of the Province had been lost to the local zamīndārs. This state of things encouraged Bahlul to make an end of a pitiable force by marching straight on the capital. But the defences of the city proved too strong for him and he had to return to Sāmānā without gaining his ends. The unhappy king held council with his ministers and sought their advice to revive the lost glory of the kingdom, and check the *rot*. His evil counsellors Quṭb Khān, 'Isa Khān and Rāī Pratāp (the Bhongaon chief), who were jealous of the power of Ḥamid Khān the Wazīr, suggested the latter's dismissal and imprisonment. They assured the Sultān that steps would be taken to strengthen the empire and they promised

23. Tab. Akb I, 293.

24. May be a son or a grandson of Mallū Iqbāl Khān whose family was transferred to Kōl by Khiẓr Khān, after the former's death, in the battle of Ajodhan.

25. Tabaqāt-i Akb. III, 330. S. H. Hodivala, Studies, 400, has brought to light, one of the exceedingly rare coins of this Maḥmūd Khān in a paper entitled "unassigned coins of Jalāl Shāh Sultāni, in *J. A. S. B.*, Cal. Art 289, 1930.

to bring under the crown a number of parganas which had passed under the control of usurping chiefs.

The King dismisses and imprisons Ḥamīd Khān who flees to Delhi and occupies the city.

The Sultān who had lost his good senses through dissipation, put that loyal servant in chains without the slightest compunction. Not satisfied with this, Rāi Pratāp, just to avenge a private vendetta,[26] insisted on the Sultān to put Ḥamīd Khān to death, and in return, he promised to add 40 Parganas to the crown. The Sultān, bereft of all conscience and being a thorough tool in the hands of unscrupulous people, gave orders for Ḥamīd Khān's execution. Ḥamīd Khan, timely rescued from prison by his relatives and partisans, fled to Delhi. Muḥammad Jamāl Khan his keeper who chased him was slain by Ḥamīd Khān. On entry into Delhi, Ḥamīd Khān most unchivalrously ejected the wives, sons and daughters of the Sultān, from the Fort, forcing them walk bare-footed and bare-headed through the streets of Delhi, and seized the treasures and paraphernalias of sovereignty.[27] The Sultān having lost his sense of shame as well, postponed revenge on the pretext of the intervention of the rainy weather. Hamīd Khān strengthened his position by inviting Bahlul from Sirhind, rather than see Delhi seized by Maḥmūd Shāh of Mālwa, or Maḥmūd Shāh of Jaunpūr. Welcoming the invitation, Bahlul marched on the capital in full force, after sending a polite message to Sultān 'Alāuddīn to the effect that he was going (852/1448), to chastise Ḥamīd Khān, the usurper. Bahlul overthrew Ḥamīd Khān through a successful coup d'etat[28] and ascended the throne, on the 17th of Rabi I, 855/April 19, 1451 and assumed the title of Sultān Bahlul.

Bahlul ascends the throne and pretends to be 'Alāuddīn's servant.

Yet he naively wrote to 'Alāuddīn at Badāun that he had avenged himself on Ḥamīd Khān for the Sultān's sake, and for reviving the glory of his empire.[29] He assured 'Ālāuddīn that he would serve as the custodian of the capital city on behalf of the

26. Tab Akb I, 297.
27. Tabāqāt-i Akb. I, 298. Ferishta, Newalkishore I, 172.
28. Has been fully discussed in the history of the Lōdi Sultans of Delhī and Āgrā, being published by the University of Dacca.
29. Tabaqāt-i Akb. I, 294.

Sultān and would not exclude the Sultān's name from the K̲h̲utba. According to Ferishta,[30] he caused the K̲h̲utba to be jointly read in his and Sultān 'Alāuddīn's name. The hapless Sultān wrote back that he regarded him as his elder brother since his father had called him (Bahlul) son, and that he would rest content with Badāun only, and keep Delhi in Bahlul's custody. That hypocritical cloak of K̲h̲utba reading for 'Alāuddīn was thrown away soon afterwards. Sultan 'Alaūddīn, lived long enough, ruling over a tract from Badaūn to K̲h̲airabād (in Sitapūr Distt., Āwādh), from the foot-hills of the Himālayās upto the bank of the Ganges, in full sovereignty, reading the K̲h̲utba and issuing the Sikka in his own name. He died in 883/1476,[31] unwept, unhonoured and unsung, after an inglorious reign of about seven years in Delhi and 18 years in Badāun. His tomb lies in a very ruined condition in Muhalla Mirān Sarāī, Badaun city, in the way to Sheikhpūrā, in an enclosure by the side of his mother, Mak̲h̲dūma-i Jahān's tomb.[32] The rights of his sons[33] were passed over by his son-in-law, Ḥusain Shāh Sharqī, who seized Badaūn as soon as he heard the news of Sultān 'Alaūddīn's death.

30. Newalkishore, I, 173.

31. Ferishta I, 177. Nelson Wright, Sultāns of Delhi, etc., 242.

32. Kanz-ut-Tawārikh, (History of Badāun), Maulvī Razīuddīn, p. 54-55; Art. in *J. A. S. B.*, entitled *Arabic and Persian Inscriptions* by Blochmann, p. 331 ff.

33. Acc. to Blochman, 'Alāuddīn 'Ālam Shāh had three sons, Aḥsan, 'Abbās and Ḥaidar. 'Abbās had no issues. He found Saiyadpūra outside Badāun fort, towards the south. The place does not exist now nor are there any descendants of his. Saiyad Ḥaidar founded Sarāi Mirān. His descendants exist to the present day, but are all poor agriculturists, P. 110-12, Inscription on Sul 'Ālam S̲h̲āh's tomb, J. A. S. B., Cal., 1872.

Synthesis in Indian Architecture

BY

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A singular characteristic of Indian art has been its capacity for assimilation of the varied elements it has received from outside. It is this feature which has kept the continuity of Indian art unbroken through the ages. This process of synthesis not only saved the soul of India in the midst of political changes, but led to a cultural alliance between the two rich and potent cultures—Hindu and Muslim. In all spheres of cultural activity, there was an exchange of ideas which provided a meeting-ground between the two major communities.

This process of synthesis and assimilation was nowhere more spectacular and concrete than in the sphere of architecture. And, this was no coincidence or chance, but a result chiefly of royal patronage or initiative. The fusion of Hindu and Muslim ideas was fostered by Muslim rulers as much as by Hindu Rajas. The blending of architectural styles produced a new and spontaneous revival of art. This architecture was one whereof both the Hindus and Muslims could be equally proud.

The manner in which the fusion resulted from an impact of the Muslim on the Hindu artistic forms is of peculiar interest. It resulted from the action and reaction of two different and independent styles upon each other, and this artistic interaction was so complex that it is often difficult to ascribe any of the constituent elements to its original source. Rarely in the history of architecture has the spectacle been seen of two forms, so distinct and so well developed, as the Hindu and Muslim, meeting and interacting on each other. The very differences which mark each of them make their fusion peculiarly instructive.

The building of mosques, tombs, palaces and cities was the favourite hobby of the Muslim rulers. But, as the number of

foreign artists was always comparatively negligible, they had to depend upon local craftsmen. The latter evinced a remarkable capacity for adaptation. They adhered to Muslim tastes and conventions as far as possible, but found ample scope for the introduction of some of their own ideas and conventions which were not in harmony with the ideals of Muslim art. This led to a blending of ideas which gave the Muslim monuments of India a look perceptibly unlike that of similar buildings in Muslim countries outside India.

It is this glaring difference which led E. B. Havell, an outspoken admirer of Hindu art, to reject the term, Indo-Saracenic, as an unscientific classification. However, even Havell, with all his bias for ancient Indian art traditions, had to admit that the traditional Indian styles were influenced by the works of Muslim art in Medieval times. Even assuming, therefore, what authorities like Havell and Coomarswamy have stated about the continuity of Indian art, one cannot deny that the Hindu craftsman of Medieval India was not merely a lender of ideas, but was also a borrower in no small a degree.

Medieval Indian architecture was thus built on the principle of give-and-take which in effect amounted to unity in diversity. The earliest mosques in India were built in Muslim style, yet the craftsmen who were mostly Hindus adapted local elements of construction and decoration. In the *Quwwat-ul-Islam* mosque of Delhi, for example, the local craftsmen, unfamiliar with the erection of arches, created false arches by means of horizontal courses of masonry which are seen in temple '*shikharas.*' The Qutb Minar which is Muslim in character was built by Hindu workmen under Muslim supervision in a manner which bears testimony to the admixture of Hindu features. The Alai Darwaza built by Alauddin Khalji, which shows the climax of 13th century Indo-Muslim art, is Muslim in general appearance, yet in its decorative details there is much that indicates Hindu taste and Hindu convention.

Even though Muslim puritanism was much in evidence during the Tughluq period, the architecture both in Delhi and the local centres like Jaunpur once again showed the process of fusion from the 15th century onwards. The architecture of Gujarat or Jaunpur or Bengal bears witness to a blending of Indian and Isla-

mic ideas and techniques. The tendency reached its high-water mark in the Mughal period when Indian and Persian elements mingled to produce a new and harmonious style of architecture. Hindu style based on the principle of horizontal or trabeate construction and characterised by a profusion of decorative detail got blended with the Muslim emphasis on the arch and the dome and with the Muslim accent on grace and harmony, no less than on symmetry and artistry. Where this synthesis was a real success, there could be wonders of art like the Taj Mahal.

Indeed, the Taj Mahal is a gem of which there is no parallel in other Muslim lands. It is Indian in form and in spirit, but is in fact neither purely Hindu, nor purely Muslim. It is the finest illustration of Hindu-Muslim copartnership in architecture. The design of the Taj Mahal is so Indian that it may be regarded as an important link in the long chain of India's art traditions from ancient times. The juxtaposition of five domes is the Hindu *"Pancharatna"* symbolism for the five elements. Even the bulbous dome which is the most pleasing feature of the Taj Mahal is, according to E. B. Havell, ultimately traceable to the old Hindu-Buddhist canon based on the lotus and the water-pot. The dome of the Taj is clearly unlike Arab, Persian or Turkish domes. The apotheosis of womanhood which the Taj Mahal symbolises was inspired by Hindu idealism.

Mughal monuments at Fatehpur Sikri, Agra and Delhi are veritable masterpieces of design, construction and decoration, which are all of a style which may be called Indian, for they are neither Hindu, nor Muslim completely. In the monuments of these centres, there is a communion of Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina and Persian features and ideas. For example, the insertion of Jaina serpentine brackets in Shaikh Chisti's tomb is a remarkable piece of a blending of dissimilar styles. The Panch Mahal at Sikri or Akbar's tomb at Sikandra likewise suggests a Buddhist monastery or *"Vihara."* The lotus-pillared Diwan-i-Khas at Sikri is another great example of a brilliant Hindu symbolism in a Persianised setting—a triumph of Hindu-Muslim copartnership. In short, there is a fundamental Indianness in all the thirteen so-called Indo-Saracenic styles enumerated by Fergusson, although it might not be visible always to the same extent everywhere.

How Hindu art motifs were adopted by the Muslim builders is a matter which is as interesting as it is significant. The lotus which is typically Indian was freely inserted in Muslim buildings as a decorative motif in both religious and secular monuments. The lotus motif is seen in mosques as freely as it is used in royal citadels and palaces. The *"Mahapadma"* on the dome of the Taj Mahal reminds one of an ancient and popular symbolism of the Hindus. The *"Amalaka"* or the *"Kalasha"* would also remind one of Hindu influence on Muslim art. Bell and Chain are other familiar Hindu motifs which were freely used in Medieval buildings.

The Muslims also borrowed many structural points from Hindu convention. Lintels and bracket-capitals are good instances. Projecting balconies, window openings and doors no less than heavy dripstones and plinths and mouldings are Hindu features to be found in Muslim buildings. The use of carving and sculpture was also inspired by Hindu tradition. Thus, even where the general outlook is Persian, Hindu tradition may still be seen in many features. For example, the combination of a Persianised dome with the Hindu kiosk is at once a reminder of a beautiful synthesis of two distinct streams of art. The same may be said about the combination of the arch and the pillar, or of the minaret and the projecting window. In short, every important Muslim monument shows that Hindu and Muslim styles could be blended into a unique amalgam.

The intermingling of ideas was not one-sided, for it was as much to be found in Hindu buildings as in contemporary Muslim monuments. Examples of pure or unalloyed Hindu style are to be found mainly in the Deccan. But, the contrast between the temples of the North and those of the South is so glaring that it catches the notice even of the hurried visitor. The emphasis on line and angle which characterises the Deccan temple is not to be seen in the Northern temples. The latter show a suitable adaptation of the Muslim arch and the dome. Again, the profusion of ornamentation which is the distinctive feature of Deccan style is absent in the North. The restraint which is seen in the North Indian temple so far as sculptural decoration is concerned is evidently a result of Muslim influence. The Hindu palaces of Rajpu-

tana and Central India are Hindu in structure, but they show a considerable influence of Muslim taste in decoration.

With the advent of the puritan Emperor Aurangzeb, Mughal art rapidly declined, and before long disappeared as a distinct entity. The craftsmen of the Indo-Muslim school took refuge in Hindu states of Rajputana, and Central India where they kept up the old traditions long after the eminence of Delhi had passed away. That the real greatness of Mughal architecture was a result of the cooperation between Hindu and Muslim genius is thus negatively proved by the sudden deterioration that came in the reign of Aurangzeb himself.

In the later Mughal period, the tombs and mosques show a distinct falling off of standard and taste which resulted from the sudden snapping of the ties of copartnership between Hindu and Muslim artists and craftsmen. The historic communion of ideas came to an end when Aurangzeb drove out all but orthodox Muslim builders, and banned the Hindu traditions of art. In other words, the decline of Medieval Indian architecture started only when the links of inter-communal alliance in art were suddenly snapped.

The characteristic greatness of the architecture of Medieval India may thus be justly ascribed to the fusion of ideas, which arose in the course of centuries of Muslim rule. Architecture symbolised a physical and external objectification of the will to unity and collaboration which formed the key-note of India's age-old artistic traditions.

Bengal under the Diwani Administration 1765-1772

Part II

BY

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The long and elaborate letter[40] of instructions, drawn up by Verelst and referred to in the Select Committee's resolution, indicates the following five main heads of their duty: —

(1) To prepare a summary history of the districts placed under their charge; (2) To report on the state, produce, and capacity of the lands in their districts; (3) To ascertain the amount and the manner of the collection of revenue, cesses, and other demands made on the ryot by the Government, the zamindar, or the collectors; (4) To examine and regulate the conditions of commerce, and abolish all extraordinary demands of the gumashtahs and other agents; and (5) To enforce justice, check corruption, and abolish all arbitrary fines. The letter concludes with a moving appeal which indicates a tender regard for the poor ryot of Bengal: - "Your commission entrusts you with the superintendence and charge of a province, whose rise and fall must considerably affect the public welfare of the whole. The exploring and eradicating of numberless oppressions, which are as grievous to the poor as they are injurious to the government; the displaying of those national principles of honour, faith, rectitude, and humanity, which should ever characterize the name of an Englishman; the impressing the lowest individual with these ideas, and raising the heart of the ryot from oppression and dependency to security and joy, are valuable benefits which must result to our nation from a prudent and wise behaviour on your part. Versed as you are in the language, depend on none, where you yourself can possibly hear and determine. Let access to you be easy, and be careful of the conduct of your dependents. Aim at no undue influence yourself, and check it in all others. Great share of integrity, disinterestedness, assiduity, and watchfulness is necessary, not only for your own guid-

40. Bengal Select Committee, Aug. 16, 1769.

ance, but as an example for all others, for your activity and advice will be in vain, unless confirmed by example. Carefully avoid all interested views by commerce or otherwise, in the province, whilst on this service; for, though ever so fair and honest, it will awaken the attention of the designing, double the labour of developing stratagems, and of removing burthens and discouragements with which the commerce of the country in general has been loaded. You have before you a large field to establish both in national and private character; lose not the opportunity, which is to be temporary only, for your whole proceedings will be quickly revised; a test which the Board consider due to themselves, as a confirmation of the propriety of their choice, to you, as an act of justice to your conduct; and to the public, for the security of its interests. As the extent and importance of your trust are great, so in proportion will be the approbation or censure, arising from your good or ill conduct in it, attended with unusual distinction or particular severity. Sentiments which I convey to you, to show the degree of confidence the Board repose in your integrity and abilities; but by which I mean not the remotest suspicion, either in them or myself of your disappointing their expectations."

Early in September the Council considered the proceedings of the Select Committee held on August 16, and unanimously resolved to adopt the plan of supervisorships, and directed Mr. Becher to instruct and supervise the new Supervisors in the discharge of their duties. Eight Supervisors of the Bengal districts were immediately appointed. Those for the districts in Bihar were, however, appointed during the Governorship of Cartier in 1770.[41] Both Mr. Becher[42] and Muhammad Riza Khan,[43] however, counselled delay in the execution of the plan on the ground that an immediate appointment of the Supervisors would prove detrimental to the present year's collections. Mr. Becher pointed out that the arrival of the Supervisors "in the height of collections" would create a divided power, and provide the artful people with a good opportunity of evading payment of the revenues by preferring number-

41. Bengal Select Committee, June 9, 1770. Bengal Secret Consultations, Aug. 2, 1770.

42. Bengal Select Committee, Sep. 25, 1769.

43. Muzaffar Namah, p. 452.

less complaints; the justness or impropriety of which the inexperienced Supervisors would be unable to judge. He urged at the same time that the Supervisors needed a special training at Murshidabad where the old records might help them in their subsequent inquiries.

The question as to whether the plan should be immediately enforced or deferred for some time came up for final decision before the Council towards the close of October.[44] The majority being impressed with the opinion of Mr. Becher that the collections might suffer as a result of an immediate enforcement of the plan favoured the view that the appointment of the Supervisors should be deferred till the close of February, 1770, except for those districts where the Resident at the Durbar thought the Supervisors might be sent immediately without detriment to the collections. Meanwhile, Mr. Becher grouped the Bengal districts into convenient divisions by annexing to each principal district all such smaller places as lay contiguous thereto, or had by any former tenure depended thereon.

For example, the salt lands of Hijili were added to Hooghly on which they had usually depended, as also several *'Taalluqahs'* which lay in its neighbourhood. Bishnupur was attached to Birbhum; while Idrakpur, Baharbund, Rangamati and its dependencies were similarly attached to Rangpur. Sylhet was joined to the Dacca division, while the lands north of Murshidabad and west of the Ganges were combined to form the division of Bhagalpur and Rajmahal. After these additions had been made, there remained the following districts which did not come under the jurisdiction of any of the Supervisors:—Chunakhali, Rokunpur, Jehangirpur, Fatehsingh Lashkarpur and Jessore. At their meeting, held on December 10, the Select Committee approved of the plan drawn up by Mr. Becher for the management of the divisions to be placed under the charge of the Supervisors already appointed. Among the unrepresented areas, Chunakhali, Fatehsingh Lashkarpur and parts of Rajshahi west of the Ganges were placed under the direct charge of the Resident at the Durbar, while separate Supervisorships were to be created for Jessore and Rokunpur.

44. Bengal Secret Consultations, Oct. 26, 1769.

Although the instructions framed by Verelst and approved by the Select Committee were sufficiently exhaustive, the Select Committee authorised[45] the Resident at the Durbar to issue such suplementary instructions to the Supervisors as might be found necessary hereafterwards. Ordinarily, the Resident was to obtain the previous sanction of the Select Committee to all such additional instructions, but on occasions of emergency he was to have authority for enforcing his instructions promptly, though in such cases he was to take the earliest opportunity of forwarding his instructions to the Select Committee with his reasons for the same. Besides, it was finally decided to place the Supervisors under the control of the Resident at the Durbar, who in cases of any misconduct on their part, was to have the power of recalling them from their stations, and of reporting their proceedings to the Governor and Select Committee. It was, however, agreed that the Supervisor of Dacca, being a member of the Council, and, as such equal in status to the Resident at the Durbar, was not to be subordinate to the latter, though he too was to send all his reports and accounts to him.

A few days before Verelst finally laid down his office, the Select Committee framed certain general directions[46] for the conduct of the Supervisors. These may be summarised as follows: First, though the Supervisors for the present were not to interfere in the collections, they were to exercise a controlling authority over the collectors; second, the collectors were to be required "to consult and mutually act on every occasion with, and report all transactions to the Supervisors;" third, the Supervisors were to have the same negative voice in all judicial proceedings; fourth, although the Supervisors were not forbidden to carry on private trade of their own, they were to discharge their duties "with as few embarrassments as possible;" fifth, the Supervisors were "to avoid all appearance of pomp and parade whatsoever," and "pursue a system of economy in all their measures"; and, last, they were to send a monthly return of their expenses to the Resident at the Durbar so that the Select Committee might be enabled to judge what allowances should be granted to them.

45. Bengal Select Committee, Dec. 10, 1769.
46. Bengal Select Committee, Dec. 15, 1769.

The entire plan of Supervisorships actually came into force in the time of Governor Cartier, when five Supervisors were appointed for the province of Bihar as well. Adopted with the best of intentions by its authors, and approved and eulogised by the Directors,[47] the plan was doomed from the very start. Its failure became so apparent that the Directors who had cordially welcomed it in 1771 insisted on its immediate withdrawal in 1773.[48] It will not be improper here to analyse the causes responsible for its failure.

The duties entrusted to the Supervisors were so numerous and difficult that they called for almost superhuman labours, and it was not humanly possible for them to execute even a small part of their trust. They were to be not so much revenue superintendents as historians, economic investigators, rural statisticians, experts in land tenures, trade development officers, controllers of law and justice, and protectors of the poor. Having been ordered to perform far more than they could possibly execute, they finished by performing much less than they might have done. The number of the Supervisors actually appointed was also much too small for the exhaustive work of control imposed upon them. The Resident at the Durbar who was already overburdened with his own normal work, and was expected to control the work of the Supervisors was to act also as the Supervisor of a big division. The Chief of Dacca whose duties in the local factory were no less arduous was also to act as the Supervisor of Dacca and Sylhet. From such an inadequate and overburdened staff, therefore, it was futile to expect any remarkable achievements.

From the outset the Supervisors were hampered in their investigations by the Zamindars and collectors. To them the appointment of English Supervisors was naturally distasteful and they tried their best to obstruct or embarrass the enquiries, and misrepresent the conduct of their new superintendents. The Supervisors, with the exception of a few, had also little or no training for the specialised work with which they were entrusted. Originally appointed for the purpose of collecting information and of keeping a vigilant watch over the administration and the collection

47. Letter from Court, April 10, 1771.
48. Letter from Court, April 7, 1773.

of the revenues, they became eventually, in the words[49] of Warren Hastings, "the sovereigns" of the divisions over which they presided, began to act as Chief Magistrates, collected the rents, and farmed the lands to persons whom they liked to favour. Thus, the original design which could have caused no material harm was frustrated with the subsequent transformation of the character of the Supervisorship itself.

Not being debarred from engaging in private trade, the Supervisors were naturally tempted to engross the inland trade of their districts, and exploit their privileged position for this purpose. They could thus have little leisure for their own normal duties. The Indian '*banyans*' who were "devils", according to Warren Hastings, abused their powers and tyrannised over the poor with the utmost impunity, and thereby nullified the whole plan of Supervisorships. Furthermore, the Supervisors were not only not granted adequate salaries, but their allowances were drastically reduced in 1771 as a measure of economy desired by the Directors at whose instance the Council[50] decided that with effect from 1st April, 1771, the Supervisors in Bengal and Bihar who had so far been receiving an allowance of 1,000 *sikkah* rupees per month were to be allowed an allowance of *Sicca* rupees 1,800 per annum! This cut in their salary, precipitate and unfair as it was, naturally caused discontent among the Supervisors, and made them all the more susceptible to the temptations to which their Indian '*banyans*' always exposed them. A low salary could hardly encourage them to rise above the general corruption. As the Supervisor tended to be preoccupied with his private trade, his '*banyan*' soon became "the lord of every supervisorship,"[51] because all the business passed through his hands, and no complaints could reach his master without his consent.

The absence of a strict control over the Supervisors owing to the weakness and preoccupations of the authorities at Patna, Murshidabad, and Calcutta was further responsible for the failure of the plan. The Supervisors were often supported by strong con-

49. Letter from Warren Hastings to Mr. J Dupre, March 26, 1772.
50. Letter from Warren Hastings to Mr. Colebrooke, March 26, 1772, and to Mr. J. Dupre, Jan. 6, 1773.
51. Bengal Secret Consultations, March 18, 1771.

nections either in the Council, or in the Court of Directors, and were, in the words of Warren Hastings, secure from a strict scrutiny into their conduct and totally exempt from the fear of punishment. Finally, the famine of 1770 also helped in upsetting the whole plan.

With a view to eradicate the glaring abuses in the present revenue administration, the Directors themselves chalked out a plan of reformation which they laid down in their letter of 30th June, 1769, to the President and Council at Calcutta. They pointed out, "Our intention is to proceed in this work without taking off from any of those profits and emoluments which have usually accrued to the zamindars who have inherited lands from their ancestors, much less to add anything to the rents to be collected from the tenants, on the contrary we mean to better the condition both of the one and the other, by relieving them from many oppressions which they now labour under."[52] Realising that a plan of reformation of an extensive character could not be executed by a single individual, they announced decision to appoint "a committee of some of our ablest servants for the management of the Dewannee revenues at Muxadabad (i.e., Murshidabad) for the Bengal province, and at Patna for that of Bahar." The gentlemen to be so appointed were to be controllers for the management of the Diwani revenues under the control of the President and Council, and they were to be assisted by as many junior covenanted servants as might be deemed necessary to correct abuses and enforce the proposed reformation.

The business of these councils was to be, firstly, to inquire into the real state of the collections and the nature of the cultivation and produce of each district, and, secondly, to find out how the immense charges of collection could be reduced. They were, in short, to control the entire work of revenue collections, and for this purpose they were to be assisted by Muhammad Riza Khan, Naib Diwan for Bengal, and, Shitab Ray, Naib Diwan for Bihar, through whom all the business was to be transacted. While it was to be the function of the Naib to give their advice and opinion upon all matters relating to the revenue, the Council was "to consider and determine the whole," and no appointments were to be made, nor were any orders to be issued by the Naib without its sanction. "To

52. Letter from Court, June 30, 1769.

sum up the whole of this subject in a few words," the Directors concluded, "our meaning is to save what we can of the large salaries now paid to idle dependents appointed to nominal but useless offices by the country government, and to lead you to such a knowledge of the real state of the rents and cultivation of the several districts as may enable you to keep the tenants free from imposition and extortion, and to give every possible encouragement to the husbandman and the manufacturer."

The Directors informed the Council at the same time that they had resolved to send three Commissioners to India "with full powers of superintending the Company's several Presidencies and directing their operations to one uniform Plan." These Commissioners were Messrs. Henry Vansittart, Luke Scrafton and Francis Forde. Although appointed for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of reform in all the settlements of the Company, the Commissioners were especially empowered to enforce "a better mode of collecting the Duannee revenues" in accordance with the plan laid down by the Directors. But, although the aforesaid Commissioners had embarked from England on 30th September, 1769, and were known even to have reached the cape of Good Hope, they failed to reach India, and it was presumed after a prolonged suspense that the Commissioners were lost at sea.

On the presumption that the work of the ill-fated mission in respect of the Diwani revenues now devolved on it the Council after mature deliberations agreed[53] by a majority of votes to enforce the orders of the Directors regarding the appointment of the Councils of Revenue at Murshidabad and Patna. It was decided that the Council for Murshidabad was to consist of four members, two of them to be members of the Council at Fort William and the rest to be senior servants of the Company. The Council for Patna was to consist of three members, one of them to be a member of the Council at Fort William and the rest to be senior servants of the Company. It was further agreed that the Instructions to be issued to these two Councils for their guidance were to be modelled on those laid down in the letter of the Directors, dated 30th June, 1769. The gentlemen appointed to form the Council of Revenue at Murshidabad were Messrs. Becher, Reed, Lawrell and Graham,

53. Bengal Secret Consultations, June 27, July 6, 1770.

while those for the Council of Revenue at Patna were Messrs. Alexander, Vansittart and Palk. They were ordered to take charge of their offices on the 1st September, 1770. It may be added in this connection that these Councils functioned until they were dissolved in 1772 on the recommendation of the Committee of Circuit.

Over and above the aforesaid Controlling Councils, a separate Controlling Committee of Revenue was constituted[54] at Calcutta in conformity to the general instructions laid down by the Directors,[55] for the formation of the Council at Fort William into proper Committees for efficient transaction of business. Under this Committee was placed all the business relative to the revenues, and the Councils at Patna and Murshidabad were placed under its direct control. Although the Directors had intended that each Controlling Committee was to consist of four members only, the Council on the recommendation of Governor Cartier decided that the Controlling Committee of Revenue should be composed of the whole Council, for Mr. Cartier pointed out,[56] "so very enlarged and important a branch as that of the revenue, I would recommend in the final settlement of that Committee the same be composed of the whole Board as the resolutions when formed of only a part can not be final and conclusive but must be referred to the Board in a collective body time may be lost before the sanction of the Board can be obtained and the orders of the Committee in consequence issued, which I apprehend will be saved if it should be determined to conduct it by a Committee of the whole Board." This Committee ceased to function in 1772, when it was replaced by a new Board of Revenue at the instance of the Committee of Circuit.

Notwithstanding all that Verelst and Cartier did to alleviate the evil character of the revenue system which Clive had introduced, its breakdown was an undisputed fact. So long as the dual system was to remain in force, the authorities were powerless to redress grievances or effect any radical improvements. Persons of character had been employed in the work of collections, but, as the Select Committee confessed with regret,[57] "Fear, reward, seve-

54. Bengal Secret Consultations, March 7, 1771.
55. Letter from Court, March 23, 1770.
56. Bengal Secret Consultations, March 21, 1771.
57. Bengal Select Committee, Aug. 16, 1769.

rity and indulgence have all failed, and ended in a short-political forbearance or additional acts of dishonesty and rapine." The Resident at the Durbar whose duty it was to check abuses and prevent oppression could not restrain single-handed "the depredations of hungry collectors" who practised "their native oppressions over a timid, servile and defenceless people." His want of time and ignorance and too indirect information through ministerial channels, in addition to his anxiety to prevent losses in the revenue from prolonged enquiries placed the oppressors beyond his reach. For the Supervisors who knew little of the language, manners and opinions of the people, and who were much too preoccupied with their own private trade, it was wellnigh impossible to prevent the frauds and oppressions rampant throughout the country. The Controlling Councils, exclusive of the extremely perfunctory control which they exercised over the Supervisors, had neither the time, nor the inclination to redress grievances. The Supreme Council or the Controlling Committee of Revenue at Calcutta was, in the words of Warren Hastings, "devoid of all power and authority beyond the narrow limits of Calcutta."

Nothing could better illustrate the utter inhumanity of the whole system than the dreadful famine of 1770, which caused a mortality rarely witnessed in the history of this country. At least, one-third of the total population must have perished of hunger and a fair portion of the rest was reduced to beggary exceeding all description.[58] It appears that little or no relief was afforded to the famine-stricken on the curious plea that the calamity was beyond the ingenuity of man and that no human means could check its baneful influence! The general distress was on the contrary turned by many of the government officials, English merchants and their gumashtahs into a source of illicit private profit, for they monopolised all available grain and compelled the poor ryots to sell even the seed requisite for the next harvest, thereby aggravating the universal misery. At the moment when people lived on leaves of trees and offered their sons and daughters to sale for want of food, the worst of profiteering was allowed to flourish without enquiry or punishment.[59] As if this was not

58. Letter to Court, May 9, 1770.
59. Letter from Court, Aug. 28, 1771.

enough, the normal revenue demand was fully enforced by the government, notwithstanding the huge mortality and the consequent decrease of cultivation. In fact, not only was there no loss to the total revenue, but there was on the contrary a perceptible increase in the collections of the year 1771. The collections were violently kept up by means of arbitrary impositions and cesses like the *Najay* which was a highly iniquitous levy on the actual or surviving inhabitants of a village to supply the loss to the revenue due to desertion or death of their neighbours. A number of zamindars were ruined in consequence, and many others were imprisoned for arrears of rents, and people of the highest rank could ill conceal the marks of poverty and want! Large parts of the country returned to jungle, for the surviving ryots took to flight rather than submit to merciless oppression, and in more than one district the estimates of total casualties reached so high as one-half and even more. In the midst of such dislocation of social and economic life of the country, the authorities at Calcutta boasted of their efficient management of the revenues in the following words, "We flatter ourselves that the comparative view we hope you will take of the Bengal collections for these several years past with those of last year will satisfy you as to the favourable success we have met with in the collections of the revenues."[60] All this betrays a cynical complacency which is truly amazing and which could be possible only under the conditions created by the dual system of government.

The administration of law and justice which has a vital connection with the administration of revenue was equally unsatisfactory throughout this period because of the anomalous character of the government under which the Company's servants were prevented from assuming a direct responsibility for it. Left to the nominal care of the Nawab and his Ministers who possessed no real powers, the machinery of law and justice in the Diwani portion of Bengal lost its former efficacy, and virtually ceased to operate beyond the narrow circle round about the capital. Calcutta and the Ceded lands, being directly under the control of the Company's servants, had of course regular courts of justice, but even there the judicial organisation was not free from anomalies and imperfections.

60. Letter to Court, Nov. 3, 1772.

In accordance with the traditions of Mughal administration, the judicial powers in the *Subah* were shared between the Nawab and the Diwan. In theory, the Nawab was the Supreme Magistrate in the province, and was responsible for the maintenance of the peace and administration of criminal justice, while the Diwan, by virtue of his office as the head of the provincial exchequer, held charge of civil jurisdiction, and was the highest judge in all civil and revenue matters. This line of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the Nizamat and the Diwani was, however, practically obliterated after the assumption of the Diwani by the English. Despite its accession to the office of Diwan, the Company strictly enjoined upon its servants not to interfere in the administration of justice, while the Nawab had neither the power, nor the means to enforce the criminal jurisdiction of the Nizamat. The regular course of justice was thus, in the words of Warren Hastings, every where suspended. Muhammad Riza Khan who held the offices of Naib Diwan and Naib Nazim was more concerned with the collection of the revenue than with the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction. In consequence, there was a break-down in the adminstration of law and order in the Diwani lands, and there were very few law courts having more than a nominal existence outside Murshidabad. In the countryside lawlessness was on the increase owing to the impotence of the Nizamat, and the member of dacoities rose to an alarming extent.[61] The *'Sannyasi'* raiders, above all, created havoc in the outlying parts of Bengal, and the 'parganah' battalions found it increasingly difficult to cope with this danger.[62]

At Murshidabad the following officers had their courts[63]:— 1. The *Nazim* who, as Supreme Magistrate, presided personally at the trial of capital offenders and held a court every Sunday. 2. The Diwan who was supposed to decide cases relating to real estates and landed property, but seldom exercised this authority in person. 3. The *Daroghah-Adalat-al-Alia,* or the *Naib Nazim* who was the

61. Muzaffar Namah, p. 441.
Committee of Circut, June 28, 1773.
Bengal Revenue Consultations, Nov. 17, 1772, etc.
62. Bengal Select Committee, April 30, 1767.
63. Letter from the Committee of Circuit, Aug. 15, 1772.
Siyar, pp. 828-34.

judge of all matters of property, excepting claims of land and inheritance, and took cognizance of quarrels, frays and abuse. 4. The *Daroghah-Adalat-Diwani,* or the *Naib Diwan* who decided cases relating to landed property. 5. The *Faujdar* who was the chief police officer and judge of all crimes not capital. 6. The *Qazi* who, besides being the judge of all claims of inheritance or succession performed the ceremonies of weddings, circumcision and funerals. 7. The *Muhtasib* who took cognizance of drunkenness, the vending of spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, and false weights and measures. 8. The *Mufti* who expounded the law and wrote the *fatwa* applicable to the case, in accordance with which the *Qazi* pronounced his judgment. 9. The *Qanungo* who, as Registrar of the lands, acted as a referee in cases relating to lands. 10. The *Kotwal* who was Peace Officer of the night, subordinate to the Faujdar.

From the above list it would be apparent that there were properly three courts for the decision of civil causes, and one for police and criminal justice. Of these the courts of the Naib Diwan and the Faujdar alone were of some practical utility. The courts did not always adhere to their prescribed bounds. Not only, the Civil Courts encroached upon each other's authority, but both Civil and Criminal Courts sometimes took cognizance of the same subjects. In the districts the Faujdars acted as magistrates and chiefs of police, and had jurisdiction in criminal matters. They had under them *'Thanahdars'* and *'Kotwals'* who helped in maintaining the peace in villages and towns respectively. It is to the Faujdars therefore that the people in the districts looked up for justice, although acts of oppression on their part were not uncommon. The Qazi had his substitutes or Naibs in the countryside, but their legal powers were too limited to be of general use, and the authority which they assumed, being often warranted by no lawful commission, was usually a source of oppression. By virtue of their position in the hierarchy of Diwani, the *amils, shiqdars, naibs* and *tahsildars* had some jurisdictions in revenue cases, while the *Mutasaddis* who were clerks in the Revenue Department and the *Qanungos* who kept registers of the value, tenure and transfer of lands acted as referees in cases of dispute or uncertainty regarding rights in land. In the interior of the country, particularly in rural areas, the Zamindar in his private cutcherry administered

a rough-and-ready type of justice, and, although he did not preside over the local Faujdari Court, as has been wrongly stated in the Sixth Report[64] of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, his criminal jurisdiction may have extended at least to the petty offences committed in his area.

That the organisation of law and justice was in a deplorable condition will be apparent from the following facts. The officers of justice received their appointments not on grounds of merit and suitability, but usually as a matter of official favour or indulgence. In consequence, corruption was rampant and "the painful task of rendering justice" was turned, in the words of the contemporary chronicler, "into a powerful engine for making a fortune."[65] The judges were not paid fixed salaries. They derived their emoluments from fines and recognised perquisites, but there was no one to check the rate of the perquisites they drew from their office. The office of the Qazi could also be leased out and under-leased. The result was that people, ignorant even of the main principles of religion and law, took leases of what they called the Qazi's rights, and openly underleased them to others. Justice was not impartially enforced in all cases, as the decision of the judges was in most cases "a corrupt bargain with the highest bidder."[66] On receiving a suitable fee, the Qazi could always "turn right into wrong and injustice into justice."[67] The levy of one-quarter, called the *Chauth,* on the amount of all debts, and on the value of all property recovered by the decrees of the courts, was a highly iniquitous and oppressive mode of taxation sanctioned by the government. Another serious defect in the judicial system was the want of properly graded subordinate courts for the distribution of justice in such parts of the province as lay out of the reach of the courts at Murshidabad. In consequence, only the well-to-do or the vagabond part of the population could afford to travel so far for justice. Owing to the absence of an effective control from the head quarters, it was easy for people in the interior to assume judicial powers without any lawful title or commission. It was

64. Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 2.
65. Siyar, p. 829.
66. Bengal Select Committee, Aug. 16, 1769.
67. Siyar, p. 828.

to prevent this growing evil that the Supervisors were required to check and register the *sanads* of all officers of justice. The Supervisors were also instructed to put an end to all arbitrary fines such as the *Faujdari Bazi Jama* which constituted an additional incentive to bribery and oppression. Registers and records of proceedings were not kept by the courts, and this too encouraged the propensity of the judge to corruption and fraud. Besides, certain practices sanctioned by Muslim law were also extremely anomalous, such as the infliction of fine, instead of capital punishment, for murder with an instrument not formed for shedding blood, or the privilege granted to sons or the nearest relations to pardon a murderer.

In the Ceded lands the administration of justice was more regular, because the Chief of Chittagong, or the Residents at Midnapur and Burdwan, in addition to their normal duties were also concerned with the courts of justice in their districts. They were invested with the superintendence of the Faujdari jurisdiction, and were authorised to arrest robbers, dacoits and other disturbers of the peace. Appeals against their decision could be made to the Governor and Council. In cases of capital punishments, they usually sought the advice of the latter. The following[68] were the main courts of law in the Ceded districts: 1. *The Sadar Cutcherry* which dealt with cases pertaining to land-rents and landed property. 2. *The Bakshi Dastur* which dealt with matters concerning the police. 3. *The Faujdari Adalat* which dealt with criminal matters including capital offences. 4. The *Barah Adalat* which was a court of *'Meum'* and *'Tuum'* for all demands above fifty rupees. 5. The *Amin Dastur* which was subordinate to the *Sadar Cutcherry*. 6. The *Chotah Adalat* which took cognizance of petty suits for debts not exceeding fifty rupees. 7. The *Bazi Zamin Dastur* which dealt with causes relating to charity and rent-free lands. 8. The *Bazi Jama Dastur* which took cognizance of social offences and had jurisdiction in matters concerning grants for lands and public works for the accomodation of travellers such as *'Sarais'* or resting places, etc. 9. The *Kharaj Dastur* which dealt with the settlement of the landholders' accounts.

68. Verelst's View, etc., Appendix, pp. 219-20.

At Calcutta there were two sets of courts—one instituted by the royal charters and exercising jurisdiction from the English Crown over British subjects, their native employees and other persons who willingly subjected themselves to that jurisdiction, and the other, established by the Company in its capacity as Zamindar, and deriving its authority from the country government, and having jurisdiction over the local inhabitants only.

The following[69] courts of justice had been instituted by the royal charters: 1. The Mayor's Court. It was a Court of Record, consisting of the Mayor and nine Aldermen. It dealt with all civil suits, except such as concerned the natives. It could take cognizance of the suits and actions between the natives also, when both the parties concerned, by mutual consent, submitted the same to its determination. 2. The Court of Appeals. It was also a court of Record, consisting of the Governor and Council, which heard appeals against the decrees of the Mayor's Court. 3. The Court of Requests. It consisted of twenty-four Commissioners who sat on every Thursday to determine summarily all petty suits as did not exceed five pagodas, or forty Shillings in amount. 4. The Court of Quarter Session. The Governor and members of the Council who had power to act as Justices of the Peace held Quarter Sessions four times in the year, and at all other times, they acted as Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery to try criminal causes. They could appoint and summon Grand and Petty Juries for the purpose of such trials.

Besides the aforesaid courts, there were the following courts[70] established under the authority of the country government:—1. The Court or Cutcherry. It consisted of the Company's servants under Council, any three of whom including their President met upon days stated at their own option to hear all matters of '*Meum*' and '*Tuum*', wherein only the native inhabitants of Calcutta were concerned. Appeals from the decisions of this court could lie to the Governor and Council. The court levied special

69. Bolts: Considerations, etc., Chap. IX,
Verelst: View, etc., Chap. V
Second Report, 1772.
Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773.
70. Bolts: Considerations, etc., pp. 27-8.
Verelst: View, etc., pp. 80-3.

'Pachotra' or tax upon the amount of the suits instituted before them. 2. The *Zamindary* or *Faujdari* Court. It was presided over by a member of the Council or sometimes a servant under Council alone. His duty was to determine in a summary fashion all causes of a criminal nature among the native inhabitants who did not apply to the English court of justice. 3. The Collector's Cutcherry. The Collector who was usually a member of the Council took cognizance of all causes and disputes relating to the payment of the revenues. From the very nature of his office, he was concerned with the police of the town of Calcutta. 4. *The Caste Cutcherry*. The Court which was presided over by some distinguished Hindu official nominated by the Governor took cognizance of all matters relative to the caste observances of the Hindus. In the exercise of his authority, the judge was assisted by a number of learned *Brahmin* priests in consultation with whom he pronounced judgment.

The judicatures established at Calcutta were not insufficient for the ordinary requirements of the Settlement, but their jurisdictions were ill defined, and their constitution was not wholly satisfactory. As the courts were more or less an off-shoot of the executive machinery itself, executive power and judicial authority were concentrated in the hands of the same persons i.e., the Governor and Council. Bolts's denunciation of the whole system of justice is doubtless exaggerated and biassed, but it at least serves to expose the anomalous character of a system under which, to use his own words, the Governor and Council could, in fact, be the parties to prosecute, the magistrates to imprison, the judges to sentence, the Sovereigns to order execution, and such despots in authority that no grand or petit jury would easily venture to disoblige them. Owing to its ill-defined authority, the Mayor's Court often assumed powers in the words of a contemporary writer, "if not illegal, at least impolitic."[71] The terms of its institution being vague, there was room for doubts as to whether its authority could extend beyond the Maratha Ditch, whether the native employees of the Company could be deemed to be British subjects, and whether they could be subjected to the laws of England. The con-

71. Considerations on a Pamphlet entitled 'Thoughts on our Acquisitions in the East Indies', 1772, p. 43.

stitution of the courts further did not provide for the appointment of experienced lawyers as judges. As a consequence, judicial power rested in the hands of men who had no training in law. The judges were not always even senior in age and service. The position and powers of the Cutcherries too were ill-defined, and the want of a proper demarcation of their respective jurisdictions often encouraged people to carry causes already tried by one court for a fresh trial to the other.

Currency reform constituted one of the most perplexing problems that had to be faced during the period of the Diwani administration. In an age when the economic science was yet in its infancy, it was well nigh impossible for the Company's servants to view the currency questions in their true perspective. Their knowledge of the economic principles being rudimentary at best, their currency measures were necessarily imperfect and amateurish. The most serious aspect of the currency question was the scarcity of coin due mainly to the following factors: first, the loss of an immense treasure in species that was carried away by Mir Qasim; second, the drain caused by the annual tributes to the Mughal Emperor from 1765 and to the British Parliament from 1767; third, the drain caused by the disbursement for troops stationed outside Bengal; fourth, the heavy yearly exports of bullion for the Company's China investment which brought no imports in exchange; fifth, the large remittances sent annually from Bengal to the other Presidencies and Settlements both in times of peace and war; sixth, the exportation of bullion by the other European Companies trading in Bengal; seventh, the stoppage of the import of specie from Europe; eighth, the decline of the external trade of Bengal with neighbouring countries; ninth, the growth of hoarding of precious metals in times of political crisis; and, last, the flight of the Bengal *Sikkahs* to the other parts of India on account of their comparative purity.

Clive was fully cognisant of the gravity of the growing evil of the scarcity of coin, and he repeatedly requested the Directors to consider some plan to obviate the unfortunate results of the ceaseless drain of specie from Bengal. But, these repeated remonstrances and representations went unheeded. Influenced obviously by an extravagant notion of the opulence of Bengal, they under-rated the evils pointed out to them. At last, to counteract in some

measure the alarming consequences of the scarcity of the current specie, Clive decided in 1766 to introduce a gold currency, though he knew[72] that this bimetallic plan could be no more than a temporary palliative.

Before introducing the gold coinage, Clive and his Select Committee had to discover the relative value of two metals, gold and silver. From the data collected, it appeared that the value of gold nearly approximated to the proportions recognised by the mint indenture in England, and this valuation had already been adopted in the case of the gold pagoda of Madras, which weighed 2 Dwt. 6 grains, and was of the fineness of 20 carats, and contained 45 grains of pure gold. A valuation on a lower scale than that of Madras was not desired, and there were reasons which suggested a higher valuation. For example, it was anticipated that a new demand for gold as current coin was bound to enhance its price. Besides, it was necessary to hold out some inducement to the local bankers to bring gold to the mint. Again, it was apprehended that gold might be exported to Europe, if the two metals were to be valued according to the European standard. The Select Committee therefore proposed to establish the par of exchange between the new gold mohur and the silver *sikkah* rupee at the rate of fifteen to one. The Council, however, thought that this rate would mean "too considerable a profit for the merchants and proprietors for bringing their gold to the mint."[73] Ultimately, after mature deliberations, it was resolved that the new gold mohur should be issued at a valuation 8 *per cent* above its intrinsic relative value, according to the proportions of the two metals established by the mint indenture in England, and was to be deemed equivalent to fourteen *sikkah* rupees. The gold mohurs were issued in the subdivisions of halves, quarters, and eighths, and it was announced that a tender of payment was in future to be equally valid in gold and silver and that every attempt to create an artificial *batta* or exchange was to be rigorously punished.

Clive's gold currency, however, proved a failure. In fact, it made the existing situation still worse, and silver began to disappear from circulation more rapidly. The circumstances which con-

72. Letter to Court, Jan. 31, March 24, 1776.
73. Bengal Public Consultations, June 2, 1766.

tributed to the frustration of the bimetallic plan of 1766 are not difficult to understand. In the first place, gold had so far been only an article of merchandise, and its present use in the form of coinage was a novelty to which the people could not be easily accustomed. In the second place, as the foreign companies preferred silver in exchange for their bills of remittance, people were compelled to purchase silver at an enhanced price for purposes of investments. In the third place, the necessity of providing for the China investment in silver obliged the Fort William authorities to exchange gold at a loss. In the fourth place, the increasing demand for silver raised its price abnormally and made the gold mohurs all the more unpopular. In the fifth place, the authorities suspected that the bankers wilfully obstructed the new currency. In the sixth place, the advice of Jagat Seth that some annual *batta* should be allowed on the gold mohurs in the same manner as was the practice in the case of the *sikkah* rupees was neglected, and this neglect, in the opinion of Verelst, was the greatest error in the plan of 1766. In the seventh place, the gold coins were not used by the Company for procuring their own annual investments. In the last place, the plan failed chiefly because the gold mohurs were overvalued to the extent of 17½ *per cent.* It is this over-rating of gold which was the real error of Clive's plan, as it made the hoarding and exportation of silver profitable. The result was that silver tended to disappear from circulation, and when silver was available at all, it commanded a heavy premium; in other words, the value of gold fell heavily in terms of silver. In Verelst's time the gold mohurs of 1766 passed at a discount even up to 38 per cent! The scarcity of silver became so acute that the bankers complained that they had no silver to give in exchange for the gold mohurs. There were in consequence a large number of bankruptcies among the merchants and bankers. It became difficult for the townspeople to procure even common necessaries or meet petty liabilities for want of silver coins.

In sheer despair, Verelst and his Council decided[74] in 1768 to abolish the gold currency. They resolved to receive into the treasury the gold mohurs at the full rate of 14 *sikkah* rupees and issue interest notes, bearing an interest of 8 *per cent* per annum. Even

74. Bengal Public Consultations, Sept. 1, 1768.

this did not improve matters in any way. On the contrary, the distress of the whole population, European and Indian, became all the more acute. The merchants of Calcutta bitterly complained that they were "distressed for daily provisions" and were in danger of becoming bankrupt "in the midst of wealth and plenty."[75] Even the Mayor's Court represented[76] that honest people were being prosecuted every day for inability to satisfy the claim of their creditors owing to the scarcity of coins.

At their meeting of the 20th of March, 1769, Verelst and his Council at last decided to establish a new gold currency to meet the present deficiency of currency. This new bimetallic scheme was an improvement on that of 1766, inasmuch as the legal value now fixed was not so unduly above the market value as in 1766. Greater allowance was now made for the inevitable variation in the proportional value of the two metals, resulting from the continued drain of silver from the country. The mohur issued in 1766 had weighed 16 annas, or 179½ grains, had been of the fineness of 20 carats, and had been issued at the denomination of 14 *sikkah* rupees. The new mohur on the other hand was to weigh 17 annas, or 190½ grains, was to be of the fineness of 23 carats. 3¾ grains, and was to be issued at the denomination of 16 *sikkah* rupees.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the authorities to avoid the errors of the previous scheme, the new currency of 1769 also ended in failure for almost the same reasons. Evidently, the authorities had not yet been able to collect the data on which they could have based a sound currency policy. This is apparent from the fact that the legal denomination of the new mohur still exceeded the market value by nearly six *per cent.* With the artificial enhancement of the value of the gold mohurs, the value of silver rupees naturally depreciated to the same extent. Thus, whatever silver there still remained in the market was practically driven out of circulation. The people gradually withdrew even the available gold from the circulation from their natural distrust of the official policy, for an arbitrary enhancement of the legal denomination within three years could hardly inspire confidence in the minds of the people

75. Verelst's View, etc., Appendix, p. 243
76. Bengal Public Consultations, March 20, 1769.

who considered it safer to hold up their stock of gold, or sell it as bullion than to bring it to the mint for coinage and thereby run the risk of future loss. The most opulent among the *sarrafs* found such difficulties in recovering the money they had formerly lent that they now preferred "locking up their fortunes in their treasure-chests to lending it."[77]

The well-meaning currency reform of this period was only of a palliative nature. The extreme scarcity of the current specie which it was meant to remedy could not have been minimised without a total stoppage of the heavy drain of silver from Bengal. That the authorities at Calcutta were sensible of this will be evident from Verelst's warning, "Bengal, like other subjected provinces, must yield its tribute, but experience will inculcate the necessity of moderating our demands, that the country may be enabled long to continue this payment."[78] Such warnings, however, failed to stop the ruthless exploitation to which an impoverished country was subjected by its new masters.

One of the crying evils of the period was the tyranny under which Bengal groaned because of the participation of the Company's servants in the inland trade. They freely misused the Company's *Dastak* to seek exemption from internal duties and grasped nearly the whole of the country's inland trade. Such was the enormity of the evil that Clive himself had to admit that the Company's servants and their Indian gumashtahs had "traded not only as merchants, but as sovereigns", and had "taken the bread out of the mouths of thousands and thousands of merchants, who used formerly to carry on the trade, and who are now reduced to beggary."[79]

While the Indian merchant starved for want of those accustomed profits which were now monopolised by the Company's servants, the cruelty and highhandedness of their gumashtahs brought ruin to the poor ryot who was not only forced to purchase goods at abnormally inflated prices—a practice called *"Burjat"* or *"Guchavat"*, but was fleeced and tormented in innumerable other ways. Regulations were issued to check the evil practices of the

77. Letter to Court, Sept. 25, 1769.
78. Verelst's View, etc., p. 103.
79. Clive's Speech in the House of Commons, March 30, 1772.

gumashtahs, but to no effect. It is to the credit of the Directors that they not merely condemned[80] the conduct of their rapacious servants in the severest of terms, but specially charged Clive with the task[81] of remedying the evils of private inland trade itself.

Clive and his Council took up the work of reform in right earnest in October, 1764, when they resolved[82] to restrict the private trade of the Company's servants to salt and betelnut under specific conditions, and made the payment of duty obligatory. They also issued strict orders forbidding the oppressive practice of selling goods at prices above the market rate. But, the scheme which they finally adopted in 1765 for the purpose of putting the inland trade on an equitable footing was the establishment of a Company, known as the Society of Trade.

The plan of the Society of Trade which was originally adopted by the Council at its meeting held on 10th August, 1765, had the following features. The Society was to be an exclusive company entrusted with the whole trade in salt, betelnut and tobacco, and was to be composed of all those who might be deemed justly entitled to a share. A proper fund was to be raised by a loan at interest in support to this trade. All salt, betelnut and tobacco produced in or imported into Bengal would be purchased by this Society by contract on reasonable terms, and then resold at selected places to the country merchants through its agents. A Committee of Trade consisting of four persons was to be appointed for the management of the whole scheme.

When the plan came up for final consideration before the Select Committee on 18th September, it was agreed by it that it would be more to the interest of the Company "to be considered as superiors of this trade and receive a handsome duty upon it than to be engaged as Proprietors in the stock,"[83] and that the duty should be collected on the following rates:—"On salt, 35 *per cent* valuing the 100 maunds at the rate of 90 Rupees, and in consideration hereof the present *Collaree* Duty to be abolished.

80. Letter from Court, Feb. 8, 1764, March 26, Dec. 24, 1765, etc.
81. Letter from Court, June 1, 1764.
82. Bengal Secret Consultations, Oct. 17, 1764.
83. Bengal Select Committees, Sept. 18, 1765.

On betelnut, 10 *per cent* on the prime cost. On tobacco, 25 *per cent* on the prime cost." It was estimated that the Company would get "a clear revenue of at least £ 100,000 Sterling" per annum from these duties. It was also agreed that the proprietors in the stock were to be arranged into three classes. The first was to comprise the Governor with five shares, the second member of the Council with three shares, the General with three shares, ten gentlemen of the Council with two shares each, and two Colonels with two shares (in all 35 shares). The second was to consist of one chaplain, fourteen junior servants and three Lieutenant Colonels, in all eighteen persons, each of them being entitled to one-third of a Councillor's proportion or two-thirds of one share (in all twelve shares). The third was to be composed of thirteen factors, four Majors, four first Surgeons at the Presidency, two first Surgeons at the army, one secretary to the Council, one sub-accountant, one Persian translator and one sub-export warehouse-keeper, in all twenty-seven persons, each of them being entitled to one-sixth of a Councillor's proportion or one-third of one share (in all nine shares). The plan was finally approved and confirmed by the Council on the 25th September.

The authorities at Calcutta justified the institution of this peculiar Society on the following grounds. Firstly, this Society was expected to remove the inconveniences of free trade. Secondly, its formation would indemnify the Company's senior servants who were entitled to *'Dastaks.'* Thirdly, the Company would benefit to the extent of half the profits in the shape of duty. Fourthly, the loss sustained by the Company's servants from the prohibition of private presents would be compensated by the profits of this Society. Fifthly, the salaries being inadequate, the Company's servants needed extra emoluments to maintain themselves in this country and return home with comfortable fortunes. Sixthly the people would get the commodities at a cheaper price than was possible before. Lastly, even in the past the trade in salt used to be a monopoly of the Nawab's favourites.

Despite all that was urged in favour of this venture, it was peremptorily discountenanced by the Directors. They rightly emphasized that it was neither consistent with their honour, nor their dignity to promote such an exclusive monopoly which was bound to perpetuate the abuses of the inland trade to the detri-

ment of the local inhabitants. But, their prohibitory orders[84] reached Calcutta in December, 1766, a little too late, for the term of the Society had already been renewed for another year in September last on a slightly amended plan.[85] This second plan marked certain innovations:—Firstly, all salt was now to be sold at Calcutta, and at the other places where it was made and nowhere else, and it was to be resold only through Indian Agents; Secondly the shares now raised to 60 were to be divided as follows: Class one with 32 shares, class two with 14⅔ shares, and class three with 9 shares, the remaining 4⅓ shares to be determined later; Thirdly, the duty payable to the Company was now considerably raised; Lastly, the maximum price of salt was now fixed at two rupees per maund. In obedience, however, to the orders of the Directors, Clive and the Select Committee decided on the 16th January, 1767, that this Society was to be abolished and the inland trade totally relinquished on the first day of September next. It appears, however, that the Society was actually wound up on the 14th September, 1768.

Though the Society of Trade was disapproved, the fact was undeniable that the salaries of the Company's servants were absurdly low. For example, even a Councillor's salary was scarcely three hundred pounds per annum, but, according to Clive, a Councillor required at least three thousand pounds to make both ends meet. The same proportion held among the other servants whose salaries were very much lower. The basic salary of the youngest writer was only five pounds per year, though his total remuneration amounted to four hundred rupees per annum because of some extra allowances he received. One of the principal sources of their income was usury, but even this was interdicted by Clive and his Select Committee who decided in 1765 that no servant of the Company was to lend money at a higher rate of interest than 12 *per cent* per annum.[86] Their practice of receiving gratuities from the Nawab or his Ministers was also disallowed[87] by the Direc-

84. Letter from Court, May 17, 1766.
85. Bengal Select Committee, Sept. 3, 1766.
Bengal Public Consultations, Sep. 8, 1766.
86. Bengal Select Committee, Oct. 5, 1765.
87. Letter from Court, May 17, 1766.

tors in 1766. In order to inculcate economy, the latter issued some grandmotherly regulations in 1767, prohibiting[88] extravagant living, but even these could hardly meet the situation. They were not allowed to hold farms of lands, and Clive and his Select Committee prohibited them from doing this on pain of suspension from the service.[89] Their misuse of the *'Dastak'* too was prohibited more than once, and their participation in the inland trade was looked upon with severe displeasure. Their right to receive private presents in any shape was also taken away by Clive under orders from the Directors. The only lawful source of income still left open to them was trade in the articles of export and import only, although the scope therein was extremely limited on account of the growth of the Company's own investments. The abolition of *double-batta,* enforced with an iron hand by Clive, caused special hardship to the military officers.

It was therefore to provide their senior servants with something more than a bare living that the Directors decided in 1767 to grant them a percentage on the revenues. The grant was meant in the words of the Directors, "to give them a reasonable encouragement to exert themselves with zeal and alacrity in their several departments, but which they are to look upon as a free gift from the hand of their employers, offered to them annually so long as the present revenues shall remain with the Company, and their behaviour shall continue to merit such a reward."[90] This new emolument was a commission of 2½ *per cent* on the net revenues. The total sum thus available was to be divided into one hundred shares for appropriation by the principal civil and military servants in graded proportions fixed by the Directors. Among civilians, while the Governor was to have thirty-one shares, a junior member of the Council was to have only one share and a half. Among the military officials, a Colonel was to have two shares and a half, while a Major was allowed only three-quarters of a share. The junior military officers were to receive an extra daily allowance in compensation for the loss of *double-batta.* While a Captain was to have three Shillings a day, an Ensign was allowed only one Shil-

88. Letter from Court, March 24, 1767.
89. Bengal Select Committee, Oct. 5, 1765.
90. Letter from Court, Nov. 20, 1767.

ling. In a subsequent order[91] of 1770, the Directors laid down a new plan of distribution, according to which one-eighteenth part of the percentage was to be set apart for Major-General Coote, Commander-in-Chief, while the remainder, divided into one hundred parts, was to be distributed to the principal officials in proportions slightly different from those specified above.

This belated generosity on the part of the Company failed to check the greed and rapacity of its servants. They received the percentage, and still made large fortunes from private trade which they managed to carry on under the names of their Indian *banyans.* In short, these *banyans* who actually became the lords of their European masters were the source of the worst oppressions in the country. Warren Hastings thus wrote[92] about them, "Were the *Banyan* himself the appointed tyrant of the country, there would be less danger of his abusing his power to a great excess, because being responsible and having no real dignity or consequence of his own, he might be easily called to an account for his conduct, and made to suffer for it. But, as his master is the responsible person, he is encouraged to go to what lengths he pleases in the certainty of impunity, and I am sure he will go to all lengths, because he has no tie or principle to restrain him." In almost similar vein, Clive described how the *banyan* was the evil genius of the Company's servant, in the course of his speech in the House of Commons on the 30th March, 1772, "....he (the Company's servant) is in a state of dependence under the *banyan,* who commits such acts of violence and oppression, as his interest prompts him to, under the pretended sanction and authority of the Company's servant. Hence, Sir, arises the clamour against the English gentlemen in India." Thus, both the Company's servants and their Indian *banyans* and *gumashtahs* combined to spread the baneful effects of monopoly and extortion on every side of them, and the root of their malevolence lay too deep in the dual system of government for any superficial reforms or regulations to reach and destroy.

In consequence of the acceptance of Diwani, the responsibility for the military defence of the *Subah* lay with the Company, for

91. Letter from Court, March 23, 1773.

92. Letter from Warren Hastings to Mr. Colebrooke, March 26, 1772.

under an agreement with the Nawab concluded[93] early in the year 1765, the Governor and Council at Calcutta had engaged themselves to secure to him the *Subahdari* of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and to support him therein with the Company's troops against all enemies, and had expressly promised to keep at all times such force as might be necessary for this purpose. It had also been agreed to by the Nawab that as the Company's forces would be cheaper and more serviceable than any he himself could maintain, he was to entertain none but such as would meet the requirements of civil administration and his own personal needs, and disband the rest of his useless rabble. Soon after Clive's assumption of office, the Nawab was disallowed to keep even his own palace troops, and was forced[94] to accept about 1500 of the Company's sepoys on the plea that this step would warrant a deduction of eighteen lakhs of rupees from his stipulated allowance. The Company's own Bengal army in 1765 consisted of nineteen battalions of sepoys, four companies of artillery, twenty-four companies of European infantry, one troop of hussars and about 1,200 irregular cavalry. Clive reorganised this army on a new basis which lasted throughout the period of the Diwani administration. The principal features of this reorganisation were as follows:—first, the hussars were incorporated with the European infantry; second, the irregular cavalry were mostly disbanded; third, the European infantry was increased and divided into three single-battalion regiments of nine companies each; fourth, the whole army was finally grouped in three brigades, each composed of a troop of cavalry, a company of artillery, a regiment of European infantry, and seven battalions of sepoys; and, last, three battalions, one from each brigade, in conjunction with eight new battalions, solely dependent on the revenue authorities, were specially set apart for the unsoldierly work of enforcing revenue collections under the designation of Parganah Battalions—a semi-disciplined force which earned a distinct notoriety in this period by its highly oppressive conduct towards the defenceless ryots and its frequent insubordination to the civil authorities.

93. Bengal Secret Consultations, Feb. 20 and 28, 1765.
94. Bengal Select Committee, Sep. 7, 1765.

What constituted from Clive's day a thorny question in respect of the Company's army was its ever-recurring attitude of independence towards the civil executive. The problem of the due subordination of the military to the civil authorities, which had always been present since the early days of the Company was particularly acute in Bengal during this period. It is noteworthy, however, that the Directors had always insisted[95] that the military must be kept subordinate to the civil government, but only a master-hand like Clive could enforce this principle. He stubbornly fought against military insubordination and enforced the stoppage of presents, gratuities, and, above all, *double-batta.* A dangerous conspiracy of the army officers, following the abolition of *double-batta,* was resolutely faced and broken up by Clive, and the guilty were either bound down or promptly cashiered. All through his term of office, Clive continued to inculcate[96] a total subjection of the army to the Civil government, and in his farewell letter to the Select Committee, he uttered[97] the following warning, "If you abate your authority over them, inconveniences and uneasiness to yourselves may not be the only consequence. I am not an advocate for arbitrary power; I am not desirous of exploding military law, but the civil power and authority of this Government must be graciously asserted and notwithstanding the confidence that on the most emergent occasions may justly be reposed in the field officers, I would have it remembered that the immediate power is vested in yourselves to dismiss any officer, let his rank be what it will, without waiting for the sentence of a courtmartial."

Clive's immediate successors, Verelst and Cartier, who possessed neither his soldierly abilities, nor his resolute will, tried to follow in his footsteps, but could not avoid serious disagreements with the military. The frequent and acrimonious altercations between the civil executive and the Commander of the Company's forces during this period serve to illustrate a transitional stage in the history of the early administrative system of the English in Bengal. Among these, one queer but important disagreement was in connection with the rival claims of Governor Verelst and Col. Smith

95. Letter from Court, June 1, 1764.
96. Letter to Court, Sept. 30, 1765.
97. Bengal Select Committee, Jan. 16, 1767.

to the title and privileges of the Commander-in-Chief. Verelst held that the Governor, by virtue of his office, was the Commander-in-Chief as well, for the Directors had recently laid down, "..... our Governor shall be considered as Commander-in-Chief of our forces."[98] The dispute had originally ended in a peculiar compromise under which while the Governor was to be the Commander-in-Chief Col. Smith was to be treated as Commander-in-Chief under the Presidency, but this anomaly was later dropped by the Select Committee in favour of the Governor. Verelst's want of firmness in this whole affair was strongly rebuked by Clive who thus wrote to him from England. "His (Col. Smith's) last, I should say his first dispute, whether the Governor or the Commanding Officer of the troops ought to have the title of Commander-in-Chief was such an open and audacious attack upon the dignity of your office, that I am surprised you let it pass unnoticed. Had a minute been made of it, he would infallibly have been dismissed from the service."[99] Even cursory examination of Verelst's disputes with Col. Smith would serve to reveal the weakness and irresolution of the Civil executive. That Col. Smith had been guilty of insubordination was clear, yet the Governor and his Council fought shy of taking the drastic step of punishing or dismissing him. In their letter of 30th June, 1769, the Directors re-affirmed their previous ruling thus, ".... our Governor is to all intents and purposes the Commander-in-Chief of our forces and whatever orders he sends to any officer must be obeyed." But, even this failed to prevent disagreements in the time of Governor Cartier who had also some trouble with the military on account of the attitude of independence assumed by General Barker; and, along with his Council, he had to make a formal representation to the Directors against it. Thus, although the principle of complete subjection of the military to the civil authorities was an admitted fact, and was consistently adhered to by Clive and his successors, yet the traditional rivalry between men of the sword and those of the pen was accentuated now and again either by personal jealousies, or mere professional arrogance, and on the whole the relations between the two were far from cordial in this period. While a soldier-administrator like

98. Letter from Court, Feb. 19, 1766.
99. Letter from Clive, Nov. 7, 1767.
(Malcolm: Life of Lord Clive, III, pp. 213-4).

Clive could rule the army with a strong hand, the civilian Governors who followed him found it a difficult job to maintain the supremacy of the civil authority. The ostensible military basis on which the English political influence was founded in India made the position of the civil authorities at times somewhat disagreeable and hazardous. The anomalous character of the dual system of government on the one hand, and the ever-present jealousy between the two arms of the civil executive—the council and the Select Committee—whose ill-demarcated powers and jurisdictions formed on the other hand a recurring source of unseemly and factious disagreements from the time of Clive to that of Cartier could hardly lead to a strong and effective civil authority.

The foreign policy promulgated by Clive and continued throughout the Diwani period was one of cautious moderation, based on a realistic grasp of the practical possibilities and dangers inherent in the situation facing Bengal on all its vulnerable sides. The fundamental principle underlying this policy was the avoidance of conquest and dominion outside the existing limits of the province. The defence of Bengal itself was an arduous charge. "To go farther," Clive maintained in one of his letters to the Directors, "is in my opinion a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd that no Governor and Council in their senses can adopt it, unless the whole system of the Company's interest be first entirely new-modelled."[100] "The limits of the Nabob's dominions," he further argued, "are sufficient to answer all your purposes. These, we think, ought to constitute the boundaries, not only of all your territorial possessions and influence in these parts, but of your commerce also; since by grasping at more, you endanger the safety of those immense revenues, and that well-founded power, which you now enjoy, without the hopes of obtaining an adequate advantage." This policy was grounded on the following considerations. Firstly, a distant dominion might prove to be a burden on Bengal, both financially and militarily. Secondly, hazards of war and conquest could not be conducive to the growth of the Company's trade. Thirdly, aggression outside Bengal was likely to stir up serious trouble with the country powers. Fourthly, Bengal itself produced, in the words of Clive, "all the riches we are

100. Letter to Court, Sept. 30, 1765.

ambitious to possess." Fifthly, a pacific policy alone could "conciliate the affections of the country powers," "remove any jealousy they may entertain of our unbounded ambition," and "convince them that we aim not at conquest and dominion, but security in carrying on a free trade, equally beneficial to them and to us." Sixthly, the security of Bengal was to be sought rather in the discordancy of the views and interests of the neighbouring powers than in a policy of aggression against them. Seventhly, if ideas of conquest were to be the basis of English policy, Clive apprehended that the Company would, by necessity, be led from one acquisition to another. Eighthly, when a sufficient number of competent English officials could not be had for the administration of Bengal itself, it was out of the question to assume the responsibility of government outside the province. Lastly, Clive was aware of the fact that, owing to the enormous requirements of the Company's own trade investments, it was impossible to find money to undertake distant wars. This he mentioned to General Carnac immediately after his arrival in Bengal, "the expense has now become so enormous that the Company must inevitably be undone, if the Mahrattas or any other power should invade Bahar and Bengal, for it will then be impossible to raise money sufficient to continue the war. This is a very serious consideration with me, and will, I make no doubt, strike you in the same light."[101] The historic treaties of Allahabad which constituted the basis of Clive's political settlement with Shujauddaulah, Nawab Wazir of Oudh, and Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor, were obviously inspired by considerations such as these.

The settlement with the Nawab Wazir who was restored to Oudh was thus no act of generosity, for it was clearly a move inspired by expediency and common interest. Conquest, partition, or re-settlement of Oudh would each have involved risks which it was unwise to incur in the present circumstances, whereas if the Nawab Wazir was restored, his immense resources, undoubted abilities and high influence could make him a serviceable and grateful ally and an effectual barrier to Bengal. But, the re-instatement of Shujauddaulah was made with certain limitations which were not only calculated for the Company's immediate benefit, but

101. Bengal Select Committee, Sept. 7, 1765.

were designed ultimately to turn Oudh into a protected state. In accordance with the treaty concluded with the Nawab Wazir on August 16, 1765, the latter had to agree, in return for his restoration, firstly, to render gratuitous military assistance to the Company in case of war or invasion, and pay for any assistance that the Company was to grant him in similar circumstances, secondly, to entertain no European deserter or such other enemy as Mir Qasim or Samru, thirdly, to cede the valuable districts of Allahabad and Kora to Shah Alam, fourthly, to guarantee Balwant Singh, zamindar of Benares, in the full possession of his estate, and lastly, to pay a war indemnity of fifty lakhs of rupees. The proposed stipulation regarding the Company's right to enjoy a free trade in Oudh was, however, not insisted on at the Nawab Wazir's earnest solicitation. In effect, therefore, Oudh became a useful buffer state, and its ruler was attached to the English not merely by the tie of gratitude, but by the motive of self-interest, for the English were his only powerful neighbour from whom he had no fear of attack.[102] The settlement with Oudh was a middle course which cemented an enduring political alliance, and ensured the security of the Company's dominion in North India throughout its formative period.

After Clive's departure, the authorities at Calcutta maintained the alliance with Oudh from the conviction that gratitude, policy and necessity were bound to keep the Nawab Wazir loyal to the English interests. Even though Shujauddaulah's personal attitude and military preparations created occasional distrust, neither Verelst, nor Cartier seriously apprehended any dangers from him. In fact, by reason of his character and inclinations, he was looked upon rather as "a proper instrument to accomplish the Company's main point, the maintaining themselves the umpires of Hindostan, than an enemy, who, from his strength or situation, could give them any material uneasiness or trouble."[103] The whole policy towards the Nawab Wazir was based on the assumption "If we sooth his vanity, and manage his foibles in trifles, we may lead, or even dictate, in essentials."[104] It was in pursuance of this principle that Verelst concluded a fresh agreement with Shujauddaulah in 1768 under which the latter was obliged to limit his forces to a

102. Letter to Court, Sept. 8, 1766.
103. Letter to Court, March 28, 1768.
104. Bengal Select Committee, Dec. 16, 1769.

maximum of 35,000 men. Clive's settlement, thus amended by his successor, confirmed the Nawab Wazir's military dependence on the English, for his plans to build up a formidable force of his own were finally nullified. The number of troops he was still allowed to retain was no more than a bare minimum which could "render him respectable among the powers of Hindostan though *in no degree sufficiently formidable to trouble the repose of these* provinces."[105] During Cartier's regime the Nawab Wazir was repeatedly pressed to form a confederacy of northern Indian powers against the Maratha invaders, but he managed to maintain his neutrality, as he knew that the English were not prepared to send their own troops against the Marathas. Early in 1772, just before the close of Cartier's administration, the Wazir had to cede the strategic fort of Chunar for the absolute occupation of the English troops.[106] This last concession obtained in the Diwani period from Oudh marked the close of the first phase in the alliance between Oudh and the Company.

Clive's settlement with the Emperor, which, however, could not survive the period of the Diwani administration was, like the one with the Wazir, a middle course, prompted by a consideration of the realities of the situation. While it would have been inexpedient to abandon the Emperor altogether, it was positively hazardous to carry him over to Delhi. It was deemed equally foolish to put him in charge of the government of Oudh. Clive refused to play the role of a king-maker conscious as he was, of the limitations of the Company's power and position. He hit upon a simple expedient. This involved no loss to the Company, and while securing for it an Imperial patronage which, despite its nominal value, had still some importance in the eyes of the local princes and the other European nations, it provided at the same time for the Emperor's maintenance and stay under English protection. It would also create a bone of contention between the Emperor and the Wazir, making a future junction between the two well-nigh impossible. This plan was embodied in the treaty of Allahabad, 1765, under the terms[107] of which Shah Alam was put in possession of the districts of Allahabad and Kora, ceded by the Wazir, and made to reside at

105. Letter to Court, Jan. 6, 1769.
106. Bengal Select Committee, Feb. 3, 1772.
107. Bengal Select Committee, Sep. 7, 1765.

Allahabad under the Company's protection. The Emperor on his part issued *farmans* confering on the Company the Diwani of the Bengal provinces and on Najmu-ddaulah the *Nizamat* thereof, in return of which the Company was to guarantee the remittance of an annual tribute of twenty-six lakhs of rupees and appropriate all the surplus revenues of the *Subah* after providing for the expenses of the Nizamat and the royal tribute. This settlement which legalised the Company's anomalous status in Bengal converted the Emperor into a stipend-earning rubber-stamp, treated with ceremonial respect, but only as a pageant.

The interminable intrigue and faction fight at the court of Allahabad, together with the Emperor's natural discontent with his existing lot, presented in the Diwani period problems which could admit of no solution without a radical change in the foreign policy laid down by Clive. The well-meaning, but futile efforts of Verelst and Cartier to maintain the *status quo* serve only to illustrate the essential weakness of Clive's settlement. It was not possible for the Emperor to remain content with a small stipend, and a still smaller demesne, for the dream of his life was to sit on the throne of his ancestors and restore the vanished glories of the Mughal empire. While Clive and his successors did not explicitly object to his cherished plan of a march to Delhi, and even held out vague promises of support from time to time, they never seriously intended to engage themselves in a hazardous expedition out of Bengal, nor had they the authority of the Directors in doing so for the latter had definitely warned,[108]......" every step beyond the Caramnassa except in a defensive war will lead to the irretrievable ruin of our affairs." If an attitude of benevolent passivity was kept up by Clive and his successors in the matter of the Emperor's Delhi scheme, it was because they regarded it, in the words of Clive, "as the only means by which we can honourably get rid of our troublesome, royal guest."[109] After making two abortive attempts, the royal guest at last left Allahabad for Delhi in 1771, and reoccupied the imperial capital with Maratha assistance. His claim to the Bengal tribute, however, did not forthwith lapse with his departure, and the Company continued to profess allegiance and pay the tribute, until it was stopped by Warren Hastings.

108. Letter from Court, March 4, 1767.

109. Bengal Select Committee, Jan. 16, 1767.

Ever since the menace of a Maratha invasion into Bengal in the years following the victory of Plassey, the authorities at Calcutta had been desirous of occupying Cuttack for the purpose of strengthening the frontier on that side and for opening up a direct passage by land to and from Madras. When Clive became Governor for the second time, he sought to obtain Cuttack by peaceful negotiations with Januji Bhonsle, the Raja of Nagpur, who since his coming into possession of Cuttack after the death of his father, Raghuji Bhonsle, had been continually pressing the English for the *chauth* of Bengal. Clive considered an alliance with Januji necessary for the security of Bengal, and, unwilling to risk an open rupture, he sought to make the payment of the *chauth* conditional on the cession of Cuttack.[110] The negotiations initiated by Clive and assiduously continued by his successor proved abortive in the end.[111] Januji who had entered into these negotiations entirely from pecuniary considerations saw no benefit in giving up Cuttack which was a valuable base for his reserve forces. The unwillingness of the English to pay him the *chauth*, notwithstanding his repeated reminders for it down to the time of Cartier,[112] was also partly responsible for the failure of the negotiations.

Alarmed by the rise of the Gurkha power and anxious to maintain a free trade with Nepal, Verelst sanctioned[113] in 1767 what may be regarded as the first English expedition to that country. It was ostensibly sent in aid of the Newar ruler of Kathmandu, but the primary considerations that led the English to espouse the cause of the Newars against the Gurkhas were economic and military. The trans-Himalayan trade of Bengal had lately come to a standstill with the recent conquest of the submontane regions of Nepal, and it was necessary to reopen it. The recurrent Gurkha incursions from the adjacent *Tarai* indicated a new danger to the security of Bengal's northern frontier, and the interests of self-defence demanded a counter-offensive against the Gurkhas in support of the friendly Newar princes. But, the expedition failed disastrously for want of adequate troops and materials. A second

110. Bengal Select Committee, Jan. 16, 1767.
111. Bengal Select Committee, Dec. 15, 1769.
112. Persian Correspondence, Trans. R. 1771 No. 104.
113. Bengal Select Committee, April 30, 1767.

expedition was proposed, but was not sanctioned by the Select Committee. After the eventual conquest of Nepal by the Gurkhas any armed intervention in aid of the Newar princes was out of the question, and the English authorities sought to establish friendly relations with Prithvi Narayan, the Gurkha ruler, and sent one Mr. James Logan on a mission to him for this purpose.[114] This mission, however, produced no tangible results.

Inside Bengal the relations between the English and their Dutch and French rivals were none too cordial, and were marked throughout the Diwani period by mutual jealousies and continual disputes. The Dutch as well as the French authorities in Bengal envied the political and commercial ascendancy of the English, and fretted against the increasing restriction of their freedom and trade after the assumption of the Diwani by the latter. Powerless to harm the English either at arms or at diplomacy, their rivals always grumbled at the interruption and decline of their commerce and bitterly complained of the vexatious opposition and highhandedness of the Nawab's officials as well as the English *gumashtahs*. Such complaints not infrequently occasioned acrimonious disputes and unpleasant incidents which served only to reveal the intrinsic weakness of the Dutch and the French Companies in Bengal under the changed conditions following the grant of the Diwani to the English. The English on the other hand sometimes suspected secret and hostile designs on the part of their disgruntled neighbours, and were ever on the alert lest the latter should seriously attempt to disturb the peace of the country.

The problem of defence as it presented itself to the English in this period was one of military forbearance. They were against aggression outside Bengal, and would not act offensively against any power, unless they were to be forced to do so in self-defence. Clive and his successors believed that, as far as the country powers were concerned, they were so distracted and divided that their ambitions could never turn towards Bengal, and that if a firm alliance could be maintained with the immediate neighbours, the latter would constitute an effective barrier or ring-fence to Bengal. An Afghan invasion was, however, the only bug-bear that kept the authorities at Calcutta on tenterhooks, and nearly all through this period the Abdali menace compelled the English to keep them-

114. Bengal Public Consultations, Oct. 31, 1769.

selves in readiness to counteract it by either diplomatic manoeuvres or military precautions. Allahabad and Chunar were made the advanced outposts for the defence of Bengal, as they commanded the main entrance into this province from the West. The authorities at Calcutta always insisted on retaining English troops at both these places not only as a necessary check on the ambitions of the Emperor, the Wazir or the Marathas, but also for guarding against unforeseen irruptions from the north-west, and for holding the general balance of Hindustan. In fact, the frontier policy of the English was founded on the basic principle of balance of power, for they recognised the fact that security lay not in a policy of isolation or inactivity, but in the maintenance of a balance of power in the country.[115]

The story of the years that constituted the period of the Diwani administration in Bengal makes a dismal reading and one cannot escape the verdict that the period was probably the darkest in the history of the local people. Though the English had become the *de facto* masters of Bengal, they cynically maintained a Nawab *faineant* to serve as a mask, and while they enjoyed the fruits of the *Diwani,* devoid of its fundamental responsibilities, they reduced the Nizamat to a tinsel sham. The break-down of a system under which power and responsibility rested in different hands was inevitable, and it brought ruin to a province which in the past had flourished under even the most despotic government. The country knew no law and order, and the people were weighed down by oppression and plunder. While corruption was rife in all official ranks from the highest to the lowest, the Company's servants and their underlings made the *Augean* stable of anarchy all the more chaotic by their unscrupulous rapacity and commercial brigandage. The life-blood of the province was drained to appease the insatiable greed of all those who held power and trust. The country altogether presented a mortifying spectacle of tyranny and exploitation. The terrible famine of 1770 formed a tragic finale to the pitiful chapter of administrative confusion, ushered in by Clive who was more a consummate schemer than a far-sighted administrator, and continued by Verelst and Cartier, his timid and mediocre successors, who lacked the penetration and statesmanship to grasp its melancholy absurdity.

115. Letter to Court, March 28, 1768.

" Kuruksetra in Early Sanskrit Literature "

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Kurukṣetra—a railway station on the Delhi—Ambālā line (via Karnāl) of the Northern Railway, is situated about ¾ mile from the town of the same name. It is also called Thānesara (ancient Sthāṇvīśvara). The place occupies a prominent place in the galaxy of the ancient holy places (*tīrthas*) of India.

Kurukṣetra in Early Literature :— (I)

Bharatas, the most prominent of all the *Ṛig Vedic* tribes, were settled in the region between the Saraswatī and the Yamunā rivers.[1] Their princes are said to have sacrificed on the banks of well known rivers—the Dṛiṣadvatī and the Āpayā flowing in the region later on called by the name of Kurukṣetra :—

Ni tvā dadhe vara ā pṛithivyā ilāspade sudinatve ahṇāṃ ;
Dṛiṣadvatyāṃ mānuṣa Āpayāyāṃ Saraswatyāṃ revadagne didīhi.[2]

In the later Vedic period, the mighty Bharatas found their place probably together within the great complex of peoples, now in the process of formation, the Kurus and their sacred land now became Kurukṣetra.[3]

1. Cf. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 1892, p. 218; C. V. Vaidya, *History of Mediaeval India*, II, 1924, Poona, pp. 271 ff; *Cambridge History of India*, I, pp. 47 ff, article of E. J. Rapson.

2. Maxmuller, *Hymns of the Ṛig Veda, I*, 1877, London, p. 226; *R. Veda*, III, 23-4. This is alluded to in connection with the lightening of *Agni* by Devaśravas and Devavāta belonging to the Bharata tribe. The close association of Vedic sages with the Saraswatī region is a well known fact. Cf. *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, VI, pp. 552 ff. referring to the views of Pischel, Woolner, Geldner, etc.

3. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 409-10 as cited by H. C. Raychaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, 4th edition, pp. 21-2; *Cambridge History of India*, I, pp. 116.

I. *Boundaries of Kurukṣetra*

A passage in the *Taittirīya Araṇyaka* (V. 1. 1. Vināyaka Gaṇeśa Apte edition, 1926) refers to the boundaries of Kurukṣetra as *Khāṇḍava*[4] to the South, *Tūrghna*[5] to the North, *Pariṇāh*[6] to the West and that the *Marus*[7] were the *utkara* (heap) of Kurukṣetra:—

Teṣām Kurukṣetram Vedirāsīt, tasyai Khāṇḍavo dakṣiṇārdha āsīt, Tūrghnamuttarārdhaḥ, Pariṇajjaghānārdhaḥ, Maravaḥ utkaraḥ teṣāṃ marvaḥ vaiṣṇavaṃ yaśa ārcchat.

II. *Localities in the Region of Kurukṣetra*

(a) Alluding to the old Vedic myth of Urvaśī and Pururavas, the *Śatapatha*[8] *Brāhmaṇa* (XI. 5. 1. 4) relates how, wailing with sorrow, the lover wandered throughout the whole of Kurukṣetra region until he reached a lotus-lake, then called *Anyataḥplakṣā*[9] where nymphs were swimming about in the forms of swans. There he found his beloved, Urvaśī, ultimately. The passage of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* runs thus:—[10]

Atha hāyamīkṣāñcakre, kathannu tadavīraṅkatha majanaṁ syādyatrāhaṁ syāmiti sa nagna evānūtpapāta cirantanmene yadvāsaḥ paryyadhāsyata tato ha gandharvā vidyutañjanayāñcakrustaṃ yathā divaivaṃ nagnan dadarśa. Tato hai veyam tirobabhūva puna-

4. In the *Pañcaviṃśa Br.* (II. 9. 4, Caland's edition, p. 27) Dṛti completed a sacrifice in the *Khāṇḍava*—the far famed region where stood the great city of Indraprastha (Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 38). It was after the burning of *Khāṇḍava vana,* that Takṣaka *nāga* shifted to Kuruksetra *(dahyamāne vane tasmin Kurukṣetram gato hi saḥ,* Chap. 253, verse 4 of *Ādi Parva* of the *Mahābhārata,* Soren Sen's edition; cf. also *ibid.,* Chap. 254, verse 17 *(dāhakāle khāṇḍavasya kurukṣetram gato hyasau)*.

5. Cf. A. Keith in the *Cambridge History of India,* I, p. 116; Monier Williams, *A Sanskrit English Dictionary,* 1899, Oxford, p. 452.

6. As also referred to in the *Pañcaviṃśā Brāhmana,* (XXXV, 13. 1) *Lāṭyāyana Śrauta Sūtra* (X, 19, 1), *Kātyāyan Śrauta Sūtra* (XXIV, 6. 32), *Śāṅkhyāyana Śrauta Sūtra* (XIII, 29.32), etc., as cited in the *Vedic Index,* I, p. 498.

7. Dr. A. D. Pusalkar (*Vedic Age,* I, London, 1951, p. 252), rightly identifies *maru* with the *Maru* deserts or *marusthala* as it stood in relation of *utkara* to the sacred altar Kurukṣetra.

8. Veṅkaṭeśvara Press edition, Volume IV, p. 2576.

9. Pischel (op. *cit.*, p. 217) places it somewhere in Sirmaur State which is adjacent to Ambala District of East Panjab; cf. *Vedic Index,* I, p. 24.

10. Cf. M. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature,* 1927, I, p. 209.

raimītyettirobhūtāṁ sa ādhyā jalpan Kurukṣetraṁ samayācacārānyataḥ plakṣā iti bisavatī tasyai hādhyāntenavvavavvrāja tuddha tā' apsarasa' ātayo bhūtvā parupupluvire [*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* XI 5. 1. 4].

(b) *Śaryaṇāvat,* another locality name, occurs in various passages of the *Ṛig Veda* and this has been taken by Sāyaṇa as a "district in the Kurukṣetra region" [cf. *Vedic Index,* II, p. 364 also referring to the views of Messrs. Roth, Zimmer, Pischel, Hillebrandt, Ludwig etc.]:—*Śaryaṇā nāma Kurukṣetravartino deśāḥ teṣāmabhavaṃ saraḥ Śaryaṇāvat; tasmin sarasi vidyamāne sarvairṛitvigbhi netavye yajñe tu suṣṭhumandasva* [Sāyaṇa *on Ṛig Veda,* VIII. 6. 39; cf. Sāyaṇa's commentary on the other verses such as VII. 7. 29, I. 84. 13].

According to a Vedic legend, the horse-headed sage Dadhyañca or Dadhīca was a constant source of terror to the demons. After his death, the *asuras* (demons) overspread the whole earth. On enquiry into the fate of sage Dadhīca, Indra was informed that horse's head still existed but none knew where it was. This led to a careful investigation into the matter and the head in question was ultimately found on the outskirts of the Śaryaṇāvat lake (*icchannaśvasya yacchiraḥ parvateśvapaśritaṃ tadviccharyaṇāvati, Ṛig Veda, I.* 84. 14).

The thunderbolt of Indra was formed of the horse's head with which he slew the *Vṛitras* (*Indro asthabhi vṛitrāṇyapratiṣkutaḥ jaghāna navatīrṇavaḥ, R. Veda,* I. 84. 13). General Cunningham [*The Ancient Geography of India,* 1871, London, p. 335] thinks that it was the same as the present great tank of Kurukṣetra. Thus he seeks to consider the sacred pool as old as the *Ṛig Veda* itself (cf. Cunningham's *Archaeological Survey of India,* Calcutta, II, pp. 218-9).

(c) It appears that this *Śaryaṇāvat* was very near to the *Somatīrtha* where Indra took the *soma rasa* (a juice) after the death of Vṛitra:—

[*Śaryaṇāvati Soma Indra pibatu vṛitahā, R. Veda, IX.* 113. 1; cf. *ye somāsaḥ parāvati ye arvāvati sunvire, ye vādaḥ śaryaṇāvati, R. Veda,* IX. 65. 22].

The above conjecture finds some confirmation in the verses from the *Vanaparva* of the *Mahābhārata* (83. 186-7).

The present lake, situated to the South of modern Kurukṣetra, is an oblong sheet of water about 3546 feet in length and 1900 feet in breadth. Abu Rihān [Reinaud, *Memoir Sur l'Inde*, p. 287 as cited by Cunningham, *An. Geog.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-5] records, on the authority of an ancient Indian writer named Varāhamihira,[11] that "during eclipses of the moon, the waters of all other tanks visit the tank of Thānesara so that the bather in this tank, at the moment of the eclipse, obtains the additional merit of bathing in all other tanks at the same time." Hence this notice (according to Cunningham) carries us back to 500 A.D. when the holy lake was in its full repute.

As regards the *Cakra Tīrtha,* Cunningham (*op. cit.,* p. 336) thinks that "it is probable that *Cakra tīrtha* or the spot where Viṣṇu is said to have taken up his *Cakra* (discus) to kill Bhīṣma, may have been the original spot where Indra slew the *Vṛitra* and that the bones which were afterwards assigned to the Pāṇḍus may have been those of *Vṛitra* of older legend. Also *Cakra Tīrtha* is close to *Asthipura* (Place of Bones). In 634 A.D., these bones were shown to the Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Thsang who records that they were of very large size [Julien's *Hiouen Thsang,* II, p. 214). The site of *Asthipura* is still pointed out in the plain to the west of the city, near Aujasa Ghāṭa."

III. *Sanctity of Kurukṣetra*

According to the ancient Indian literary sources, Kurukṣetra was an abode of piety and eminently a sacred place where gods had the good fortune of kindling the sacred fire in a very remote period. The following extracts[12] from some early Sanskrit texts deserve a slight reference here. Kurukṣetra was the "centre from which Indo-Aryan culture spread first throughout the Hindusthāna and eventually throughout the whole sub-continent" [*Cambridge History of India,* I, p. 47].

(i) *Kurukṣetre' amī devāḥ yajñaṃ tanvante te vvām yajña-dantaryanti tenāsarvausthastenā—samṛiddhāviti tau tata evāśvi-*

11. Also cited by Alberuni in his account. See E. C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India,* II, 1910, London, p. 145.

12. Some of these refer to the location of Kurukṣetra too. Cf. *Vedic Index,* Volumes I and II.

nau preyastāvatāvājagmaturdevānyajñaṃ tanvāntstutevahiṣpavamāne [*Śat. Br.*, IV. i. 5. 13, Veṅkaṭeśvara Press Edition].

(ii) *Teṣāṅkurukṣetraṃdevayajanamāsa. Tasmādāhuḥ Kurukṣetraṃ devānaṃ devayajanamiti tasmā dyatra ca Kurukṣetrasya nigacchati tadevamanyata idaṃ devayajanamiti taddhi devānāṃ devayajanaṃ* [*Ibid.*, XIV. 1. 1. 2, pp. 2989].

(iii) *Devā vai satramāsata Kurukṣetre agniḥ somā Indraste bruvan* [*Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, II. 1. 4., Sātavalekar edition, p. 105].

(iv) *Devā vai satramāsata Kurukṣetre griḥmaravo vāyurindraste abruvan* [*ibid.*, V, 5. 9., p. 375].

(v) *Yato vā adhi devā yajñe neṣṭavā svargalokamāyaṃstatrai tāṃścamasāṃ nyubjaṃste nyagrodhā abhavannyubjā iti hāpye nānetarhyā cakṣate Kurukṣetre te ha prathamaja* [*Aitareya Br.*, VII. 30, ed. of Tatvavivecana Granthapracāra Samiti, Bombay, Śaka year 1812; cf. also the translation of Haugh's ed., 1863, p. 486].

(vi) (*Eṣa dhṛitirnāma yjñakratuḥ*) *adhi pratāraṇo rājan īje dvirātrāntaṃ haiva cakre, taṃ mahābrāhmaṇa uvāca 'parā kuravaḥ Kuruksetrasa vā ksetrana eva dhṛityā hriyate yat triṣṭomo agniṣṭomaḥ* [*Das Jaiminiya Brāhmana in Auswahl*, ed. by W. Caland, Amsterdam, 1919, p. 303, verse II. 207].

(vii) *Na kṣatrasya dhṛitināyaṣṭa amameva prati samaraṃ kuravaḥ Kurukṣetrāccyoṣyanta iti* [*Śāṅkhāyana Śr. Sūtra*, XV. 16. 11, ed. A. Hillebrandt, I, Calcutta, 1888, p. 187]. We are informed here that Vṛiddhadyumna erred in a sacrifice when a Brāhmaṇa threatened that the result would be the expulsion of the Kurus from Kurukṣetra. The event actually came to pass after some time[13] (*ibid*, verse 12). This led Dr. Winternitz (*op. cit.*, I, 1927, Calcutta, pp. 470-1) to seek some reference to a war in the region which was disastrous for the Kurus.

(viii) *Kurukṣetre pariṇahisthale' agnyādheya manvānvārambhaṇīyāntaṃ bhavati* [*Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, XXIV. 6. 32, Vidyādhara ed., Banaras, *samvat* 1987, p. 272].

13. Cf. Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 37; *Vedic Index*, I, p. 166. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣat* (I, 10. 1), records the devastation of crops in the Kuru country by *mataci* and the enforced departure of Usasti Cākrāyana—a contemporary of Janaka of Videha (Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38).

(ix) *Saṃvatsarādūrddhaṃ Pariṇaṃ nāma sthalī Kurukṣetre. Tasyāmagnīnādhāya yathākālamanvārambhaṇīya yeṣṭvā prasṛjyeteti Śāṇḍilyaḥ* (X. 19. 1) and *Saraswati Dṛṣadvatyoḥ sambhedam prāpyāgneye nāṣṭākapālena yaṣṭumupakramet* (X. 19. 4) of the *Lāṭyāyana Śrautasūtra,* Biblothica Indica Series, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1872, pp. 773, 774 respectively. The *Mahābhārata* too reveals that the holy region of Kurukṣetra was then watered by the famous rivers called the Saraswatī and the Dṛiṣadvatī.

(x) *Oṃ devā vai satramāsata; ṛiddhi parımitaṃ yaśaskāmāḥ-Tesabruvan yannaḥ prathamaṃ yaśaṛicchāt; sarveṣāṃ nastatsahāsaditi; teṣāṃ Kurukṣetraṃ vedirāsīt* [*Taitt. Araṇyaka,* V. 1. 1. Vināyaka Gaṇeśa Apte's ed., 1926, p. 363].

(xi) *Tadanu Kurukṣetraṃ devānāṃ devayajanāṃ sarveṣāṃ brahmasadanaṃ brūhīti. Sa hovāca Yājñavalkya; avimuktaṃ vai Kurukṣetraṃ devānāṃ devayajānāṃ devayajanaṃ sarveṣām bhūtānām brahmasadanaṃ. Tasmādyatra kvacana gacchati tadeva manyetīdaṃ vai Kurukṣetraṃ devānāṃ devayajanaṃ sarveṣām bhūtānāṃ brahmasadanam Atra hi jantoḥ prāṇeṣūtkramamāṇeṣu rudrastārakaṃ brahma vyācaṣṭe* . . . etc., in the *Jābāli Upaniṣad* as edited by F. Otto Schrader in *The Minor Upaniṣads,* Madras, 1912, pp. 59-60.

(xii) *Indraścaruśamā ca śaṃ prāsyetāṃ yataronau pūrvo bhūmiṃ paryyeti sa jayatīti bhūmimindrah paryait Kurukṣetra ~ ruśamā sābravīdajaisantvetyahameva tvāmajaisamitīndro bravītau deveṣva pṛicchetāṃ te devā abruvannetāvatīvāva prajāpatevvediryyāvat Kurukṣetramiti tau na vyajayetāṃ* [*Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa, II,* Biblothica Indica Series, A.S.B., Calcutta, 1874, pp. 817-8, verse XXV. 13. 3].

This is in nutshell a short account and some notices of Kurukṣetra in the early Sanskrit literature.[14]

14. References to the place in the grammar of Pānini will be described and discussed in a separate paper.

The American Civil War : A Major Factor in the Improvement of the Transportation System of Western India ?[1]

BY

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As a consequence of the American Civil War, the immense and highly lucrative cotton trade which that country had established was thrown open to the rest of the world. Increased cotton cultivation was undertaken in nearly every country where the plant would grow. India, Brazil, Egypt, the West Indies, and China were the chief aspirants to succeed the United States as the number one cotton exporting nation. Of this group, India was viewed as the "one great hope" not only to relieve the immediate distress resulting from the reduction of supplies from America, but to relieve permanently the dependence of the English manufacturers upon that "unstable" source of supply. However, it was readily admitted in India in 1861 that before Great Britain could dispense with the United States, an improved transportation system connecting the interior cotton districts with the sea coast ports was essential.[2]

Although the earlier Court of Directors of the East India Company, and after 1858, the Government of India, made attempts to

1. The writer gathered the material for this article in the course of a year's study and research in India in 1953-1954. He wishes to express his gratitude to the Ford Foundation Board on Overseas Training and Research for the financial support which made this study possible. That foundation, however, is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or views expressed herein.

2. While cognizant of the part played by the railroads in improving the transportation system of India between 1861 and 1865, this study will confine itself only to road construction.

improve the cotton roads of Western India, the problem remained unsolved throughout the period before 1861. For example, twelve years before the outbreak of the American Civil War the few roads which existed in Western India were generally without bridges. A 200 mile trip from the cotton districts of the interior to Bombay City usually took from two to three months; and during the three or four months of the monsoon, goods could not be conveyed at all.[3] By 1859 the situation was apparently little improved inasmuch as the Bombay Chamber of Commerce complained that the greatest obstacle in getting the cotton from Dharwar to Bombay City was the condition of the roads. Thus, even though the cotton was picked from the bolls in March, much of it could be brought in any quantity to the coast for shipment to Bombay City before December, "that state of the roads (during the rainy season) being an insurmountable difficulty.[4]

However, even during the dry season, the transit of cotton to Bombay City on the eve of the American Civil War afforded abundant evidence that road communication required improvement. A picture of the "hardships" the cotton went through while enroute is given in the following:

> Cotton is exposed to every species of depreciation during its transit to Bombay City. Moving along at a rate of one or two miles an hour in rude carts, or on the back of bullocks, over bad roads, the dew and dust do their worst to it. The bullocks are loaded and unloaded twice a day; generally in the neighbourhood of watering places, and their packs are

3. *Railways for Bombay* (May, 1849), p. 18.

4. Secretariat Record Office, Revenue Department, Bombay City, quoted in the Report of the Revenue Commissioner, Northern Division, to the Revenue Department, Government of Bombay, December, 1859. See also the *Deccan Herald* (Poona), June 3, 1861. When the rains started in May or June all transit of cotton, except by rail, ceased; for the loose soil was dissolved into a thick layer of mud, "so deep and tenacious that the country carts cannot be dragged through." Moreover, coastwise navigation was closed also by May 20 of each year, as shipping along the coast became difficult and dangerous. Therefore, during the wet season practically an entire halt came to the transit of cotton to Bombay City. Henceforth references to the material housed in the Secretariat Record Office, Revenue Department, Government of Bombay, will be cited as SRORD with accompanying appropriate data.

> rolled in the mud. Each bullock consoles himself during the march by keeping his nose in his leader's pack, and steadily eating the cotton. The loss in weight, which has not been compensated by the accumulated dust of the journey, is too often supplied in water at its close.[5]

Such, in brief, was the state of roads and the means of transportation in Western India when civil war broke out in America in 1861. As the weeks of fighting in that country passed into months, and with the Northern blockade of the ports in the Southern states cutting short the cotton supply to England, Western India, in its effort to meet the crisis and take advantage of the opportunity offered, was confronted with this inadequate road system running from the interior to the sea coast. To effect the needed and immediate improvement was no simple matter, for behind the approximately forty miles of comparatively level land rose the Sahyadries, or Western Ghats, a mountain range sprawling from north to south for hundreds of miles.

Notwithstanding, and spurred on by the "difficulty" of the United States, the Government of India and the Government of Bombay sought to remove the inadequacies "without exceeding (their) legitimate functions." Thus the question: "What could the government do within its legitimate functions towards improving the means of bringing cotton to the ports for shipment?" On February 28, 1861, the Government of India published a resolution which attempted an answer. In part this resolution read:[6]

> It is by facilitating existing means of communication, even though it be in a rough way, that Government can best aid the merchant promptly without exceeding its legitimate functions.
>
> Projects for bridged and metalled roads are not practicable within the next year or eighteen months; but there is a great extent of country capable of producing cotton, which is now not easily accessible to ordinary country carts, even during the fair season; and probably it is by improving the present cart and pack tracks, and thus extending the mileage over

5. Walter R. Cassels, *Cotton, An Account of its Culture in the Bombay Presidency*, (Bombay, 1862), p. 299.
6. For full text of the February 28, 1861, resolution, see SRORD.

which an ordinary load of Cotton may be conveyed at a rate of 2½ miles or three miles per hour that the export of next season's crop may be most effectively aided.

With this aim in view, the Governor General, Lord Canning, requested that each local government immediately appoint "a competent officer" to survey the adequacy of communication facilities between their cotton fields and the ports of shipment. Canning also urged that the officer appointed be accompanied by "a member of what ever commercial community may be most interested in the produce of the District, who might observe and report on any obstacles other than physical, which may appear to impede the Cotton trade." Copies of this resolution were sent to the Governors of Madras and Bombay; to the Lieutenant Governors of Bengal, the Northwestern Provinces, and the Punjab; and to other minor areas under British control.

The Government of Bombay received the resolution on March 11.[7] Two days later, A. D. Robertson, Secretary, Government of Bombay, Revenue Department, in accordance with the stipulations contained in the resolution, informed W. Grey, Secretary, Government of India, Calcutta, of the appointment of Captain W. C. Anderson, Superintendent, Revenue Survey and Assessment for the Southern Mahratta Country and Berar, as the officer to inspect the cotton districts in the southern part of the Bombay Presidency.[8] On the same day, Robertson, in a letter to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, requested that body to appoint one of its members to accompany Anderson on the latter's inspection tour and report on the roads in the cotton districts.[9] On April 6, the Chamber notified Robertson of the appointment of W. C. Sillar a cotton merchant of Bombay City.[10]

With the inspection team organized, the Government of Bombay, on April 25, decided that it could not spare the services of Anderson. But of even more significance, it failed to appoint another officer in the place of the relieved Anderson. The government simply noted that inasmuch as Anderson "had sufficient work

7. SRORD, letter from Grey to Robertson, February 28, 1861.
8. SRORD, letter of March 13, 1861.
9. SRORD, letter from Robertson to Brooke, March 13, 1861.
10. SRORD, letter from Brooke to Robertson, April 6, 1861.

at present to occupy fully" his time, Sillar was being sent out alone.[11] On the same day, however, Stewart sent a circular to the collectors in the various cotton districts in the Southern Division requesting that they would "have the goodness to afford that gentleman (Sillar) every assistance" in his effort to obtain information on the cotton producing potential of their districts as well as the difficulties involved in the shipping of cotton to Bombay.[12]

Sillar left Bombay on April 26, 1861, and returned to that city approximately a month later, May 24. His trip appeared to have been a complete failure, and he attributed it "to the contumacy of the authorities" in the districts through which he passed or attempted to pass. Nonetheless, he wrote that the cotton which he was able to observe, "whether cotton in the unclean state or of the remains of Cotton plants on the ground where it was grown, (was) wretched to the extreme; suggestive of an utter want of Care in any one process of picking or of selection of seed for sowing." Sillar explained that the deplorable condition of the cotton was due chiefly to "the wretched condition, if not utter absence of roads compelling the Cultivators to prefer a crop which has a market near at hand such as the grain crop," and to "the great difficulty attending the endeavor of a European to visit these localities for the purpose of persuading them (Indian cultivators) to adopt better modes of cotton Culture." These, he viewed, were the main obstacles in the way of improved or extended cotton cultivation.[13]

Although Sillar's trip was abortive and without great value, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, in a letter to the Government of Bombay, declared that great advantage would result to the Indian community, and the mercantile classes of Bombay City as well as to the manufacturing interests in England from an extended and thorough tour through "some of the Cotton Districts at this Presidency by an Engineer Officer accompanied by a Merchant."[14] That this suggestion found favour with the Bombay Government

11. SRORD, letter from Stewart to Anderson, April 25, 1861.

12. SRORD, Circular of April 25, 1861.

13. SRORD, letter from Sillar to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, June 4, 1861. For a more thorough account of Sillar's trip from Bombay via. Poona to Sholapur, see his report, "My Visit to the Cotton Districts near Bombay," (1861).

14. SRORD, letter from Brooke to Stewart, July 9, 1861.

is shown in its answer three weeks later. It declared that it was prepared to send Engineer Officers or European Assistant Collectors to accompany through the cotton growing districts of the Southern Division, "or any other district" during the 1861-1862 "Cold Season" any person the Chamber might select.[15]

The determination of the Government of India to push forward internal communication was underscored by Samuel Laing, the Finance Minister for India. In the course of his remarks on April 27, 1861, on the presentation of the Indian budget for 1861-1862, he declared that the government would especially urge on the construction of roads in the chief cotton growing districts in order to be prepared to bring the resources of India into play to supply the expected scarcity of cotton from the United States.[16] Laing then uttered these interesting words:

> . . . you may depend upon it; that it shall not be said of us, that slavery triumphed and India missed its opportunity, because its government was too blind to discern, or too weak to carry out, the policy which, at a great crisis, Providence had clearly pointed out to us.[17]

In commenting on the Finance Minister's speech, the *Gazette* declared that those were the words it wanted to hear from the government spokesmen. Without roads it was believed that cotton cultivation could not be carried much beyond what it was at the commencement of the American Civil War, and unless the cultivation was very greatly extended and improved "India would never control the British market in competition with the United States." India, in other words, would never become, instead of the United States, "the feeder of Lancashire."[18]

When the Government of India, in a letter to a Calcutta cotton firm, on July 2, 1861, reiterated its fixed policy to facilitate the

15. SRORD, letter from Stewart to George Lord, Chairman, Bombay Chamber of Commerce, July 29, 1861. See also SRORD, letter of Lord to Stewart, August 13, 1861.

16. See the *Bombay Gazette,* May 8, 1861. See also, "Financial Statement by the Honorable Samuel Laing," April 27, 1861, *Annual Financial Statements for the Official Years, 1860-61 — 1873-74* (Calcutta, 1871), p. 55. The Indian financial year began on May 1, and ended on April 30.

17. See the *Bombay Gazette,* May 8, 1861.

18. *Ibid.*

transport of cotton by improving roads and means of internal communication "so far as the financial resources of Government will admit,"[19] the Bombay Government, had it been aware of the statement, would have enthusiastically welcomed it. For a month later, August 14, in accordance with the February 28 resolution, the Public Works Department of that Presidency submitted its survey of the adequacy of communication facilities between the cotton fields and the ports of shipment.[20] The survey, covering both Northern and Southern Divisions of the Bombay Presidency, emphasized the fact that much work and money would be necessary to construct the needed all year round roads in the major cotton producing districts. This was so because of two reasons. First, the difficulty of procuring workers, especially in the important cotton growing district of Dharwar. The Superintending Engineer in charge of that collectorate was quoted in 1862 as saying that "the people appear so well to do that they are not disposed to take service on roads." Second, in the actual construction of roads, particularly in Gujarat and the plains region of the Deccan, it was necessary to raise the road above the face of the country in order for it to withstand the destructiveness of the monsoon; and the gravel necessary to harden the surface was not obtainable in the immediate vicinity. Hence, it could be secured only "with great difficulty and at great expense."

Apparently with the intention of meeting this "difficulty" and "expense," the Financial Department, Government of India, sanctioned on October 8, 1861, an additional grant of twelve lakhs (Rs. 1,200,000), to the Public Works Department for the year 1861-1862. This extra grant was given specifically to expedite works to facilitate the export of Indian cotton to England.[21] The following day the Public Works Department in a resolution called on the

19. *Correspondence Relating to Cotton Cultivation in India* (1863), p. 51, letter from W. Grey to Messrs. Mosley and Hurst, Honorary Agents to the Manchester Cotton Supply Association, July 2, 1861. Hereinafter cited as CRCCI with appropriate accompanying data.

20. For the entire report, see SRORD, letter from Colonel H. B. Turner, Acting Secretary, Government of Bombay, Public Works Department, to Lieutenant Colonel H. Yule, Secretary, Government of India, Public Works Department, Calcutta, August 14, 1861.

21. CRCCI, p. 158, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Financial Department, October 8, 1861.

local governments to submit not later than November 15, 1861, "a brief but precise statement of the objects on which they propose to expend this addition to their assignments. The apportionment which the Governor General in Council asked the local governments to bear in mind when drafting their statement was as follows:[22]

Bombay	..	3¼ lakhs
Nagpoor	..	1¼ "
Madras	..	1½ "
Bengal	..	1½ "
Northwestern Provinces	..	1½ "
Punjab	..	¾ "
Pegu	..	¾ "
Hyderabad	..	½ "
Reserved for Government of India	..	1 "
Total	..	12 lakhs

Approximately a month later, November 4, Colonel H. B. Turner of the Bombay Government, in a letter and report to the Secretary, Government of India, Public Works Department, in accordance with the Governor General's reminder, listed eighteen works which the Bombay Government desired to carry on during the 1861-1862 year. Not surprisingly, the works on which the proposed 3¼ lakhs were to be expended were situated mainly in the Southern Division of the Presidency, chiefly in the important cotton growing districts of Satara, Belgaum, Sholapur and Ahmadnagar. (The latter district, though not an important cotton producing area itself, required improved roads for the transit of cotton across its territory). Turner estimated that the eighteen projects would cost Rs. 1,164,867, or slightly in excess of eleven lakhs. The amount required in 1861-1862 was put at Rs. 320,092, or slightly less than the 3¼ lakhs promised by the Government of India, leaving a total of Rs. 844,775 as the amount required for the completion of all the listed projects.[23]

22. CRCCI, p. 158, Circular Number 90, October 9, 1861.

23. CRCCI, pp. 161, 163, letter and report, Colonel H. B Turner, November 4, 1861.

In the same report, Turner listed separately an estimated nine lakhs (Rs. 900,000) for Bombay City to improve wharfage and facilities for landing and shipping cotton. By way of justifying this amount, he pointed out that "the large increase of cotton expected this year (1861-1862), and the prospects of still further increase in future, render it imperative that increased wharfage be provided; with this view, a plan and estimate have been drawn up and are now under consideration, but the necessity is so urgent that this Government desires to commence the work at once." Therefore, Turner requested that Rs. 50,000 of the proposed 3¼ lakhs grant be allocated to the Bombay City project.[24]

On December 2, 1861, Lieutenant Colonel H. Yule, in a reply to Turner's letter, stated that the proposals of the Bombay Government for the disposal of the grant appeared to the Government of India to have been all well considered, with one exception. The expenditure of half a lakh on increasing the wharfage at Apollo Bay by pushing back the sea was viewed unfavourably. Yule added that since the estimated cost of completing the work was nine lakhs of rupees, the Government of India failed to see how the "urgent necessity" for a work costing that amount could be "effectively met by spending 50,000 rupees."[25] Therefore the latter sum was ordered excluded, leaving a remainder of 2¾ lakhs as the total amount of the additional grant to the Bombay Presidency for the year 1861-1862.[26] As a result of this and other modifica-

24. *Ibid.*, p. 162. As early as March 5, 1862, the *Bombay Gazette* had pointed out the need of improved shipping accommodations in Bombay in the following words:

> The disruption of the American Union, if not healed, must make Liverpool and Manchester dependent, to a vastly greater degree than ever before, on India for their supply of cotton; and with this fact sternly staring us in the face, convenient, and sufficient accommodations in Bombay, from which alone about sixteen twentieth of the entire quantity of Indian cotton now shipped to England is exported.

25. CRCCI, p. 164, letter from Yule, December 2, 1861. The work on reclaiming a portion of Appolo Bay was subsequently sanctioned. See *Statement on the Moral and Material Progress of India*, 1861-1862 (Part II, Chapter IX), p. 29.

26. It seems that this refusal and explanation was a mere justification, inasmuch as the Government of India was forced to revise its apportionment in lieu of an underestimate by the Punjab Government of a previously contracted debt.

tions, the Government of India revised the original apportionment, and issued accordingly a resolution on December 23 listing the following sums to the local governments:[27]

To Bombay	..	2¾ lakhs
„ Madras	..	1½ „
„ Bengal	..	1½ „
„ Northwest Provinces	..	1½ „
„ Punjab	..	———
„ Nagpur	..	1¼ „
„ Hyderabad	..	½ „
„ Pegu	..	———
Total	..	9 lakhs

It will be seen that aside from the exclusion of Punjab and Pegu, Bombay was the hardest hit by the revision.

Perhaps this reduction from the amount originally promised to the Bombay Presidency was a big factor in the continued complaints from the mercantile interests of Bombay City that the Government had done nothing tangible in the matter of improving road facilities with the interior for the export of cotton.[28] Apparently the dissatisfaction and grumbling had grown to such an extent that in August of 1862 the Governor of Bombay, Sir B. E. Frere, felt it necessary to publicly restate the road policy of the government. Addressing a public meeting in Bombay's Town Hall on behalf of the workers in the cotton manufacturing districts of England, Frere emphasized that although the Government of India was in the past slow to construct roads, that policy had happily been reversed. He declared that both the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for India had not only 'sanctioned all that we [the Bombay Presidency] could show was required, but in all their communi-

27. CRCCI, p. 183, Resolution, Government of India, Public Works Department, December 23, 1861.

28. *Times of India*, May 13, 1862. This complaint is all the more surprising in the light of the fact that on April 16, one month earlier, Samuel Laing, the Finance Minister for India, in a special grant for cotton roads, assigned Rs. 1,200,000. This sum, of course, was in addition to a like amount sanctioned in October, 1861. See "Financial Statement by the Honourable Samuel Laing," April 16 1862, *Annual Financial Statements, op. cit.,* p. 75.

cations they have not ceased to urge on us the necessity for making due provision for the want of the cotton trade."[29]

It appears that not only did the Government of India "urge" the Bombay Government to increase road construction, but the government also requested periodic progress reports. Thus on March 25, 1863, the Public Works Department in Calcutta, in a telegram to the Secretary of Public Works, Bombay Presidency, requested the latter to furnish the following information with respect to cotton roads: the mileage opened for fair weather traffic; the mileage in progress; the money spent up to a stated date; and the probable date of completion of the whole or any stated part.[30] In an immediate telegrammed reply, the Government of Bombay stated that since April, 1861, seventy two miles of cotton roads had been opened for traffic at all seasons; and 290 miles opened for fair season travel. Expenditures in 1861-1862 amounted to Rs. 262,000; expenditures in 1862-1863 up to January 21, 1863 totaled Rs. 250,000. Rivers pointed out that it was impossible to reply about the date of completion since each road or in some cases, each mile of a specific road would probably be completed at a different date.[31]

In the light of the much larger sums granted to the Bombay Government for road construction, it is not surprising that Williams was not satisfied with Rivers' hasty answer. Thus on the same day he received the telegram from the Bombay Government, Williams, in a return wire, requested that government to send him a listing of all the cotton roads completed prior to 1861 as well as a condensed report of all that had been done in the Bombay Presidency since action was first taken in 1861 to facilitate the exportation of cotton by roads. The Government of Bombay was also asked to list roads in progress and the aggregate amount expended or appropriated.[32]

29. Frere's speech on "The Distress in Lancashire", *Speeches and Addresses of Sir H. B. E. Frere,* compiled by Balkrishna N. Pitale (Bombay, 1870), pp. 233, 234.

30. Secretariat Record Office, Public Works Department, (hereinafter cited as SROPWD), telegram from Captain A. Williams, Under Secretary, Public Works Department, Government of India, Calcutta, to Lieutenant Colonel H. Rivers, Secretary, Government of Bombay, Public Works Department, March 25, 1863.

31. SROPWD, telegram of March 26, 1863.

32. SROPWD, telegram of March 26, 1863.

The Bombay Government now did what it should have done in the first instance. It sent letters to its various districts requesting that the information sought by the Government of India be supplied to the Public Works Department, Bombay, as quickly as possible. But a composite report approaching anything like the fullness obviously desired by Williams required time. Therefore, when the Government of India, on April 27, wired Bombay that the report was "anxiously awaited,"[33] it wisely refrained from despatching an immediate answer. Eight days later, on May 5 1863, the Government of Bombay, through its Public Works Departments, submitted to the Government of India the "anxiously awaited" survey.[34] The pertinent information from this report reveals that of the 2,836 miles of roads in the Bombay Presidency on January 30, 1863, *nearly half that length was completed or commenced between May, 1, 1861 and January 30, 1863.* Although it may be disputed in some quarters, this fact offers sufficient evidence to conclude that the American Civil War hastened by several decades the starting construction of an adequate network of roads in Western India.

33. SROPWD, telegram from Lieutenant Colonel M. Beale, Officiating Secretary, Government of India, Public Works Department, Calcutta, to Lieutenant H. Rivers, April 27, 1863.

34. The writer compiled these figures from the report of Rivers. For a complete account of River's report, see SROPWD, Report of H. Rivers, May 5, 1863.

Reviews

SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA by Joseph Needham, F. R. S. Vol. I.—Introductory Orientations, Cambridge, at the University Press—1954. Pages XXXVIII and 318. Net 52 sh. 6 d.

This is a comprehensive seven-volume project to assess the World's debt to China in Science and Technology by a leading English Scientist of our time. Thirty out of the fifty sections included in the plan have been written out and the rest sketched in more or less detail. The first volume now issued comprises the first seven sections, appropriately grouped together as 'Introductory Orientations'.

In his preface Prof. Needham points out that historians of science in the early nineteenth century betrayed 'a bland unconsciousness' of the existence of contributions made by non-European peoples to the history of man's understanding of his environment. 'Since then, the debt of developed scientific thought to the ancestral pioneering of the Egyptians, as also to the work of the ancient inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent, Sumerians, Babylonians, the Hittites and others, has been better recognised and explored. Owing partly to circumstances which brought Europeans into close contact with Indian Culture from the days of Megasthenes to those of Macaulay, some justice (still insufficient) has been done to Indian achievements, though here there are difficult problems of chronology which continue to prevent the appearance of a clear picture. And still to-day the contribution of the Far East, and especially of its oldest and most central civilisation, that of the Chinese, to science, scientific thought and technology, remains unrecognised and clouded in obscurity.' "The very term "FAR EAST" ', he adds significantly, 'which I shall not use again in this book, but which springs spontaneously to the written page, exemplifies that fundamental insularity of outlook which it is so difficult for Europeans, even those who have the best intentions, to discard. The scientific contribution of Asia, and in particular of the "Central Country," China, is the theme of this work.'

The author is well aware of the magnitude of the task before him, 'that a book such as the present one can be but a reconnaissance.' But there is already a vast and scattered literature, in Chinese, Japanese and the Western languages, that calls for being digested in handy book form; again, there is much original Chinese literature that deserves close study. A scholar with scientific training and interests, with original work on the history of Science and Technology to his credit, with a knowledge of the social and economic background of science, with personal experience of Chinese life, knowledge of the Chinese language and able to command guidance from Chinese scientists, was needed to essay the task. 'That these strangely assorted circumstances should all have fallen to my lot,' modestly states Prof. Needham, 'is my basic defence against the criticisms, which I shall certainly deserve, from those who are, in one field or another which this book will touch, past masters. It is also the reason why I have been prepared to sacrifice much in order to accomplish the survey proposed, fearing that it might be some time before the same collocation of circumstances recurs in another person.' With some notable exceptions among contemporary sinologists, modern Western Sinologists have devoted far more attention to literary and philosophical studies than to science (p. 44). Europe has adopted many techniques from China with generally no appreciation of their origin; Bacon mentioned printing, gunpowder and the magnet as having 'changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world'; but even Bury who refers to these factors in his *Idea of Progress* does not provide even 'a footnote pointing out that none of the three was of European origin.' (p. 19).

The plan of the work, Bibliographical Notes and Geographical Introduction constitute sections 2-4. Stress is laid on the influence of the literary language in promoting the Union of China in the face of almost insurmountable geographical obstacles: 'To the Chinese the literature of millenniar is open; and his unrivalled love for and knowledge of the ancient culture of his country is largely due to the peculiar nature of his literary language.' The quality of Prof. Needham's writing is compact and allusive; almost mathematical in its brevity aided by a number of devices and conventions, all fully explained at the outset. Discussions of debated points are carried on by means of cross references to items in the complete

bibliography of books and articles, in Chinese and other languages, listed at the end. The reader can pursue any aspect of the subject to any further length he wishes. References to the later sections of the book, not still published, are also frequent. The History of China is dealt with in two sections—5. Pre-imperial and 6. Imperial; and section 7 on the conditions of Travel of scientific ideas and techniques between China and Europe is the *piece de resistance* (pp. 150-248).

It is impossible to do justice to a fundamental book of this nature in a review. Only a few random samples can be put before the reader to indicate the nature of the great and good things he may expect to encounter in reading the book. The invention of paper in China in the second century A.D. (+ 2nd Century as Needham writes it) was no unmixed blessing, as till printing began some 700 years later this led to manuscripts being written on perishable material instead of on the clumsy but durable parchment of the West (p. 45). 'It has been suggested that the requirement of Lamaist Buddhism that every family should contribute one son to the great monasteries, and also the system of polyandry, have had the contraceptive effect necessary (on the Tibetan plateau) where the resources were so few' (p. 67). 'Cave dwellings (as I may say from personal experience) are very convenient, cool in summer and warm in winter; but cause much loss of life by collapsing in earth-quakes' (p. 70). 'Bishop has pointed out that the area of wheat-culture in antiquity is almost identical with that of the use of bronze' (p. 84). The history of China cannot be pushed back beyond about—1500 (i.e. 1500 B.C.); iron appeared in China first about—600. 'Inspite of this fact, we shall see below (Sect. 36) how rapidly the Chinese surpassed all other parts of the World in iron technology' (p. 99). It is precise and clear statements like these that greatly enhance the value of this great work. In the Thang period, 'Chhang-an, no less than Baghdad, became a meeting place of international fame. Arabs, Syrians and Persians came there from the West to meet Koreans, Japanese, Tibetans and Tonkinese and to discuss religion and literature with Chinese scholars in the elegant pavilions of the great city in the Wei Valley' (p. 125). The Thang dynasty was humanistic, the Sung much more scientific and technological (p. 127), and China seems to have given much more than she received (p. 129).

The last section in the volume on the Travel of scientific ideas and techniques between China and Europe is fundamental, dealing as it does with all the difficult questions of origin, priority, parallel developments, diffusion and so on in a full, frank and realistic manner eschewing all bias. The reader can see at once that if the author could be shown to be wrong by new evidence or arguments none would be better pleased than he; so sincere and transparent is Prof. Needham's desire to get at the heart of the truth about things, and his documentation is in each instance admirably full and precise. Chinese civilization was most isolated from the others (p. 156); 'contacts there were, but never abundant enough to affect the characteristic style of the civilisation, and hence of its science' (p. 157). Its foundations nevertheless seem to form a prehistoric continuum with those of Western culture as is seen from striking similarities in the shape and make of the pommels of bronze swords from Denmark, Russia and China (illustration p. 160); this idea seems to be re-enforced by literary, folklorist and art parallels, but adds Prof. Needham, 'our own impression of such studies is that they are most valuable when they have some direct relation with a concrete piece of technology, the movements of which can be traced by means of epigraphic illustrations and literary evidence. Otherwise they are liable to remain rather speculative' (p. 168).

The trade-routes by land (170-6) and sea (176-80) and the silk road (181 ff) are as may be expected very fully dealt with, and the role of pax Mongolica in ensuring the traffic of men and merchants, ideas and techniques brought out forcibly (188 ff). 'There is evidence that much racial mixture occurred, and the Mongol or Chinese girls probably contributed some useful genes to the European population.' (p. 189). Throughout the formative period of modern history, however, the Far West took no interest in the Far East, and there was no appreciation of Chinese or Indian contributions to thought, though the opportunities for transmission of thought were greater than would at first sight appear; technical inventions on the contrary show a slow but massive infiltration from east to west throughout the first fourteen centuries of the Christian era (pp. 222-3) and there is an impressive list (pp. 240-41) of these inventions which so travelled including items already noted like paper, and printing, besides porcelain, parts of the horse-harness, canal lock-gates, the compass and so on.

Prof. Needham is very much alive to the difficulty of reaching final decisions between the possibilities of parallel developments, diffusion, and 'stimulus diffusion leading to new developments on the basis of an external suggestion or technique.' He quotes Toynbee who says: 'there is no doubt that a mechanical penchant is as characteristic of the Western Civilization as an aesthetic penchant was of Hellenic, or a religious penchant was of the India and the Hindu,' and mildly rebukes him saying: 'It is to be feared that all such valuations of East and West are built on insecure foundations.' (p. 241). He says also this: 'Although most Amerindian Archaeologists have upheld a kind of Munroe Doctrine about the origin of Mexican, Mayan and Peruvian civilisations, the number of culture traits which they share with the East Asian Continental groups is so suggestive that one cannot but wonder whether a few direct stimuli did not reach than across that great waste of waters' (p. 248).

Before concluding, some points on which Indian Influence in China has been traced or suggested by the author may be noted. First among these is the possible influence of association with Sanskrit scholars on the analysis of the sounds of Chinese characters into their component sounds which appears to have originated in the third century A.D. (pp. 33-4); more generally, Indian grammar undoubtedly stimulated Chinese philological study in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. (p. 213). Then the process of unification of the country by communication systems so characteristic of the Achemenid and Mauryan empires influenced China, and the importance attached to works of hydraulic engineering in China indicates that the Mauryan influence was perhaps the greater (p. 102); readers will doubtless recall here Dr. A. Salmony's thesis on the influence of Indian Art and thought on pre-Buddhist China. Influences flowing through the Hinduised countries and islands of South-East Asia (p. 118) and through Buddhism itself, the fresco paintings of the caves of the Thousand Buddhas at Tunhuang and the carvings of the Yunkang Caves near Ta-thung inspired directly by Ajanta and Ellora respectively, the Chinese pagoda which is without question a development of the India stūpa may also be noted.

The reference in *n.* g on p. 154 is missing; and on p. 220 'claims

from them descent from the Chaldeans' should read 'claims *for* them.'

Prof. Needham's work when completed, as we hope it will soon be, will be another monument of English scholarship which will take a secure place by the side of Frazer's *Golden Bough*, Toynbee's *Study of History* and other works of the kind.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

SINDHIA AS REGENT OF DELHI, 1787 and 1789-91: (Persian Records of Maratha History, Vol. II, Translated with notes by Jadunath Sarkar and Published by the Director of Archives, Secretariat Record Office, Bombay Castle, Bombay-I, Rs. 2/-).

The Veteran historian who translates and edits these Persian news letters describes his work in the following succinct terms in his brief introduction: (p. 17).

"The copious Persian reports from Sindhia's Camp which cover the years 1789-91 are here published for the first time and form an invaluable source of North Indian History. They also reveal the character and capacity of Mahadji by a hundred small touches as no other document known to us does . . . No biographer of Mahadji Sindhia can afford to neglect this original source." Mahadji Sindhia and Nana Phadnis are the two central figures of Maratha history in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Both escaped the carnage of Panipat and rose to be the saviours of the Maratha State. Mahadji Sindhia was regent for Shah Alam II, from 1784 to 1794. He greatly felt the need of money for enforcing the authority of the Emperor. The Rajputs had not paid their tribute for years and Sindhia demanded the arrears. Jaipur and Jodhpur combined against him in 1786. In the following year he undertook the Lalsot (in Jaipur, Rajputana) Campaign and was defeated. The Maratha writers in his camp feared another Panipat as the result of this entanglement in the desert of Rajaputana. But his strength of character and genius for command saved his army from disaster and he retreated to Dig in eleven days. In 1788 Ghulam Qadir blinded the Emperor but was disgraced and put to death by Mahadji Sindhia in 1789. His general Benoit de Boigne invaded Raja-

putana in 1790 and defeated the Rajputs at Patan and Merta. Sindhia's joy knew no bounds.

The historical background is explained by P. M. Joshi in the foreword. The scholarly introduction by Jadunath Sarkar discusses the Lalsot Campaign of 1787, Sindhia in Madhura and Rajaputana and his illness in 1789. The news letters published in the volume form a necessary supplement to the already published English records on Mahadji Sindhia in the Poona Residency Correspondence series Vol. I. The Appendix contains the description of the Lalsot Campaign in Faqir Khair-ud-din Allahabadi's Ibrat-nama written early in the 19th century. The volume is provided with a chronology and an index.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA—by A. L. Basham, B.A., Ph.D., Reader in the History of India in the University of London, Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1954—Pages xxiv and 568—Plates 89, Line drawings and maps 26, Price 45 sh. net.

Dr. A. L. Basham is well known to Indologists already as the author of a scholarly and comprehensive monograph on the Ājīvikas. The present work, he says, 'has been written to interpret ancient Indian Civilisation, as I understand it, to the ordinary Western reader who has little knowledge of the subject, but some interest in it.' We may say at once that the author has achieved admirable success in his endeavour, and one of his readers at least has little doubt that this book will no way lag behind its companion volumes on Greece, Rome and Egypt in conveying a vivid and correct picture of the past culture and civilisation of the country. Dr. Basham has kept the general reader steadily in his view, eschewed tiresome discussions and references, cut down political narrative to the essential minimum, and found room for an adequate and fairly detached presentation of subjects like political and religious thought, literary and artistic movements, all very well illustrated by means of choice pictures and specimen translations.

The general approach of Dr. Basham to Indian culture is that of an understanding admirer who has seen through shallow common places and bases his judgments on deep personal knowledge

of the sources. 'In no other part of the ancient world were the relations of man and man, and of the man and the state, so fair and humane . . . . . . To us the most striking feature of ancient Indian Civilization is its humanity . . . . . . Our second general impression of ancient India is that her people enjoyed life, passionately delighting both in the things of the senses and the things of the spirit . . . . . . India was a cheerful land, whose people, each finding *a niche in a complex and slowly evolving, social system, reached* a higher level of kindliness and gentleness in their mutual relationships than any other nation of antiquity' (p. 9).

'It is not wholly just to India to stigmatize her ancient wisdom as mere "life-negation"' (p. 247). Examples of other thoughtful judgments are found in the following: 'Pre-Aryan India made certain advances in husbandry for which the whole world owes her a debt' (25); 'India has conferred many practical blessings on the world at large; notably rice, cotton, the sugarcane, many spices, the domestic fowl, the game of chess, and, most important of all, the decimal system of numeral notation, the invention of an unknown Indian Mathematician early in the Christian era' (p. 485); 'In the best days of the Gupta Empire Indian Culture reached a perfection which it was never again to attain. At this time India was perhaps the happiest and most important region of the world, for the effete Roman Empire was nearing its destruction, and China was passing through a time of troubles between the two great periods of the Hans and the T'angs' (p. 66). The *Gītā* is, 'the most exalted and beautiful of India's religious poems (253).' 'Hinduism is essentially tolerant, and would rather assimilate than rigidly exclude' (309). The Brāhmī script though still not completely perfect was by the time of Aśoka the most scientific script in the world (396). Dr. Basham, finally, is quite hopeful of the future of Hinduism and of the rôle of India in World Civilisation (484-487).

The author unlike some other writers takes good care to emphasise the central position of India in the Indian Ocean and her external contacts which lead to much give and take. His brief treatment of Pre-History is very valuable. The Harappa people lived under a single centralised state rather than in a number of free communities (p. 15). 'No other ancient civilisation until that of the Romans had so efficient a system of drains' (16). The Harappa Civilisation was 'rather unimaginative but comfortable'

(p. 18). It is not certain that the bronze "dancing girl" is a dancer, much less a temple dancer (p. 21). Dr. Basham sees reason to think that horse-riding nomads found their way to N. W. India in small numbers long before the Aryan invasion (18-27).

He is quite critical of hastily formed conclusions of his predecessors. 'It has been suggested that the Paṇis were Semitic traders, but the evidence is so slight that this conclusion cannot be accepted' (32). 'The priest-king of some other early cultures had no counterpart in Vedic India' (34). 'It is as futile to try to reconstruct the Political and Social history of India in the 10th cent. B.C. from the *Mahābhārata* as it would be to write the history of Britain immediately after the evacuation of the Romans from *Malory's Morte d'Arthur*' (39). 'It is practically certain that caste did not originate from Varṇa. In fact the two systems have never been thoroughly harmonized' (148-150). Dr. Basham does not accept that Buddhism and Jainism represent a reaction of the warrior class to the pretensions of the brahmans and to the sterility of the sacrificial cult and points out that many of the teachers of the new doctrines were themselves brahmans (246). Nor does he sympathise with the view that denies originality to Buddha's thought (268). In its final form, 'the Hindu system of World-cycles is clearly an imperfect synthesis of more than one independent doctrine' (321). 'Śaṅkara's Brahman is not really different from the "Void" or the Nirvāṇa of Mahāyāna Buddhism, a fact well recognised by Sankara's opponents, who called him a Crypto-Buddhist' (328). 'Rāmānuja was not as brilliant a metaphysician as Śaṅkara, but Indian religion perhaps owes more to him than to his predecessor' (332). 'Now the sculpture of Gandhāra is sometmes described as a mere imitation of an imitation, the weak copy of a great art in decline. Neither judgment is fair. In an Indian context the style of Gandhāra has a rather insipid flavour, but it is not without originality' (p. 369).

Dr. Basham seems to put Greek influence on Indian drama somewhat higher than others would (59). Khāravela has been assigned to the middle of the first century B.C. without any indication of doubt about it (61). 'The invasions of the Hūṇas destroyed or dispersed the older martial tribes of Rājasthān' (67). This needs elucidation. The battle of Talikota is said to have brought about the end of the last great Hindu empire of India (99);

this empire lived on in some strength for nearly a century after the battle. The suggestions that the Buddhist column was the survival of a phallic emblem or megalith (263) and that the Bodhisatva ideal was influenced by a Christian conception (276) will not find ready acceptance. The statement that the final form of Hinduism 'was largely the result of influences from the Dravidian south' (298) reminds one of A. B. Keith's vigorous protest against this view in an appendix to his *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda.* It is also difficult to accept Dr. Basham's affirmations that the majority of the political thinkers of ancient India favoured the doctrine of royal ownership of land (110) and that Tilak and Subas Bose are more orthodox than Gandhi in their attitude to the rôle of Violence in society (483).

Now a few minor points may be mentioned before we conclude. Somadevasūri described as Jaina writer of the 11 cent. (80) really wrote in the 10th. 'The last horse-sacrifice took place in Orissa in the 9th cent.' (85); Chola Rājādhirāja performed it in the 11th cent. The translation 'make a living by their title of Rājā' for *Rājaśabdopajīvī* and the inference from it of the practical ineptitude of the republics (97) seem alike unwarranted. The summary of Girinar inscription relating to the repair of the dam (99) is too reminiscent of Jayaswal's imaginative theorising to be accepted as correct. 'Garland of Madurai' (203) is not a correct rendering for *Maduraik-Kāñji.* Tirukkuṟaḷ can hardly be described as 'a collection of religious aphorisms' (300); and of the two sons of Śiva, Gaṇeśa, not Subramaṇya was the elder (314). At page 69, line 6 from foot, 'pirares' should read 'pirates'. In p. 212 line 11 from foot plate L xxxiii (b) should be L xxxii (b). There are twelve very useful Appendices well worth reading on Cosmology, Geography, Astronomy and so on.

K. A. Nilakanta Sastri

CAHIERS D'HISTORIE MONDIALE (Journal of World History) Vol. I, No. 1, Juillet 1953, Paris.

The Journal under review represents a laudable effort made on the part of the UNESCO Commission for bringing about a series purporting to trace the Cultural and Scientific Development of mankind under the able direction of Lucien Febvre, Member De l'Institut De France.

The Journal is devoted to the publication of articles by eminent scholars of all nationalities; French, English, German and American.

There are three parts in the number. The first part comprises original contributions. The second is reserved for documentation; the third embodies suggestions and an Editorial Note. The fourth is official text, and the fifth chronicle. The first part contains articles by Professor Garrod, Prof. H. A. R. Gibb, Bernard Lewis of the School of Oriental and African studies and others.

In her valuable article, Professor Garrod has carefully examined the problem of the relation between the upper palaeolithic blade industries of Europe with those of South-West Asia. She has rightly questioned the basis of comparison between the chatelperronian and the Gravettian of Europe with the upper palaeolithic blade cultures of Abu Halka, Ksar Akil, El-wad and El-Kebara. The evidence of the end scraper, the burin and the blunted back blade is not distinctive. The end-scraper, in particular, turns up everywhere and at all periods and is still in use to-day among the Eskimos and the natives of Central Australia. But she has made a case, on adequate grounds for a close connection between the Aurignacian of West Europe and that of South-West Asia. She has shown that the Aurignacian originated from Europe and reached the east Mediterranean shore relatively late in the upper palaeolithic, a hypothesis already formulated by Ewing as early as 1947 (Antiquity XXI) on geochronological grounds.

The articles by H. A. R. Gibb and others are equally illumining. We heartily congratulate those responsible for this excellent production.

K. A. Nilakanta Sastri.

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT INDIA: by B. C. Law (Societe Asiatique de Paris 1 Rue de seine, Paris, VIE, France —Pages 354).

In this Historical Geography of Ancient India, Dr. B. C. Law has brought out a systematic and comprehensive book on this important aspect of Indian History. He has based his book on origi-

nal works in Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Sinhalese, Burmese, Tibetan, and Chinese and has received invaluable help from other sources such as epigraphy, archaeology, numismatics, accounts of Greek travellers and Chinese pilgrims. He has paid proper attention to modern literature and modern researches on the subject. His well-known qualifications for the task are alluded to in the *avant-propos* of Dr. Louis Renou. He has arranged the geographical names in an alphabetical order and fully dealt with them under the proper regions to which they belong.

In his long introduction of about sixty pages, the learned author discusses the sources, the different names of India, the shape and divisions of the country, physical features and the sixteen Mahajanapadas. It also contains as an appendage a list of publications on Ancient Indian Geography. Following the introduction, the book is divided into five parts (1) Northern India, (2) Southern India, (3) Eastern India, (4) Western India, and (5) Central India. Places like Ahicchatra, Anga, Aparanta, Badami, Bali, Cambay, Damila, Ellore, Gangapadi, Yandheya and others are discussed at length. There are some errors, particularly on South India. In page 162, Kandalur is identified with Chidambaram with the remark that Rajaraja I destroyed the ships there! The author has based this view on the suggestion of Dr. E. Hultzsch in 1890 (South Indian Inscriptions Vol. I, 64). Under Palar (Paler) we find the following: "It flows into the Krishna just at the point where the latter enters the Madras State. It runs through the North Arcot and falls into the Bay of Bengal near Sadras in the Chingalpet District" (page 180). In page 193, it is said that the great Tanjore temple was built during the time of Rajendra Cola! Many places of historical interest like Kalyani, Goa, Dwarasamudra, to mention a few only, have been left out. Under Sravana-Belagola, the author has forgotten to mention the existence of the colossal statue of Gommatesvara (57 ft. in height). Satiyaputra is not marked though it is said that "it lay to the west of the territories of the Cholas and Pandyas and extended along the western sea coast of South India" (p. 186). The book contains a useful index at the end. On the whole, it serves as a useful guide to all serious students of Ancient Indian History and Culture.

K. A. Nilakanta Sastri.

KASHMIR Volume IV Number 11—issued by the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Old Secretariat, Delhi, Pages 223-240. Price As.8/-.

This is an interesting and instructive monthly periodical on the various aspects of Kashmir, published by the Government of India. The present number consists of seven articles viz. The River of Kings, The Paratap Singh Museum by *Sharada Ramaiah,* Bird Life in Sreenagar by *Samsar Chand Kaul,* The Mosques—by *B. P. Sharma,* Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin by *Nilla Gram* Cook, Our News Letter by *Vijay* and Pilgrimage to Vaishno Devi by *Suraj Sarof.* The Publishers deserve to be congratulated on producing this monthly periodical about the different aspects of Kashmir.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

SELECTIONS FROM THE NAGAPUR RESIDENCY RECORDS Vol. IV (1818-1840): By H. N. Sinha (Government Printing, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur. Pages XXIV and 592.

Dr. H. N. Sinha has rendered an invaluable service by sifting and editing the valuable historical material in the Nagpur Residency records covering the period 1818-1840. He has maintained the high standard set up for such work in such publications as Sirdesai and Jaudu Nath Sirkar's selections from the Poona Residency correspondence, published by the Bombay Government.

This is a collection of about 239 letters from the Nagapur Residency arranged under eight convenient heads, each bearing a separate series of numbers for the collection falling under it. The chief contents of the letters are neatly summarised by the Editor in his introduction of about six pages, and there is a chronological index to the letters following the introduction which makes for easy reference. There is also a summary indication of the contents of each letter preceding the text in the body of the book, and a serviceable index at the end, so that the reader finds all the facilities required for his use of the book. The main heads are: Bhonsla's Territories after the Third Maratha War, Bhonsla's Territories under British Administration (45), Appa Saheb after 1818 (39), The Pindaris. (6), Peshwa's Affairs (10), Sindhia's Affairs (5), Miscellaneous (18), Confidential News letters of

1840 (17). There are sometimes several enclosures to a letter and these are often more important than the covering letter, and the editor has done well to draw the reader's attention to this in every case. The information supplied by these records is necessarily of a political nature. Yet some interesting details are available on such diverse matters as economic conditions, currencies and banking and Pindaris.

The volume is well got up. There, however, is no indication of the general plan of the series, of the number of volumes it is likely to comprise, or of the probable time of their publication.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

KASHMIR THROUGH THE AGES: By G. L. Kaul (The Chronicle Publishing House, Srinagar, Kashmir, 1954, pages xxii and 287, Rs. 10).

This is an attractive and readable account of the fortunes of Kashmir from the earliest times to the present day. In his introduction, the author writes that "The History of Kashmir is more a chronicle of Kings and Courts and Conquests than of Organic or National Growth" (xxi). The book contains twenty-three chapters including the bibliography. In the Chapter II, the note on Kalhana explains his greatness as a historian and the sources utilised by him. 'It may be proudly said that while India was poor at History at one time it is Kashmir that gave a lead. Many a scholar has received inspiration from Kalhana from time to time' (page 2). Kashmir emerged as an independent state in North India in the 8th century A.D. The author gives an account of the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Dogra rule; the text of the treaty of 1846; the career of the Sadar-i-Riyasat Karan Singh; the President's order on Kashmir, 1954 under Article 370 of the Constitution of India. The character of the Kashmirians is separately given as well as the features of their society; Chapter xviii deals with a list of places of religious importance and the next one of the ancient authors; a complete chapter is devoted to the description of the monuments of Kashmir; and extracts from the observation of foreigners are also given. There are numerous misprints and price is rather high. There is no index.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE PATIALA AND EAST PUNJAB STATES UNION: By Ganda Singh, M.A., Ph.D., Published by The Director of Archives, Pepsu, Patiala, 1954. Pages 48.

Students of Sikh History will welcome this handy and up-to-date list of works and periodicals arranged according to languages and in English alphabetical order indicating the place and the year of publications. The Archives collection of books is mainly devoted to historical and other allied subjects, with particular reference to the country north and north-west of Delhi, including the Punjab and the Pepsu. A chronology of the ruling houses of the constituent states of the Patiala Union is given at the end to help scholars determine the scope of their study and research. Dr. Ganda Singh deserves our sincere thanks for devoting himself so earnestly to the very important task of preparing planned bibliographies on this aspect of Indian History. He says that a separate handbook of the official records of the constituent states of the Patiala and EPS Union is under compilation.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE: By Lal Bahadur (Published by Agra Book Store, Rawatpura, Agra 1954, p. 368—VI. Price Rs. 8/-).

This short piece of historical research is a reprint of the thesis for which the Doctorate Degree was awarded to the author by the Agra University. It is the purpose of this book to describe the history, the activities and achievements of the Muslim League through whose efforts India came to be partitioned. This pioneer scientific work is divided into sixteen chapters. It contains a dispassionate analysis of the available sources in English, Urdu and Hindi. The author has taken great pains in collecting this material from diverse persons and places and utilising it in a critical spirit. The author, however, has not concentrated on the main theme. His book has consequently become a sketch of the history of Indian Politics during the twentieth century and it covers the common ground covered by the activities of the Indian National Congress, the opposition to it by the Muslims in general, the British policy of divide and rule, the influence of Gandhi on the

Freedom Movement, the Cripps Mission and the Cabinet Mission. But we must not forget the fact that the activities of the Muslim League are inextricably interwoven with the general course of Indian Politics after 1900.

But apart from this, the author has succeeded in informing the public how from 1858 onwards separatist tendencies dominated the activities of Muslim leaders like Saiyyid Ahmad, how the British took advantage of this, how the attempt to bring together the League and the Congress on several occasions could not fructify, how the reforms of 1919 and 1935 gave shape to the forces of separatism and how finally Jinnah inspired by Iqbal took up the cry of Pakistan and achieved it through communal massacres and atrocities. The language of the book is lucid, style simple and ideas are clear. The book is provided with an exhaustive bibliography and a good index.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

CATALOGUE OF THE GUPTA COINS IN THE BAYANA HOARD : By Dr. A. S. Altekar, published by the Numismatic Society of India, 1954, Bombay. (Pages 36, clviii and 1-363, with 48 plates and an index).

The discovery of the Bayana hoard constitutes a great landmark in Indian Numismatics. The hoard was discovered on the 17th February 1946 in a field lying east of the village of Naglachhela, 7 miles south-east of the railway junction of Bayana in the former Bharatpur State by a small party of children on the hunt for empty cartridges. The villagers were quick, and got 285 coins melted but the prompt action of the Bharatpur authorities saved the remaining 1821 gold coins of the hoard. Historians and Numismatists tender their warmest thanks to His Highness the Maharaja of Bharatpur and the State officials for their laudable efforts in securing the great majority of the coins of one of the biggest hoards of gold coins known to history. Very likely the hoard was buried during the disturbances caused by the Huna invasions by an inhabitant of Bijayagadh, eight miles north-west of Naglachhela and an important centre of Gupta administration.

The hoard consists of the following coin types:

(i) Chandragupta I type	:	10
(ii) Samudragupta	:	183
(a) Standard	:	143
(b) Aśvamedha	:	20
(c) Battle axe	:	9
(d) Archer	:	3
(e) Lyrist	:	6
(f) Tiger-slayer	:	2
(iii) Kācha type	:	16
(a) Chakradhvaja	:	15
(b) Garuḍadhvaja	:	1
(iv) Chandragupta II	:	983
(a) Archer (Throne reverse 41 plus Lotus reverse 757)	:	798
(b) Horseman (King to left 52 plus King to right 30)	:	82
(Chhtra (Mahārājādhirāja Sri Chandraguptaḥ legend 5 plus Kshitimavajitya sucharitair divam jayati Vikramādityaḥ legend 52)	:	57
(d) Lion-slayer (Lion combatant 21 plus Lion trampler 20 plus Lion retreating 1)	:	42
(e) Couch type	:	3
(f) Chakravikrama	:	1
(v) Kumāragupta I	:	628
(a) Archer	:	183
(b) Swordsman	:	10
(c) Horseman (Goddess alone on reverse 47 plus Goddess feeding peacock 258)	:	305
(d) Kārtikeya (Rev.)	:	13
(e) Chhatra	:	2
(f) Tiger-slayer	:	36
(g) Lion-slayer (Lion combatant 23 plus Lion trampler 30)	:	53
(h) Elephant-Rider and Lion-slayer	:	4
(i) Aśvamedha (Caprisoned horse 2 plus Bare horse 2)	:	4
(j) Elephant-Rider	:	3
(k) Lyrist type	:	2

(l) Apratigha (Rev.)	:	8
(m) King and the Queen type	:	1
(n) Rhinoceros-slayer	:	4
(vi) Skandagupta (Kramaditya) Chhatra type	:	1

An independent coinage has been attributed to Chandragupta I. Whether it was not actually issued during the reign of Samudra still requires consideration. Allan has pertinently drawn attention to the fact that this Chandragupta I type is less slavishly imitated from the Kushān proto-types than the standard type of Samudra. The problem perhaps still remains open. It is the same case with the Kācha problem. Dr. Altekar thinks that Kācha, a brother of Samudra, ruled from 325-330 A.D. Fleet and Allan accept the identity of Kācha with Samudragupta. The force of the argument drawn from the legend on the reverse namely 'Sarvarājochhettā', as applying to Samudra cannot be easily dismissed.

Regarding the historicity of Rāmagupta, Dr. Altekar has referred to the discovery of copper coins in Malwa (P. xvi). No gold coin of this ruler, however, has come down to us. More evidence is necessary before we can put him among the ruling kings of the Gupta dynasty.

Many new types of Gupta coins have been revealed to us through this hoard. Some of them are unique. The Chakravikrama type of the reign of Chandragupta II testifies that he was a great devotee of Vishṇu. The obverse of this type has no legend which is unusual. Kumāragupta I's reign also witnessed several new types shown to us for the first time by the Bayana hoard. The Lyrist type which came into vogue for the first time with Samudra was revived by Kumāra. The Rhinoceros-slayer type is quite a new and a beautiful type whose existence is only known through the Bayana hoard. There are four specimens of this type. A fifth coin of this type has come to light subsequent to the discovery of the Bayana hoard and has been published in the Journal of the Numismatic Society of India, Vol. XI, p. 9. The king and queen type, also a new type of Kumāra is unique.

On p. xxx, Dr. Altekar leaves us to infer that he prefers the reading Pushyaymitra to the new suggestion of Yuddhamitra in the Bhitari pillar Inscription. Again he postulates two Bālādityas

on p. xxxviii, a position to which he is led by his treating the two Kumāraguptas usually numbered as II and III as just one king Kumāragupta II.

Much hard work has gone into the publication and Dr. Altekar has earned the gratitude of students of Indian history and culture. The book could have been made more attractive if more care had been exercised. On p. lxxiii there is a footnote inviting attention of the reader to note I on p. 52. But on p. 52 there is no note at all. There is no devanagari transcript facing each plate of legend as promised on p. 32, in the review copy at any rate. Some of the plates of the volume have not reached that technical perfection which is portrayed by Allan's excellent catalogue of Gupta coins in the British Museum. Plates 38-48 containing drawings of costumes, furniture and symbols from the coins are very useful.

K. A. Nilakanta Sastri.

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE ECONOMY OF BENGAL FROM 1704 to 1740: By Sukumar Bhattacharya.

This book is the outcome of the author's thesis approved by the University of London for his Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. He has chosen for his study the history of the East India Company in Bengal at its formative period, which has not hitherto received adequate attention. The principal source of information for the study is found in the copies of the Fort William Consultations and Factory Records now available at the Commonwealth Relations Office Library, London.

The author opens the study with an analytical survey of Bengal's economy during the early part of the 18th century, which witnessed the transition of authority from the Moghuls to the British. Chapter II deals with the rise and early growth of the English East India Company in Bengal beginning from 1633 and shows that the farman granted by the Emperor Farrukhsiyar in 1717 was an important landmark in the history of the Company. However, while it is admitted that this farman opened the way for the commercial and political supremacy of the English in India, it seems inappropriate to speak of it as the "Magna Carta of the English trade in India" (p. 29).

Murshid Kuli Khan became the Diwan of Bengal in 1700 and later its Subadhar (1717-27) and in both these capacities this competent administrator improved the well-being of the Subah. His successor, Shujauddin Khan was Subadar from 1727 to 1739, but this period proved vexatious for the Company on account of the unauthorised exactions of the Nawab's officials. The administration of Sarfaraz Khan (1739-40) did not ensure a more cordial relationship, but during the Subadharship of Illahwardi Khan (1740-56) the position was substantially altered, and the Company was able to make a rapid progress.

The author compares in Chapter III the development of the English East India Company with that of the other European rivals in the field and eventually examines the causes for the decline of the Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, French and Ostend companies in Bengal. After narrating the history of the mints and currrency in chapter IV he proceeds in the next chapter to assess the volume and character of the English commerce with Bengal during this period. He shows how the Company exported from Bengal saltpetre, silk and cotton goods but imported little in return. The balance of trade for Bengal was redressed only by the import of bullion, for which there was a constant demand.

Reviewing the general condition of Bengal in chapter VI he explains how in spite of occasional ravages of robbers, threats from the Marathas as well as the invasion of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739 and its repercussions, peace prevailed for the most part which contributed to the well-being of the people. The standard of life of the people on the one hand and that of the servants of the Company on the other are assessed on the basis of systematically collected data. The works of relief and charity undertaken by the English in Calcutta are described at some length (pp. 211-17). This important chapter, however, could have with greater appropriateness preceded the chapter on Markets and Trade.

In the final chapter the conclusions are summarised and it is shown how the period 1704-40 constituted the important epoch of the early adolescence in the history of the East India Company. His study is objective and his findings are expressed lucidly. The get up of the book is good. The Appendices contain lists of the

Subadhars and of the Presidents and Governors of Bengal during the period, a comprehensive Bibliography, a photostat copy of the farman granted to the Company by the Emperor Farrukhsiyar, a map of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa as well as another of the Kasimbazaar island. The book is a useful addition to the history of Bengal and to the history of the British in India.

K. K. PILLAY.

"STUDIES IN HINDU POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ITS METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS.": By Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Varma, M.A., (Pat.), M.A., (Columbia), Ph.D., (Chicago).

Political thought as such was not developed by the ancient Hindus, and consequently India had no schools of political philosophy in the western sense. Nevertheless, beginning from the Vedic age, political themes like the origin of the state, basis of law and features of ideal monarchy have been adverted to in the Vedas, Brahmanas, Mahabharata, Upanishads, Buddhist Jatakas and later in the Dharmasastras and Nitisaras, while Kautilya's Arthasastra provides the earliest comprehensive treatise on polity. Several scholars have attempted to unravel the strands of political thought contained in these works. But two faults have invariably vitiated their efforts: one, that of reading into the ancient texts Western ideas, and another, that of mistaking political speculations for historical accounts.

The book under review, which in its original form was accepted by the University of Chicago for the author's Ph.D. Degree, seeks to correct these misinterpretations and examines the metaphysical foundations of Hindu political thought. Dealing in his first chapter with the historical background, which is a factual analysis of the early political institutions—monarchical and republican—the author undertakes in his second and third chapters of the book a searching analysis of concepts like Danda, Artha and Dharma.

The Arthasastra has deservedly received an elaborate treatment. A vehement denunciation of the view that the Arthasastra is a historical manual of the Mauryan administration (p. 63) is

followed by a repudiation of the claims that Kautilya conceived politics as an end in itself (p. 72) and that he raised politics to the position of an independent science (p. 73). However, the author has uncritically adopted the familiar view of Jayaswal and Jacobi regarding the date and authenticity of the Arthasastra, a view seriously challenged at present.

The concept of Dharma receives a careful examination, and the author disputes the identification of Dharma with religion (pp. 87-8) and criticises the claim that in ancient India Dharma signified the sovereignity of Law (p. 137). Nor does he accept the exaggerated view that the Buddhist conception of the "wheel of Dharma" embodies the germs of political imperialism (p. 94) or that a cosmic Dharma operates as Natural Law (pp. 134-6). His approach, however, is not merely negative. He examines the metaphysical foundations of Dharma and shows how it is the most comprehensive concept in the entire history of Hindu thought constituting the norm of action for the rulers and the ruled alike. Asoka's ideal of Buddhist Dharma is fully expounded. He rejects the suggestion of certain writers that it was none other than Hindu Dharma. The author's assessment of the importance of the Bhagavad Gita in the sphere of political thought is marked by discrimination and moderation. He shows that the interpretations imported into the Gita by giants like Tilak, Aurobindo and Gandhi are at best half-truths (pp. 125-9). In fact the greatness of the Bhagavad Gita lies elsewhere than in the sphere of political thought.

The author's last two chapters are devoted to an analysis of the Hindu ideas of kingship. Examining the various legends regarding the origin of kingship, he lays ultimately a great stress on the so-called 'Great Elect' (Mahasamanta) story put into the Buddha's mouth. Though he does not read into it the formulation of the consensual theory, as does Dr. Basham in his "The Wonder that was India", p. 82, Dr. Varma himself is inclined to overrate its importance. For one thing this Dialogue of the Buddha did not describe in detail the nature of Mahasamanta. Nor was it followed up by later Buddhist tradition.

While discussing the theory of kingship in Ancient India he examines the doctrine of Karma and its political implications. His defence of the doctrine of Karma, in spite of the high authori-

ties quoted in his support, is not convincing. It seems difficult to agree with him that 'the belief in the autonomy of the self prevents it from degenerating into a philosophy of fatalism." (p. 162), In actual practice the belief in Karma has more often than not encouraged fatalism. Nor is the author's statement acceptable that "The law of Karma is highly democratic, to the extent that it rejects Hebraic or Calvinistic idea of special election or selection." (p. 213).

The book does not profess to furnish a compherensive treatment of the philosophical basis of Hindu political thought; it concerns itself with only "some of the dominant aspects of Hindu political thought from the Ṛigveda to the Manusmriti." Subject to this limit, the author has fulfilled in a commendable measure his aim of subjecting the former pseudo-modernistic methodology to a scientific criticism and has provided a necessary corrective to sentimental and ill-balanced assessments. Bibliography is a desideratum. The Index is neither complete nor analytical. Misprints are numerous.

K. K. PILLAY.

Select Contents of Periodicals

I. *The Adyar Library Bulletin,* Vol. XVIII, Part 3-4, December 1954, Madras.

1. *The Theory of Meaning according to Buddhist Logicians,* by K. Kunjunni Raja.

II. *The Aryan Path,* Vol. XXVI, January 1955, No. 1, Bombay.

1. *The Fundamentals of Jainism* by Prithvi Raj Jain.

III. *Bharatiya Vidya,* Vol. XV, No. 1, 1954, Bombay.

1. *Two sculptures (of Parvati as Sabarakanya) from Western India,* by M. R. Majumdar.
2. *Gujarat as Known to Mediaeval Europe,* by Dr. L. Sternbach.

IV. *Bihar Research Society, Journal of the,* Vol. XL, Part 3, September 1954, Patna.

1. *Vaisravite Gleanings from the Mediaeval Inscriptions of Marwar,* by R. C. Agrawala.
2. *Superstition and Politics in the Arthasastra of Kautilya,* by Ram Sharan Sharma.
3. *The Abhiras, Their Antiquity, History and Culture,* by Buddha Prakash.
4. *An Anti-British Plot in Bihar in* 1845-46, by Kalikinkar Datta.
5. *The King in the Kautilyan State,* by B. P. Sinha.

V. *History and Political Science Journal,* Vol. II, No. 2, Agra.

1. *An Introduction to the Study of Indo-Islamic Polity,* by H. N. Sinha.
2. *The Date of Akbar's Birth,* by A. L. Srivastava.
3. *The Fall of Mauryan Empire,* by N. S. Varma.

VI. *Indian Historical Quarterly,* Vol. XXX, No. 3, September, 1954, Calcutta.

1. *New Facts about the Senas,* by D. C. Sircar.

2. *The Kusana Invasion of India under Kumaragupta,* by Buddha Prakash.
3. *Fortifications of Cities in Ancient India,* by Udai Narain Roy.
4. *Apabhramsa and Post-Apabhramsa Features in the Early Prakrits,* by S. N. Ghosal.
5. *The Satavahana Kings Hala and Sati,* by Sant Lal Katare.

VII. *Oriental Institute, Journal of the,* Vol. IV. September, 1954, No. 1, Baroda.

1. *The Civilisation of Raksasas in Ramayana,* by Dr. S. N. Vyas.
2. *Dr. H. Jacobi's Introduction to the Bhaviśattakaha,* by S. N. Ghosal.
3. *Vikramaditya-Saga-I,* by Dr. U. P. Shah.
4. *Excavation at Timbarva,* by R. N. Mehta.

VIII. *Tamil Culture,* Vol. IV. No. 1, January, 1955.

1. *A Sculptor's Paradise in South India Mamallipuram,* by Leop. Bazou, S. J.
2. *The Present State of Dravidian Philology,* by Dr. Kamil Zvelebil.

IX. *University of Bombay, Journal of the,* Vol. XXIII, Part 2.

1. *Hymns to Indra in Mandala X,* by H. D. Velankar.
2. *Badarayana's Conception of Brahman,* by P. M. Modi.
3. *Some Unknown Senses of Plural Number as Shown by Panini,* by R. S. Bhattacharya.
4. *The Order of the 'Duryodhana' Plays of Bhasa,* by S. A. Dange.